Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

862B.49/7–3153: Telegram

No. 739
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Bonn, July 31, 1953—6 p.m.

476. Reference: (a) Deptel 385 to Bonn repeated Berlin 64.¹ (b) Deptel 369 to Bonn repeated Berlin 58.² (c) Bonn’s telegram 465 to Department repeated Berlin 83.³

In considering following comments on offer of medical equipment to East Germans, reference (a), you should also consider suggested program of hospitality, entertainment, and distribution of printed material, second paragraph reference (b), and my yesterday’s cable, reference (c).

I assume all proposals listed above are part of suggested pattern of psychological warfare strategy and should be considered as a whole. All of us here recognize the importance of continued imaginative psychological strategy, and agree that maximum psychological benefits should be derived from entire project. In this connection it is our feeling that best possible propaganda is food itself and fact that it is being supplied to and consumed by hungry East Germans. It is imperative, therefore, that food be kept in constant supply to those persons who need it.

Recognizing that supply of food cannot be maintained if Semenov decides or is forced into taking draconic counter-measures to prohibit delivery, it is imperative that our course not be made one which constitutes for him unbearable provocation.

At present we are engaged in a highly successful operation as part of overall psychological strategy. Food from West Berlin is being distributed to inhabitants of East sector and East zone. There is no doubt in the mind of any German that this operation is possible and will continue because of US initiative and supplies. We feel that if there were any attempt to over-emphasize or over-publicize American direct participation in this project its present success would be endangered in one or more of following ways:

(a) Overt American connection could provoke Soviets to seizures of food, reprisals against East German recipients, etc.;

(b) East and West Germans would react against obvious propaganda, to which they are hyper-sensitive;

(c) Semenov could make counter propaganda as he has attempted in recent note to me,⁴ and might even use excuse to cut Berlin in half or interfere in shipping supplies from Federal Republic into Berlin.

Keeping in mind that our best propaganda weapons are successful deeds rather than words, we judge that further offer of any type, reference (a), at this time, which is almost certain to be refused, would be branded as pure propaganda and be resented by Germans, both East and West. There has been no clear need for such assistance demonstrated in East Germany and certainly no request for such assistance or concern about its lack has been voiced by Federal Republic. Considering present situation between AHC and Semenov and his apparent attitude about food distribution, no one would believe that our offer of medical equipment had any chance of being accepted and therefore its refusal most certainly could not be a successful part of our psychological campaign.

In addition, and most important, publicity about such an offer and its refusal would most certainly detract from present successful continuing propaganda about food distribution.

In a High Commission meeting this p.m.⁵ I intend to suggest once more that three High Commissioners approach Soviet authorities once again on elimination of inter-zonal passes. Such proposal to Semenov will embarrass him considerably if he, as is almost certain, is forced to turn it down. If, unexpectedly, he is authorized to accept proposal and inter-zonal passes are indeed removed, possibilities of food distribution to East Germans directly from territory of Federal Republic would become reality and present food program would achieve greater dimensions than ever.

Conant

1. Dated July 31, telegram 385 explored the possibility of broadening the food parcel program to include medical supplies as well. (862B.55/7–3053)
2. See footnote 2, Document 737.
3. Document 737.
4. Reference is to Semyenov’s note of July 21 concerning the food relief program, transmitted in telegram 98 from Berlin, July 22. (762.00221/7–2253)
5. No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.