Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

MSA–FOA telegram files, lot W–130, “Bonn Tomus”: Telegram

No. 740
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Mutual Security Agency

secret

Bonn, August 2, 1953—11 a.m.

Tomus 81. For Stassen from Harris. I have just returned from a three-day visit to Berlin where I observed the food distribution program. This important project has already bettered our position in the cold war.

A vast number of persons, not only from the Eastern sector of Berlin but from deep in the Eastern Zone, have appeared in person to apply for food. At four distribution centers I saw between 8,000 and 15,000 people lined up 10 to 12 abreast awaiting their turn. One thing the Soviets have taught the East Germans successfully and that is to wait in line. Many had to remain from 8 to 14 hours and some were put up overnight because they could not be served on the day of their arrival. The statistics, however, do not even paint the bare bones of what is happening in Berlin.

No matter where one turns in Berlin one sees the streets swarming with miserably dressed people carrying suitcases, crates, haversacks and paper boxes filled with food. As late as 1 or 2 in the morning groups heavily laden with food are on the streets of West Berlin waiting transportation back.

However, the mechanical problems of speeding up distribution to reduce the number of waiting hours and service more people is well on the way to being solved and, provided the number of people does not continue to increase, perhaps will disappear by early next week.

One of the dangers in this scheme has been, and remains, the possibility of disorder or riots caused by large congregations impatient after long periods of waiting. This danger has been forcefully brought home to the Senat officials by the officers of the Berlin element and adequate steps appear to be planned to cope with it.

There are, of course, not only difficult mechanical problems but great built-in risks in a venture of this sort. The Soviets might have sealed off the border or even blockaded Berlin. They could still take such action. In addition they could at any time cut off private German gift parcels currently being sent through the Protestant and Catholic Churches—or they could crack down on those church organizations in East Germany. The defection from their leadership by so many people is a threat to their control of the populace of the Eastern Zone, and they must be giving serious consideration to possible countermeasures. (Have just heard that issuance rail tickets from zone to Berlin sharply curtailed).¹

I talked with many of the East Zoners. They are aware of the American origin of the food and are grateful for our assistance. Of far greater importance than any propaganda value that can be derived from further publicity that the food comes, directly or indirectly, from the US is the fact that the Soviet state has again been successfully defied by the East Germans. The June 17 uprising was the first challenge by the people. It not only sharply divided the people from their Communist rulers and pitted the masses against the rulers, but it paralyzed (at least temporarily) the ability of the state to function, to lead and to command the people. The food distribution program in West Berlin is the first direct move by the West which has had the same result. Most of these people welcomed the opportunity again to defy their rulers by the mere act of going to West Berlin. Many of them came from deep within the zone.

The extent to which this has taken hold can best be illustrated by reports from some of the East Zoners. One said the men in his plant, 300 in number, did not at first believe it possible that food would be distributed free and so sent him as a delegate to test the story. Upon his return he assured us the entire plant will shut down for a day so that all can go to West Berlin. Some rail lines in East Germany are reported to be jammed with people attempting to get to Berlin. Local officials, under instructions to keep the people back, often are willfully disobeying their instructions. Those who do obey such instructions will be marked forever as having attempted to keep food from the hungry.

Not only has the prestige of the Zone Government deteriorated but their usual repressive tactics have failed to control their subjects. This will be a permanent effect upon the mass of East Zoners and upon their relationship with their Communist masters.

Moreover, the program has given the East Germans contact with the West and has made it once more a real, vital force in their lives. They know that the West exists, thinks about them and hopes some day that the East will be free. To people, many of whom have not seen the West for many years, this physical contact is all important.

They have seen West Berlin and what we have done there. Hungry people have seen food as they have not seen it for many years. One man said he had not been able to buy a pair of shoes for several years and was amazed when he saw the stores filled with the goods.

This picture of what the West has done will be spread throughout the East Zone and will penetrate into other Satellite states. The story will be carried by the most effective instrument of propaganda—word of mouth—throughout the East Zone and into the Satellite countries as well. In my judgment the full propaganda value of this project has been obtained and would be diluted if we were to launch a blatant propaganda campaign to ram home the American role in this project. These people “know” where the food comes from. They are deeply impressed by the receipt of free food and will contrast it with their experience in their own Zone where they are subject to a merciless barrage of propaganda and still go hungry. This is a new, refreshing experience in their lives which may become less potent an influence if our zealousness to propagandize should lead them to believe we are as anxious as their own rulers to fight a propaganda war over their fate. Moreover, an intensified US policy campaign would give the Russians some basis for their contention that the program is motivated for propaganda purposes. The most effective answer we have to the Russians lies is in the food itself. It is distressing that experienced American newspapermen in West Berlin have failed to see this point, but it is nonetheless true. It would be tragic if, at this moment of success we stooped to obtain more glory and thereby tarnished our good deeds.

I believe we should seek to retain the initiative on those matters where our actions emphasize the contrast between our objectives and our reactions and those of the Soviets. For example, I hope that we accept Grotewohl’s challenge and unblock the East German funds ($1.5 million)² in the US provided the funds are used solely for food for the East Germans. The request itself acknowledges the need and our quick favorable action—again I would hope without excessive fanfare—would demonstrate our concern for the welfare of the people and our determination to overcome obstacles in order to get food to them.

Conant

1. On Aug. 1, the GDR Minister of the Interior announced that, with a few exceptions, travel by rail within Berlin and between Berlin and the Soviet Zone was prohibited. For text of the announcement, see Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 17, 1953, p. 209.
2. On Aug. 4, Conant addressed to Semyenov a letter in which the offer to unblock the funds of the Deutsche Notenbank was made. For text of this letter, see Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 17, 1953, p. 210. The funds were originally blocked by the Department of the Treasury on Mar. 7, 1952, on the grounds that they were being used to support the North Korean war effort.