Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

762.00/2–554: Telegram

No. 420
The United States Delegation at the Berlin Conference to the Department of State¹

secret priority

Berlin, February 5, 1954—noon.

Secto 87. Department pass OSD. Following summarizes second part tenth session, February 4:²

Following 15 minute recess, session resumed at 1832.

Secretary spoke first. His impromptu remarks have been reported by separate telegram.³

Bidault said he feared it would be fruitless to repeat again what he has already stated on three or four previous occasions. His statement this afternoon covers most of points raised by Molotov. He will, of course, examine Molotov’s proposal⁴ but at first glance it is hard to see how any conciliation or even move toward conciliation will be possible.

Eden said he will not reply to Molotov until tomorrow. He simply noted that his plan for free all-German elections has been rejected by Soviet delegate apparently because man should not be free because he is sometimes bad and parliamentary institutions are bad because they are sometimes abused by totalitarians. He accepted neither premise and promised to argue them further tomorrow.

Molotov expressed view that confusion of participants comes from their fatigue. He believed to be unfair assertion that Soviet policy at conference is marked by zigzag. If Soviet plan is not completely satisfactory, he said, it could be amended, but he did not think it too complex to be understood. He emphasized that plan has two features, one old and one new. Old feature calls for formation of provisional all-German government on basis of prior agreement between East and West Germany. New feature provides that, in order to insure real freedom in elections, all occupation troops be withdrawn from East and West Germany before elections, leaving behind only limited contingents to fulfill protective functions. Neither Secretary, Bidault nor Eden, he noted, has rejected proposal directly, so perhaps it is not so bad after all. There is no reason to accuse Soviet policy of zigzag merely because he has added new feature to old proposal. Noting suggestion made that withdrawal of occupation forces except for limited contingents represents threat to Germany and all Europe, Molotov thought those fears are result of fatigue rather than reality. He believed next step should be to study Soviet proposal, after which fears will disappear and ground for agreement could be sought.

Meeting adjourned at 1910.

1. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, Moscow, Vienna, and CINCEUR.
2. For a report of the first part of the tenth plenary, see Secto 86, supra.
3. Secto 90, infra.
4. For Molotov’s proposal, see FPM(54)33, Document 514.