Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

762B.00/11–1853: Telegram

No. 762
The Director of the Berlin Element, HICOG (Lyon) to the Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, at Bonn¹

confidential

Berlin, November 18, 1953—3 p.m.

644. From EAD. Reference Berlin’s telegram sent Bonn 643 repeated Department 561.²

Reference telegram expressed opinion June 17 repetition at present unlikely result from implementation current SED policy of liquidating potential resistance and opposition in GDR although SED now entering period when will face test of this policy. This winter, because of probable internal economic difficulties, balance between political coercion and economic concession will become extremely delicate. Possibility exists that, in such situation, external political developments can upset balance, giving rise to unrest and political action similar June 17.

June 17 uprisings caused East Germans take new lease on life and encouraged them believe liberation from Communist rule might be achieved. Fact uprising quickly quelled by Soviets without sacrificing Grotewohl–Ulbricht Government was discouraging. But initiative seized by West on unity issue with series notes inviting Soviets to Lugano kept hopes East Germans alive. While not much direct evidence available, we strongly suspect, basis subjective analysis, that negative Soviet position on four-power German conference has had depressing effect on East Germans.

Moreover, if Bermuda conference leads to early ratification EDC or consummation some other arrangements to grant Federal Republic full sovereignty and green light given for establishment West German defense forces, believe this action, plus dire Soviet predictions of consequences, will depress East Germans and may make them desperate. Instead of seeing their June 17 uprising and sacrifices leading to unification and liberation from Communist oppression they may become convinced status quo of split Germany becoming solidified, and that their last chance for liberation through peaceful unification has disappeared.

We believe one of two things might result from such a development.

(1) Either East Germans, sparked by more irresponsible minority elements who came to light June 17, will resort to political act of desperation in hope it will force Soviets to negotiate or, failing this, oblige West come to their aid militarily; or

(2) They will become more resigned to making their peace with an increasingly more sovereign and independent Communist-dominated GDR Government, more thoroughly integrated as part of Soviet orbit.

While, subjectively, we can only regard reaction (1) above as a possibility and not probability (due improved capabilities East German police handle new disorders, demonstrations, strikes, etc.), we believe atmosphere such that it would be prudent for US Government give thought now as to what policy and actions its various agencies should follow in the event of such a development. Should reaction to developments be along lines described in (2) above, this too poses problem, although of different nature, as to what policies and action US Government should pursue.³

Lyon

1. Repeated to Washington, London, Paris, and Moscow; the source text is the copy in Department of State files.
2. This telegram, dated Nov. 18, reported that the GDR governmental policy of political coercion and economic concessions was continuing successfully, but that its future success depended upon the supply of consumer necessities. (762B.00/11–1853)
3. At the time that this telegram was transmitted, NSC 174, “United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe,” Dec. 13, 1953, was in its final stages of preparation.