Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

862B.49/7–3053: Telegram

No. 737
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Bonn, July 30, 1953—7 p.m.

465. Reference: (a) your telegram 369, repeated Berlin 58, July 30, 1953,² (b) your telegram 373, repeated Berlin 59, July 30, 1953.³

I am disturbed by apparent difference in our understanding of agreed food program policy and that implied by reference (a). While origin of food program was an operation governed by psychological strategy we have been assuming agreement that US course which implied strictly humanitarian motives and avoided blatant propaganda would produce best results. I expressed this view in my telegram 290, repeated Berlin 54, July 18, secret,⁴ recommending against second note to Soviets and had understood question was reviewed and decided at that time at highest level. Several other cables from Department have indicated agreement that our purpose is to get food to the East Germans and avoid publicity which either might interfere or make food program appear primarily to have propaganda purpose.

I repeat following message from Lyon Berlin because it expresses my own views so well.

“While we have not yet received Shackford’s story or Scripps-Howard editorial I believe course we have been pursuing of leaving distribution of food entirely in German hands is correct one. In my opinion West Berlin food distribution project now in progress has represented (and promises to continue to do so) impressive political propaganda victory over Communists, and major contributing factor in this is that fact of US participation in project has remained relatively in background. All previous communications from HICOM and Department have shown full awareness of this aspect of situation.

Seeing as I have the pitiful East Germans and East Berliners who have flocked to Berlin last three days makes one realize that most important factor in operation is to get food to these Germans. Approximately half a million packages have so far been delivered, so from that point of view the operation has been successful. I repeat what I have said before—fact that operation was entirely German may have been sufficiently face-saving for the Soviets not to interfere with recipients or confiscate food which they probably would have felt forced to do had we over-publicized our role. We had considered providing movies, pamphlets, to recipients but until now have felt it unwise to attempt anything which might jeopardize primary objective.

It will be recalled that both the French and British authorities have had considerable misgivings about this food operation. Many German officials share their anxiety and I consider that in our exposed position to over-play propaganda side would be unwise. I fear that we may receive more derogatory press articles but everybody including East Germans realize that it was American gift of food which made food distribution possible and I repeat by following course we have, food has been reaching East Germans.

In summary I feel that to date we have reaped maximum advantages from situation which could possibly have been expected. To reverse our previous policy of refraining from overt propaganda efforts and simply letting obvious facts of situation regarding US role speak for themselves might give rise, in my view, to following undesirable risks:

(1) Alienating good will of British and French Allies and West Berliners, who have shown appreciation of American modesty to date.

(2) Appearing to lend truth to Communist charge that whole program is here American propaganda trick rather than sincere humanitarian effort alleviate human suffering.

(3) Provoking Communists into effective action to bring halt to distribution operations—this would be particularly unfortunate since our observations have clearly indicated that East Germans genuinely eager obtain West Berlin food packages, and they would be bitterly resentful if they felt vigorous US obtrusion into picture had been responsible for termination of program.

(4) Impairing development of feeling of all-German solidarity (which we consider entirely healthy) resulting from fact West Germans and Berliners rather than Americans are running program.”

Lyon adds Timberman concurs completely. Widest possible use is made of RIAS. While success of program here presently exceeds anything we could have anticipated and publicity which over-emphasizes US part will be harmful and perhaps dangerous, I realize you have special problems with US press. Perhaps statement along following line by Secretary might help solve this:

“The food now being distributed in West Berlin to Germans from East Berlin and the Soviet Zone is from food stocks immediately available there, owned by the German Federal Republic. These stocks will be replenished by shipments from Western Germany. This can be done because the American food now arriving in West German ports is being delivered to the German Federal Republic. The German people both in the East and in the West are well aware that this whole program has been made possible by the gift of food from the American people offered by President Eisenhower. The President’s offer and the arrival of American food has been widely and favorably publicized in Germany.”

Conant

1. Repeated to Berlin.
2. Telegram 369 reported that the Scripps-Howard papers of July 28 carried an editorial criticizing U.S. officials in Berlin for their reluctance to emphasize U.S. involvement in the food program, and encouraged HICOG officials to step up their propaganda activities. (862B.49/7–2953)
3. Telegram 373 reported that a news story by Roland H. Shackford claimed that a decision had been taken in Washington to pretend that the United States was not involved in the food parcel program. Noting that Shackford was “normally reasonable” and that the Scripps-Howard papers were “strong supporters of Administration,” the Department, in order to refute this claim, advised HICOG not to deny the source of the food. (862B.49/7–295–3)
4. Document 733.