762.00/10–2853
No. 229
The United States High Commissioner
for Germany (Conant) to the Secretary of
State
Dear Foster: This personal note will supplement the cables and at the same time bring you a somewhat more intimate picture of the way the situation here in Germany looks to me at the present moment.
Unless something unexpected happens in the next few weeks it seems we must be reconciled to a slower schedule for EDC ratification than I had hoped, and a slower schedule than the Chancellor [Page 551] had repeatedly prophesied before his election. There can be no doubt that the Chancellor has run into resurgent German nationalism in connection with the formation of his Cabinet. He has also run into political ambitions and party differences greater than he had anticipated. He told me the other day he had spent two very bad weeks forming his Cabinet and had finally told the quarreling party leaders that if the German people had overheard the quarrels they would be shocked, and he was going ahead and settle matters finally himself. How much his difficulty in forming a Cabinet will affect his eventual attitude toward the Saar question is problematic, but it certainly has delayed his meeting with Bidault.
The Chancellor is now blaming Bidault and the French for the delay. He has probably convinced himself that the French and not the Germans are responsible for the delaying tactics. Yesterday he refused to consider even on an off chance that he and Bidault could make a settlement of the Saar problem before the French presidential election, placing the blame on Bidault and his presidential aspirations. We shall see whether or not the Chancellor and Bidault can make some progress towards a Saar settlement in the next few weeks. I am not yet willing to pass final judgment on whether the Chancellor’s own previously liberal point of view about the Saar has been altered.
The Chancellor seems quite aware of the dangers inherent in the delays. Likewise, the French High Commissioner, M. Francois-Poncet, is very disturbed about the growing impatience of the United States. Possibly the Chancellor believes the United States will force the French to ratify without a settlement of the Saar problem. There is even a remote possibility that under the influence of the more nationalistic elements in his coalition he may himself be flirting with the idea of a national German army within the NATO framework. If so, he has reversed himself recently. For as late as September 10, in the course of a conversation with Bruce and myself, he went out of his way to affirm strongly his belief that only an EDC solution would be acceptable to him and the more sensible Germans. He then said we do not want a national army.
If I may express my own personal views, I would be deeply concerned if there were any possibility of a national German army. I know some people in the Pentagon and in Congress feel otherwise. And the former British High Commissioner, Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick, also was willing to consider the possibility, but from what I have seen I would consider the creation of a national German army a most dangerous undertaking. The basic German political situation is too unstable and the German governmental structure is too new to trust the final command of a national army to the hands of the [Page 552] unknown German leaders of the future. It could well be that such a national army would find itself allied with the East against the West. In short, the crucial decision of these months is whether we can bind West Germany to the West politically, economically, and militarily. If in the coming months there should be serious discussion in Washington of an alternative involving a national German army, I hope I may be permitted to return to argue my case at the highest level. If worse came to worst I myself would prefer the withdrawal of all but token forces from Europe and a so-called peripheral defense rather than a German national army.
I trust these personal observations may be of some value to you. You will readily understand why I am sending them in this personal form and for your eyes only. There are so many reasons why EDC must be put through that I have found it unwise to argue with most people about whether or not a German national army would be a good or a bad thing in itself. My standard argument is that I cannot imagine that French leaders in a rational mood would prefer a national German army, and France is as necessary for our defense as Germany.
With all good wishes.
Sincerely yours,