Eisenhower Library, Dulles papers, “1951–1959”

No. 231
The United States High Commissioner for Germany (Conant) to the Secretary of State1

official eyes only
personal and private

Dear Foster: When I wrote you on October 282 that I believed there was “even a remote possibility” that the Chancellor, under the influence of the more nationalistic elements in his coalition, might be flirting with the idea of a national army, I was giving expression to only a vague suspicion. I am sorry to say that events which occurred yesterday, and of which you have heard through other channels, have now thoroughly alarmed me.3 It seems clear that the Chancellor is interested in exploring an alternative to EDC. This can only mean a national army, presumably within the framework of NATO and in close collaboration with the United States. I have also today learned that recently Herr Blank told one of our … men that he had three plans of organization, one for the present, one for EDC, if the treaties are ratified, and one for another alternative.

There can be no doubt that some American Army and Naval officers have been making statements to Blank and some German officers and politicians suggestive of something pretty close to a German-American military alliance while expressing disdain for the French. A little of this sort of talk will go a long way in the present mood in a country which today is feeling its oats. Indeed, I [Page 554] am distressed with the increasing tensions between France and Germany since I am convinced that there is no future for Western Europe unless these tensions can be diminished and European integration accomplished, however slowly.

I believe we must now face the possibility that the Chancellor has really changed his mind about a German national army and about the possibility of a solution of the Saar problem. Indeed, his realization of the difficulties he faces here with a solution of the Saar problem may have led him, step by step, to the conclusion that he must throw over EDC and temporarily, at least, EPC and the movement toward European integration. How he can hope to go down this new road and yet be known in history as the great statesman that brought about European integration, I fail to see. Of course, there is the possible hypothesis that he is still unchanged in his fundamental point of view and is merely anxious to test out the United States position in order to demonstrate to some of his colleagues that there is no real alternative to EDC.

Needless to say, I hope this second hypothesis is correct, for otherwise we are really in for great difficulties. Indeed, the difficulties would be so great that I would prefer to risk the defense of the free world to an emasculated NATO, rather than see the creation of a German national army. I take it our experience in Korea has shown the dangers involved if a nationalistic government has an independent army, even if it is only a small one and not prepared for a global war. Needless to say, the relation between the Bundes-republik and the East Zone is almost as explosive as between North and South Korea. I wish that some of our soldiers and Congressmen who have been talking here rather lightheartedly about a German national army would think over the analogy between Korea and Germany.

If I may venture a recommendation, it would seem to me highly important for the Chancellor to be told directly by the President that the United States would not be a party to arming a German national army. Furthermore, that the United States Government was convinced that a defense of Europe is only possible in the long run on the basis of good German-French relations and that a solution of the Saar problem is essential as the next step in forwarding these good relations. This is on the assumption that the United States policy is and will remain the policy of support of EDC, EPC and European integration. If there is any discussion of a reversal of this policy, may I repeat my request of my earlier letter, namely, that I be given a chance to come to Washington to argue the case against the formation of a German national army. I was somewhat [Page 555] disturbed by a recent cable (Deptel 1451, of November 64) expressing the hope that an amendment of the German constitution would permit “a direct defense contribution” if EDC failed.

In a later letter or cable, which could receive wider distribution than this letter, I may suggest certain statements which could be included in a radio speech I am to make on Wednesday the 25th. I believe that two ideas might well be coupled together at this time; namely, that American troops will remain here in force to defend a united Western Europe, and second, that a united Western Europe means primarily progressively bettering French-German relations.

May I conclude by expressing my opinion that outside of political circles public opinion in Germany is much less concerned with rearming the country than in regaining sovereignty. This is particularly true among the industrial people with whom I have been meeting in a number of cities recently. The removal of the industrial controls is a matter with which they are deeply concerned and, I think, quite rightly. Therefore, if the Saar problem could be solved in at least general outline before the first of the year, it might well be in order to consider the removal of most of the remaining occupation functions by action of the Allied High Commission. But this is a separate subject about which I may trouble you later.

With all good wishes.

Very sincerely yours,

Jim
  1. Handwritten notations on the source text indicate that it was seen by Secretary Dulles, Under Secretary Smith, MacArthur, Merchant, and Bowie.
  2. See Document 229.
  3. Neither the events nor the communication has been further identified.
  4. Not printed. (762A.3/10–1653)