Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199, “November 1953”
No. 232
Memorandum of Conversation, by the
Acting Director of the Office of German Affairs (Lewis)
Subject: Visit of Dr. Krekeler with Under Secretary Smith, 11:30 a.m., November 18, 1953.
- Participants: Under Secretary Smith
- Dr. Heinz L. Krekeler, Ambassador, Chargé d’Affaires of the Federal Republic of Germany
- Mr. Geoffrey W. Lewis, Acting Director, GER
Dr. Krekeler came to see the Under Secretary at his own request. He had just returned from a quick trip to Germany. He [Page 556] wanted to deliver certain messages from the Chancellor and discuss the situation he found in Germany.
Withdrawal of US Forces. Dr. Krekeler said the Chancellor was seriously concerned that the United States may be contemplating withdrawal of a large part of its forces and reliance instead on new weapons. The Chancellor greatly feared the effect on both the Russians and the other NATO members if this should be done.
General Smith stated emphatically that there was no thought of any such action. The United States fully appreciated the great importance of keeping its troop strength in Europe at about the present level. As evidence of this, General Smith told Dr. Krekeler that when the question had come up of the possible withdrawal from Trieste of our small garrison, the intention was not to bring these troops home but to station them elsewhere in Europe as an indication of our policy. With respect to new weapons, General Smith assured the Ambassador that before any fundamental change in US tactics or troop dispositions would be made on the basis of a changed situation brought about by the existence of these weapons, there would be full consultation with our Allies.
The Saar. Dr. Krekeler said the Chancellor was worried about the French attitude as reflected so far in his discussions with Francois-Poncet.1 He thought that a solution would demand true compromises and that while the Chancellor would accept a solution based on the Europeanization of the Saar, this must not be simply a new name for something resembling the present status. The Chancellor hoped that if need arose, the United States would be willing to take a hand in order to bring about a solution of the problem.
General Smith said that the United States stood ready to help in any way that it could. However, the larger issues at stake were so important that the Saar problem must not be allowed to stand in the way of working them out. Therefore, the Germans must be prepared to give on the issue of the Saar until it hurt. Both sides would have to make concessions which would be painful to them.
Progress in EDC Ratification. Dr. Krekeler said the Chancellor was greatly concerned at the slow pace of action by the French although he realized that nothing could be done until after their Presidential election. He was particularly troubled by the impression he had gained that the French people did not really desire an integrated Europe. As for ratification in Germany, a bill would be introduced from the floor in the Bundestag to amend the Basic Law so as to remove the constitutional issue which is now before [Page 557] the Constitutional Court. The Chancellor was sure that the Court would not act before this legislative action had been taken and that the bill would be passed since the Chancellor’s coalition commanded a two-thirds majority in both Houses. Dr. Krekeler asked if General Smith could give him any views as to the possibility of EDC ratification and as to the all-important question of timing.
General Smith stated that he was certain the French would ratify the EDC some time during the early part of 1954. He pointed out that the US Congress would meet on January 6 and would shortly thereafter take up the budget and the question of further aid to the European countries. The French were well aware that the sentiment in Congress was such that it would be extremely difficult to get our program for aid approved by the Congress if the French had not at least given definite indication by that time of their intention to ratify. General Smith then read to Dr. Krekeler a passage from a staff paper which he said he had set aside when it came to his desk for just this purpose.2 The passage emphasized that US policy toward Europe was founded on close Franco-German rapprochement.
The Bermuda Conference.3 Dr. Krekeler asked if the Under Secretary could give him any indication of what might come out of Bermuda, particularly with respect to matters which concern Germany.
General Smith said that it was still pretty unclear as to what would emerge. However, he felt sure there would be a reaffirmation of the fundamental support by the three Allies for the EDC. There might perhaps be a statement by the President that we intended to keep our troops in Europe for the foreseeable future. There would probably also be considerable progress in ironing out some of the differences of view among the Allies on questions in other parts of the world, for example, the Near East. General Smith assured Dr. Krekeler that the Chancellor would be kept fully informed on matters affecting Germany and he understood that the Chancellor did not want an observer at Bermuda.
Dr. Krekeler thanked the Under Secretary and said that the Chancellor would be greatly reassured by General Smith’s statements. The interview lasted about 40 minutes.
On the way out of the building Dr. Krekeler said to Mr. Lewis that he hoped we would not hesitate to seek information on the Saar problem, if we needed it, for, he said, “If the problem is discussed at Bermuda, who would present the German point of view?” [Page 558] Mr. Lewis said he thought it extremely unlikely that the problem of the Saar would be discussed in that kind of detail at Bermuda but that he would bear Dr. Krekeler’s offer in mind. He hoped that Dr. Krekeler, for his part, would keep us fully informed on the progress of the Franco-German negotiations insofar as lay within his power.
- For information on Chancellor Adenauer’s conversations with François-Poncet, see telegrams 1589 and 1992, Documents 654 and 655.↩
- Not further identified.↩
- For documentation on the Bermuda Conference, Dec. 4–8, 1953, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1710 ff.↩