762.022/11–2053
No. 657
The Secretary of
State to the United States High Commissioner for Germany
(Conant), at
Bonn1
personal
Dear Jim: I am writing with respect to the messages of November 13 and 192…
This letter is to let you know of my continuing concern over indications that Chancellor Adenauer is more reconciled to a slower schedule for the settlement of the Saar issue, and hence the EDC, than he was prior to the German elections. As we have cabled you, we strongly believe that the greatest remaining obstacle to ratification and entry into effect of the EDC is the Saar. While we do not recognize that there is a legal link between the Saar and the EDC, as a practical matter they are linked. We feel it is essential for Adenauer to go to the extreme limit to reach agreement with the French, and we believe Germany is in a better position politically to make reasonable concessions than are the French. Ambassador Krekeler called on Bedell Smith Wednesday and during the course of their talk this subject was discussed.3 Bedell stated our views forcefully, particularly along the lines that the whole future of Europe is at stake and that the Germans should give on the Saar until it hurts. I hope you will get this point across to the Chancellor and use every influence at your disposal in pressing the Germans toward a settlement.
I am even more deeply disturbed over your impression that the Chancellor is developing doubts about EDC ratification and is thinking over the possibility of some US–UK–German agreement as an alternative to the EDC. In this connection, I read with great interest your letter of November 13, 1953, and your telegram 1687 reporting [Page 1475] the call you and General Gruenther made on the Chancellor.4
The policy of the United States with respect to Europe is, of course, based on the imperative necessity of a Franco-German unity as the only foundation for the development of any real strength in Europe. If France and Germany cannot be woven together in a European fabric of mutual understanding and common endeavor, not only will there be no real strength in Europe, but the resources which the United States in its own enlightened self-interest has been pouring into Europe will be wasted and will not serve the long-term purpose for which they were appropriated. Our policy with respect to Europe does not, therefore, involve a choice between France or Germany. It is based on France and Germany. Bedell also made this point entirely clear to Krekeler on Wednesday.
The Congress, in its original and subsequent legislation covering aid programs for Europe, has made clear that European unity—the hard core of which is a French-German understanding—is an essential objective. In the Richards amendment to the Fiscal Year 1954 foreign aid legislation, the Congress made the entry into effect of the EDC a statutory basis for military aid. Therefore, if the EDC fails to enter into effect early in the coming year, it is difficult to believe there will be adequate congressional support for the continuation of our program to build up the defensive strength of Europe. Insofar as the United States is concerned, we are convinced there can be no adequate security arrangements for the defense of Europe which are not based on full and effective Franco-German cooperation in the military and related fields, and we know of no alternative to EDC which would provide a basis for such cooperation and at the same time be acceptable to France and Germany. Certainly, the United States is not now considering alternatives, and continues to believe most firmly that the EDC, presumably to be followed by the EPC, provides the only practical basis for tying Germany in solidly with the West in a framework of effective Franco-German cooperation.
I have the impression that neither the French nor the Germans realize fully what is now at stake in terms of our own future policy toward Europe. Elements in the French Government probably believe we shall continue programs of military aid and support regardless [Page 1476] of whether the EDC is ratified early next year or not. This does not seem to me to correspond with the facts.
Similarly, elements in Germany may believe that we shall support a German national army in NATO if EDC does not come into effect. Undoubtedly, there would be support in this country and elsewhere for such a solution. For my part, however, I personally sympathize with your opposition to the constitution of a German national army. If any such alternative should be seriously considered at a later date, I would certainly want you to have an opportunity to present your views here.
I would hope, therefore, that in your talks with Adenauer you will, as you deem most appropriate, impress upon him that we have reached a decisive moment in history. The foundation of our present European policy is that real strength and stability and effective defense in Europe depend on the development of an organic unity which includes France and Germany. If the Chancellor harbors any idea that effective defense or real stability can be built on Germany alone, bypassing France, he is laboring under a disastrous illusion. We cannot, of course, force either of these countries to join with the other, but if they cannot do so we will have to reassess our own interests and policies in the light of those circumstances. In the self-interest of Germany, the Chancellor should fully understand our position and do everything he conceivably can to ensure early agreement on the Saar in order to remove the one remaining obstacle.
As I said above, I believe it essential that the Germans approach this problem with a maximum of understanding and conciliation insofar as the French are concerned. We have, of course, also been making clear to the French that we have now reached the most critical point in post-war history and that we expect them not to be unreasonable in their approach to the Saar problem. We will have the opportunity to impress this again on the French both at Bermuda and later in Paris at the North Atlantic Council meeting, which we will most certainly do. At the same time, we will count on you to get our views across to the Germans in the most effective manner possible.
It has occurred to me that it might be useful for me to send a personal message to the Chancellor based on some of the above thoughts. Accordingly, I am enclosing such a letter to him5 which, if you perceive no objection, you might deliver to him, and use this occasion to set forth our position regarding Germany and Europe as I have outlined it.
Sincerely yours,
- Drafted by MacArthur.↩
- For the November 13 message, see Document 231; the November 19 message has not been found.↩
- For a memorandum of Smith’s conversation with Krekeler on Nov. 18, see Document 232.↩
- Telegram 1687 reported on General Gruenther’s first official visit to Bonn during which the Germans had expressed their disappointment at the lack of progress on the Saar. They had indicated that they believed the French were backing away from Europeanization and were only concerned with French economic hegemony in the Saar. (740.5/11–1653)↩
- No letter was attached to the source text. The text of this letter is printed infra.↩