Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

662A.00/6–1952: Telegram

No. 115
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

secret priority

Washington, June 19, 1952—8:50 p.m.

7465. Fr and Brit Ambs called on Secy this afternoon to discuss reply to Sov note.² Bonnet summarized progression in Fr position ending with stmt of substantial agreement with Eden Gifford formula (reported London’s 5677³) (rptd Paris 2455, Bonn 660, Moscow 211) subject to substituting “it being understood four Govts are in favor” in place of “provided Sov Govt will make clear”. Bonnet emphasized Fr insistence proposal for meeting must include question of elections and interim status of Ger Govt and not be confined to composition and functions of commission as proposed in last US draft.⁴ However Fr were now willing to accept proposal made by Franks reported in Deptel 6655 to London, Paris 7381 (rptd Bonn 3717, Moscow 885)⁵ for insertion of words between sub-points i and ii. Franks noted Fr and Brit positions had moved in direction of agreement and inquired whether US still remained adamant.

Secy stated issue was very greatest importance and not mere preference for language. On wisdom of this decision regarding reply to Sov note depends the question of Ger ratification. Secy then reviewed history of note of May 13, its favorable reception, general agreement at Paris that Sov reply was feeble and further agreement at Paris on matter of our further reply. It was now thought we needed to meet some public opinion pressure which was not clearly identified. If note sent as proposed by Fr and Brit we would be committed to meeting involving discussion of interim status of Ger Govt and this would undermine Adenauer and sabotage his plans for ratification. This was not merely US estimate of Ger situation but emphatic stmt of Chancellor who is best judge of Ger opinion. (Franks confirmed that Adenauer had made similar strong stmt to Kirkpatrick.)⁶ If Ger ratification is not secured before recess no telling where we would be. Secy then commented briefly on possible disruption of Senate schedule for ratification if note sent as proposed by Fr and Brit but emphasized that Ger situation was all important. Secy said hard to judge public opinion but we can judge effect on our plans of proposal of kind contemplated. We would be taking terrible risk because discussion now of interim status of Ger Govt would open up the deep divisions of opinion among Ger parties and inevitably postpone Bundestag ratification. Our immediate problem is to aid Chancellor to secure ratification. After that we can take care of public opinion problems in Fr and other countries which will confront parliamentary action at later time. If we secure US and Ger ratification we will have two sound pegs which will help ratification elsewhere. If we wreck plans for Ger ratification we would be proceeding down the road to disaster.

Franks agreed with Secy estimate Ger situation but said problem of note must be viewed in broader terms of European opinion concerning whole struggle between East and West for soul of Ger. HMG has carried public support relative to establishment of positions of strength but could not assert that we refuse discussions with Sovs until after these positions fully consolidated. Brit do not expect results from Sov negotiations but insist on sincere attempt to ascertain Sov position. American draft would be interpreted as striking false note and not taking Sovs seriously. He agreed we should not disrupt Adenauer’s plans but must consider general Brit and Eur attitudes as well.

Secy expressing understanding this situation pointed out this was not last note and negotiations could continue. He again emphasized importance of timing and necessity of postponing discussion of status of Ger Govt until after Bundestag ratification.

Bonnet indicated Francois Poncet reported less emphatic stmts by Adenauer but later admitted that Chancellor wanted meeting confined to question of elections. He emphasized Fr parliamentary opinion and Schuman consultation with Senators. Fr did not believe note they proposed would be sure to prevent Ger ratification. He said matter was not fully discussed by Ministers at Paris but there was merely preliminary exchange of views. Secy expressed emphatic disagreement reviewing nature of full discussion with Eden and Schuman and agreement reached. Secy wondered whether Paris and London disagreed with his conclusions regarding situation relative Ger ratification and Adenauer’s view. If any doubt existed on this point Adenauer could be approached by the three commissioners. He wondered if London and Paris agreed that note would interfere with Ger ratification they would say that nevertheless it was desirable to send note. Secy suggestion that matter might have to be discussed by three Ministers in London evoked from both Franks and Bonnet hope that agreement could be reached in Washington. All agreed main issue whether suggestion for next meeting should be confined to composition and functions of commission with second meeting after report of commission according to suggestion in note May 13 or whether other points should be discussed at same meeting before Commission reported. In this connection Secy again stressed importance of timing. Secy stated he could not be responsible for hazarding the results of work of one and half years and asked if London and Paris fully appreciated dangers of delay in Ger ratification. He appreciated difficulties confronting Schuman but felt these difficulties would be greater if Ger ratification were not secured. He emphasized that under American proposal there could be meetings with Sovs on status Ger Govt but only at later time.

Both Ambs said they would report fully although Bonnet indicated he had no hope his Govt could agree. It was understood further tripartite meeting would take place when Embassies had received further instructions in light report this meeting.

Acheson

1. Drafted by Jessup and cleared with Riddleberger. Also sent to London and repeated to Bonn and Moscow.
2. No other record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.
3. Document 111.
4. Presumably the draft referred to in the editorial note, supra.
5. In telegram 6655, the words in question were, “when agreement has been reached on this”. (662.001/6–1652)
6. Regarding Adenauer’s conversation with Kirkpatrick on June 13, see telegram 3359, Document 113.