Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

396.1 BE/2–554: Telegram

No. 419
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

confidential priority

Berlin, February 5, 1954—11 a.m.

Secto 86. Department pass OSD. Summary first portion tenth plenary session Foreign Ministers February 4, chaired by Eden, follows:²

Eden called first on Bidault who had yesterday reserved right to reply to questions posed to him by Molotov.³ In fairly lengthy statement Bidault rebutted in detail Molotov charge that Bonn and Paris agreements would be binding in advance on all-German government resulting from free elections under Eden plan.⁴ After paying “tribute” to Molotov’s “tenacity” and “obstinacy” on this issue, Bidault said he would repeat once more for Molotov’s benefit that new united Germany would not and could not be bound by political commitments entered into either by Federal Republic or GDR. He developed this theme at some length, dwelling in turn in his rebuttal upon each article of Bonn and Paris agreements which Molotov had brought into issue yesterday. Bidault concluded this aspect his statement by saying he now found it impossible to conceive that anyone could still contend the new all-German government would be bound by commitments entered into by Federal Republic; if anyone continued to advance such a thesis, it was only because his purpose was to postpone expression of will of German people.

Bidault then inquired why Molotov felt impelled to employ all dialectics at his disposal to postpone consulting wishes of people in “normal” and “classical” manner, when it was evident that free elections were the one thing most ardently desired by German people. Why was Molotov not willing to take same risks as Western powers—was he possibly not able to await with as much calm the judgment of electorate? He charged Molotov with imposing unjustified pre-conditions to free elections and said such procrastination in seeking solution German problem was something he could not accept. Bidault next made short shrift Molotov’s suggestion for referendum, asserting that only possible motivation behind such a proposal was to maintain Pankow government in power as long as possible and to undo without any risk to Soviets all progress made by Western powers in recent years.

In conclusion Bidault once again strongly challenged Molotov’s assertion that 1952 agreements by Western powers were responsible for division of Europe, drawing attention anew to system of Eastern European military, political and economic alliances built up between 1945 and 1948 under Soviet leadership and with support of Red Army; he said GDR had been completely integrated into this Eastern bloc, factor which constituted serious obstacle to German reunification. For correction, which was urgently needed, of resulting division of Europe he called on Molotov to give serious consideration to proposals already put forward by Eden for setting up all-German government as result of free elections.

Eden, after expressing complete agreement with Bidault reply which he hoped could be considered as settling issue at hand, expressed additional hope meeting could now move on to real issue of free elections and called on Molotov to speak.⁵ Latter then delivered in rapidfire tempo long tirade extending (with consecutive translations) over two hours in length and concluding with submission of specific proposal re Germany (already forwarded by separate telegram⁶).

Highlights of Molotov statement were following: Unification of Germany cannot be undertaken without agreement between the two parts of Germany and without taking their mutual interests into consideration. In postwar period two Germanies had developed along different lines—in East Germany under Potsdam Agreement monopolies were liquidated, property of Nazi war criminals turned over to people and democratic land reform carried out; in West Germany cartels continued stranglehold over economy, no land reform, and war criminals becoming even more important in political and economic life. In light of this situation reunification of Germany was not a formal matter of technical organizational character as envisaged by Eden plan but a question of substance. Molotov then delved into German history in 1932–1933 period to prove point that Nazis came to power through parliamentary processes (he referred in this connection to alleged role played by Von Papen, Adenauer, Schleicher, Hindenburg and industrialists such as Thyssen and Krupp) and to support conclusion that “we should not be carried away too much simply by parliamentary formalities;” this, he said, had been recognized in Potsdam Agreement which provided that peace treaty should be “accepted by a German Government considered appropriate for that purpose”. Therefore it was now necessary that “fascist degenerates” not be allowed take dominating positions, even by parliamentary means, in new all-German government. Eden plan and its five stages made no provision to prevent this and did nothing to insure reunification of Germany as “democratic” and “peaceful” state. Under his proposal “anti-democratic” elements, industrial and banking magnates, and “desperate adventures of revanchist type” would be likely to come to power, presenting real threat to German people and particularly to working class. For this reason Soviet Government could not support Eden plan.

Molotov then stressed that Four Powers could not be relieved of responsibility of assuring that after elections Germany would develop along “peaceful” and “democratic” lines. He said there were two prerequisites in this regard—internal matters and those of external character. Re internal matters he said German elections must be free and democratic and therefore should be carried out by Germans themselves and by their “democratic organizations,” not by foreign occupation authorities. But Western election plan was imbued with distrust for Germany’s “democratic forces” in proposing that occupation powers rather than Germans draw up electoral law, supervise elections, et cetera. Best means, Molotov said, to ensure early all-German elections was to agree this was matter for Germans themselves. He, therefore, proposed formation of “a provisional all-German government by Parliaments of GDR and FedRep with wide participation of democratic organizations,” such provisional government to replace East and West German Governments either at once or over certain period of time. He further proposed calling urgent conference of representatives GDR and FedRep to agree on composition, functions and powers of all-German government, which would enable carrying out of free all-German elections and convocation of all-German Constitutional Assembly. All these measures, Molotov said, should be carried out by agreement among all Four Powers.

Molotov then stated: “All-German elections should naturally be carried out under conditions which would assure freedom of activity for all democratic organizations. But that does not mean we should not take measures directed against activation of fantastic and militaristic organizations. We should also exclude possibility of attempts at pressure on part of big monopolists during preparation and carrying out of elections”.

Turning to external prerequisites for “peaceful” and “democratic” Germany, Molotov said Paris and Bonn agreements were intended to bind within EDC net not only Western but Eastern Germany, and that was impossible. He stated only possible conclusion was that for there to be German reunification and German peace treaty, Germany could not be made member of “a war grouping of Western European countries,” since this would be contrary to interests of German people and of European security.

Molotov then summed up by stating that Eden plan was unacceptable since it involved turning all-German elections over to occupation authorities and by-passing Germans themselves: it did not provide for prevention of political pressure from foreign states during the elections; it was based on maintenance of present status of occupation forces in Germany, which was “incorrect”; it limited rights of all-German government in advance by providing latter would be bound by provisions of Paris and Bonn agreements; and it would permit coming to power of “aggressive German militarists”.

Molotov then submitted his specific proposal for unification of Germany and free all-German elections, including concept of withdrawal all occupation forces, other than “limited contingents,” from Germany prior to the elections.

Meeting recessed briefly at 1810 hours.

1. Repeated to Bonn, Frankfurt, London, Paris, Vienna, and Moscow.
2. The U.S. Delegation verbatim record of the tenth plenary, USDEL PLEN/10, is in Conference files, lot 60 D 627, CF 194. For a record of the second part of the meeting, see Secto 87, infra.
3. For the full text of Bidault’s statement, which was circulated as FPM(54)31, see Berlin Discussions, pp. 151–155, or Cmd. 9080, 76–79.
4. For text of the Eden plan, see FPM(54)17, Document 510.
5. For Molotov’s statement, circulated as FPM(54)32, see Berlin Discussions, pp. 90–100, or Cmd. 9080, pp. 80–87.
6. For Molotov’s proposal, transmitted in Secto 85, see FPM(54)33, Document 514.