Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

MSA–FOA telegram files, lot W 130, “Bonn Tousfo”: Telegram

No. 763
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Foreign Operations Administration¹

confidential

Bonn, January 6, 1954—7 p.m.

Tousfo 457. References: (A) Usfoto 450, repeated Berlin 363, (B) Usfoto 471, repeated Berlin 385, (C) Tousfo 447, (D) Usfoto 447, repeated Berlin 362, (E) Deptel 1859, repeated Berlin 382.²

1. Reference telegram (A) and immediately preceding cables suggest East German food operation is now regarded as economic aid requiring usual justification (although reference telegram B implies less stringent criteria). In our view this operation, ever since July inception, has been psychological warfare (and also surplus food disposal) program which never had normal economic justification and was not devised primarily for benefit East or West Germans. Hence, usual economic criteria not applicable. Examination of cables commencing July 1, 1953, with Deptel 5 repeated Berlin 2 and Deptel 20 repeated Berlin 4,³ leaves no doubt program had this character up to Usfoto 422 on 8 December.⁴ You will note vigor with which we were ordered to assure dramatic use of $15 million food with maximum publicity, and also pressure exerted to these ends by US press and Congress. Present distribution plan devised in this atmosphere because we believed and so advised Department, that after highly dramatized performance July–September US would not only be acutely embarrassed but its prestige would suffer very serious setback if advertised program faded out halfway to goal. Soviets took heavy beating during Berlin distribution and will repay it with interest at first opportunity not only in Germany but elsewhere.

2. It is HICOG’s opinion that:

(a) There is no justification for East German food program as ordinary FOA economic aid program and if it were now considered to depend on such justification it should be discontinued as rapidly as we can disengage ourselves from our commitments. Before reaching such decision, possible press and Congressional reaction should be considered.

(b) As psychological warfare program we cannot hope to equal last summer’s tremendous success but we may still win substantial credit by seizing appropriate opportunities to aid East Germans under circumstances where they will know source of aid. Publicity is not essential element since our credit with East Germans is established by deeds not words and knowledge of these automatically spreads to West. Indeed excessive publicity may be disastrous by causing Soviets to block existing flow of food packages from Federal Republic to Soviet Zone; this and related danger of interrupting West Zone charitable activities in East Zone is so serious that Federal Republic charitable associations will have nothing to do with our various programs. Any program we undertake will, from point of view of East German need, be far less important than existing German programs.

3. Some comments and inquiries reference telegram (A) appear to us inconsistent with established facts and if program proceeds further it seems essential we both operate on common understanding of such facts.

(a) First sentence paragraph 3 re assuring German contributions to our program in order to maintain and foster maximum German interest. We must emphasize that West Germans individually and officially are far more interested than us in supporting East German relatives, friends, political persecutees, institutions, etc. While government and many Germans delighted our assistance, our program is US, not German, program. Original Adenauer request stimulated by us as followup to 17 June and made by him during election campaign. Operation relatively far less important than their own programs, which represent some real strain on their available resources. We can enlist German interest and support for our program only if it supplements theirs, not if it competes and draws away money. As you know, our program already unpopular with organized charities because they feel its political character endangers their institutions, apparatus, and work in East, and government will certainly not sacrifice their essential cooperation in activities described in October 27 report.⁵

(b) Questions paragraph (2) (D) re German agency and government contributions, and specifically contributions to mailing first three million and additional packages. Of two to eight million packages mailed per month, large number are purely private. Remainder are from agencies, partly own programs, and partly in cooperation with government which contributes to cost of poster campaign, some part of mailing and probably some part of organization. We can get facts so far as known to government but hesitate to do so until we know proposed use.…

(c) For same reason we are much concerned with statement paragraph 3 that October 27 report will be made “appropriately” available. We hope someone in authority appreciates dynamite in this report if its many references to system become known.

(d) Supplemental assistance mentioned paragraph (2) (C) is from our program. See reference telegram (C).

4. Re medicine and medical care, reference telegrams (D) and (C) paragraphs I (B), IV and V. We long since authorized such use by Germans, believing you not only authorized but originally suggested it. We can, of course, cancel medical items without serious repercussions but from standpoint East German need no actual aid, this is highly desirable item and involves comparatively little money. We urge authorization.

5. Re Berlin children’s clothing program reference telegram (E).

(a) Further consideration depends on clarification basic policy per preceding paragraphs and situation which develops after four power conference. Greatest need for clothing will then have passed due to end of winter and atmosphere might be so delicate it would be unwise to start new Berlin action for some time.

(b) We doubt German financial participation since they do not particularly seek this program and it would impair their ability to further basic German programs. Administrative services were to be provided by Berlin city administration as in Berlin food distribution.

Can’t wholly eliminate open end aspect of program since we never know how many East Germans will come. Best guarantee against fraud is East German need.

(c) Re paragraph (3), impact program on DM West-East exchange rate would depend almost entirely on how Berlin Central Bank introduced eastmarks into open market.

Bank has in past been inclined favor keeping value eastmarks up, and probably would take no action, such as dumping, to decrease their value in terms westmarks. Likelihood that any bank decision not to introduce eastmarks into open market would result in significant appreciation in value of eastmarks considered slight. Therefore, appears to us DM West-East exchange rate would remain reasonably steady throughout operation, unless affected by other factors.

Conant

1. Repeated to Berlin.
2. None printed; all dealt with various aspects of implementing the relief programs for residents of the German Democratic Republic. (MSA–FOA telegram files, lot W 131, “Bonn Usfoto” for references A, B, and D; MSA–FOA telegram files, lot W 130, “Bonn Tousfo” for reference C; Department of State file 862B.49/12–953 for reference E)
3. See footnote 2, Document 720.
4. Usfoto 422 estimated that $4 million of the original $15 million allotment still remained to be used in the current food relief program and discussed ways to expend it. (MSA–FOA telegram files, lot W 131, “Bonn Usfoto”)
5. Reference is to a brief history of the food relief program for the German Democratic Republic from July 1 until Oct. 9, 1953. Nineteen pages in length, it was prepared by the staff of HICOG in Bonn and was transmitted in despatch 1216 from Bonn, Nov. 3. (862B.49/11–353)