Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 211: Telegram

No. 421
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

priority

Berlin, February 5, 1954.

Secto 90. Department pass OSD. Following is text of Secretary’s impromptu remarks following the tabling of Soviet proposal on Germany at tenth plenary session, February 4:²

I have been told that the zigzag was an essential part of the Soviet practice. If so, I think that the discussions of the last few days form a classic example.

I have seldom been as confused in my life as I am at this moment. We have been debating for several days the plan which you tabled,³ Mr. Chairman, and we discussed a section to which Mr. Molotov devoted his attention. And after we finally had agreed, the three of us, to amend it to meet what we understood were Mr. Molotov’s views, then he said he rejected the whole plan.

I wonder why we spent so long debating one paragraph of the plan if the whole plan was unacceptable.

Then, Mr. Molotov, as I understood, attacked our proposal on the ground that it did not give the Germans sufficient freedom of choice as to what they would do in relation to their future international relations. And when we had painstakingly explained that the plan did give them complete freedom of choice in that matter, then apparently the plan could not meet Mr. Molotov’s approval because it gave the Germans too much freedom.

He explained at great length how the Germans could not be trusted with freedom; how they had abused freedom in the past; and from that it is to be inferred that they should not have the freedom that they had in the past. And there again I am completely confused and bewildered.

Then there was a question of the all-German elections. The plan which you tabled, Mr. Chairman, provided for the careful supervision of the elections, not only supervised by the four occupying powers, but also possibly by neutrals, to be sure there would be true freedom of elections.

But, Mr. Molotov says that that proposal indicates that we do not trust the Germans and the elections are not sufficiently free. And in the same breath he also says the elections must be so conducted that what he calls the “non-democratic” elements in Germany are not going to be allowed to vote.

I am curious to know as to how that can be accomplished without a supervision of the elections.

I cannot but believe that what he really has in mind is that there must be conducted in all of Germany the type of elections which I described earlier, which had brought the “government” of East Germany into power, where everybody was compelled to put in a ballot to assure that there would be no possibility of any “undesirable” person being chosen.

We discussed at great length the Paris and Bonn treaties yesterday and again today and explained in simple words—words of one syllable—that the unified Germany would have the choice as to whether or not to adhere to those treaties. Nevertheless, the Soviet Foreign Minister continues to make the assertion that they still would be bound by these treaties and he insists upon his formula which would, as he interprets it, prohibit adopting such treaties.

The fact is that there is a compulsion on the part of the Germans to align themselves with the Western European community. It is not a compulsion of law or treaty. We have made that perfectly clear. It is a kind of compulsion which draws inevitably the East Germans toward the West. It is the same compulsion that has drawn one million East Germans to seek sanctuary in the West, and it is that compulsion Mr. Molotov would prohibit by legal and military action, because despite what he says about wanting the Germans to have freedom of choice, the fact is his formula would deny them that freedom which they seek by themselves—which are irresistible attractions unless held back by military power.

I speak only of the compulsion of the spirit, of the human aspirations which under the plan we have proposed would enable the Germans freely to seek their own future.

I, of course, will study carefully the proposal which has been submitted by the Soviet Foreign Minister.⁴

But certainly on the basis of his own explanation of it, I am regretfully compelled to feel that it indicates that the conditions attached to German elections and the establishment of an all-German government are such that they are calculated to make them operative only if there is an extension of the system of the East German Republic to all of Germany.

If that is in fact the interpretation which his proposal seems to bear, that would indeed be a very tragic conclusion for this conference to have to end on, as far as Germany is concerned.

I felt, however, that after all the zigging and zagging perhaps the Soviet Foreign Minister’s last words about troop withdrawal from Germany, indicated the object to which all else had led up to—namely, the ending of any defense of Western Germany; its complete exposure to the vast forces that lie to the East.

And we must also recognize that if all of Western Germany is so exposed, that exposure also endangers all of Western Europe.

1. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Vienna, Moscow, and CINCEUR.
2. For a record of the tenth plenary meeting, see Sectos 86 and 87, Document 419 and supra.
3. FPM(54)17, Document 510.
4. FPM(54)33, Document 514.