Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 2

862B.49/7–1853: Telegram

No. 733
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Department of State¹

secret
niact

Bonn, July 18, 1953—4 p.m.

290. Limited distribution. To Secretary and Riddleberger from Conant. Re Deptels 224 and 225 sent Bonn July 17 repeated Berlin 44 and 45, Moscow 53 and 54.²

I strongly doubt the advisability of new note proposed in paragraph 2 reference cable although I recognize that there may be broad considerations not fully known to us here.

So far as reaction in Western Germany is concerned, I should advise unhesitatingly against the note. Adverse reaction to first note appeared not only in SPD press as expected but to some extent among conservative press, e.g. “Food, yes. Propaganda, no.” I think reaction to second note at this time would be almost universal that it is propaganda. Since Soviets are almost certain to reject our offer press will argue it could have had no purpose except propaganda.

As against this, actions now under way, e.g. arrival of US food and actual increase of deliveries to Eastern Sector and Eastern Zone population, with muted publicity, will make excellent impact on Western German public. Very fact we do not attempt propaganda drum-beating will be in itself favorably received.

In my view this operation to date has been successful and there are reasonable chances of further success. If, however, continued publicity and obvious propaganda moves are continued, disastrous condition can develop from both psychological and humanitarian points of view. Political and psychological objectives will become even more obvious and, the more obvious, the less effective they become. Furthermore, severe Soviet reaction on current parcels shipped through private organizations might result. If so, we would have large stocks of American food sitting uselessly in Germany, and stoppage of parcels to hungry people. This would occur in middle of Adenauer’s re-election campaign.

As matter of fact, if Reuter’s judgment correct, we can probably publicize rather heavily the Berlin operation described our 280 July 17 (repeated Berlin 52, Moscow 21).³ While no firm campaign can be worked out except as operation develops, I can picture RIAS inviting East Zone population who visit Berlin to come across sector border and get food package, and VOA broadcasting how many food packages picked up. If Soviet Zone authorities confiscate packages, that will also make excellent publicity. US participation need not be continually advertised. This chance of publicity does not, of course, apply at present to charitable organization shipments on which we must maintain complete silence.

I realize Western German reaction is perhaps less important but doubt this note will constitute great gain either in Eastern Germany or satellites. Eastern Germany will be most interested in actual receipt of food and any Soviet action which keeps it out. I do not think they will react strongly to note and rejection, but are more likely to react to possible RIAS and VOA broadcasts suggested above. So far as satellites concerned, I would not have thought note and rejection would make much impression on them nor that they would be greatly interested whether Germans get more food or not. Germans are still enemies to most of them.

To extent I can judge from general attitude our British and French associates here, additional note will be considered as purely propaganda and as “needling” at a time when they think calm is desired.

As against foregoing, I recognize note would undoubtedly somewhat embarrass Soviets and tend keep them off balance, and conceivably impede them in dealing with German problem. The importance of such a consideration is difficult for us to assess in Germany.

If final decision is to send note, I believe I should approach Semenov with proposal for technicians meeting (paragraph 3, first reference cable) before Soviets have chance to reject note. This would require prior advice from Moscow to delivery time of note.⁴

In addition, suggest amendment in paragraph 2 of note, as follows: “US requests Government USSR to reconsider the possibility of developing practical methods.”

Conant

1. Repeated to Berlin and Moscow.
2. Telegram 224, supra. Regarding telegram 225, see footnote 2, supra.
3. Telegram 280 reported that Thedieck, the State Secretary in the Ministry of All-Germany Affairs, had been appointed coordinator for the food program in the German Government; that four distribution plans were under study in the Federal Government; that HICOG and the German Government needed to know the status of food procurement and shipment; and that publicity concerning the food program had to be phrased in such a manner as to leave the impression that the program was a German, and not primarily an American, undertaking. (862B.49/7–1753)
4. The question of sending a second note to the Soviet Government remained under consideration in the Department of State for the remainder of the month. On Aug. 4, the Department sent to Bonn in telegram 441 a revised draft note. For a description of this note and for an account of its disposition, see footnote 1, Document 742.