Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

662A.00/5–2852: Telegram

No. 107
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

secret

Washington, June 3, 1952—7:20 p.m.

7148. In accordance with Tripartite agreement outlined in Paris 7397 rptd London 2076 Moscow 259 Bonn 922² below is text of suggested draft reply to Sov note of May 24³ as worked out in Dept. For convenience of reference paras of draft are numbered. Copies being given to Br and Fr Embassies here. After agreement reached in Paris on substance of reply, Dept will be prepared to coordinate final draft with Br and Fr here pursuant to agreed procedure. In view of discussion already held between Sec and other 2 Mins, Dept feels it will not be nec to conduct discussions in Paris on level of Ambs and Fon-Mins but that discussions can be handled by next ranking officials as has been done in previous coordination in Lon.

Draft text fol:

• “1. After studying note sent to it by Sov Govt on May 24, 1952, US Govt deeply regrets the lack of concern displayed by Sov Govt with regard to steps which might be taken to bring about free elections in Ger and the consequent unification of Ger. Sov Govt has failed to meet if it has not entirely rejected the 4 concrete and practical proposals made by US Govt in its note of May 13, 1952,⁴ the acceptance of which would have made possible a mtg to discuss the specific measures nec to create an all-Ger Govt.
• “2. The fundamental difference between the position of Sov Govt and that of US Govt is that Sov Govt falls back to its first proposal for immediate negotiations on the terms of the peace treaty before the formation of an all-Ger Govt which cld participate in those negotiations. US Govt on other hand has pointed out that an all-Ger Govt is an essential participant in the negotiation of a peace treaty and that therefore a precondition to such negotiations is the unification of Ger including the establishment of an all-Ger Govt. The unification of Ger in turn depends upon holding of free elections. Accordingly, the essential first step, as US Govt has pointed out, is the holding of free elections as soon as it is determined that appropriate conditions for such free elections exist.
• “3. Moreover, Sov Govt insists on moving backward to Potsdam Agreement and re-establishment of 4-power control. Potsdam Agreement was originally designed to cover “the initial control period”. Nevertheless, Sov Govt insists that its provisions must ‘guide’ not only the establishment of Germany’s boundaries, but the interim status of an all-Ger Govt and a peace treaty with Ger.
• “4. This attitude of Sov Govt clearly implies that the Ger people shld be excluded from negotiation of the peace treaty, thereby turning the clock back 7 years and ignoring the moral and political recovery of the great majority of Ger people who have been free to make that progress. The suggestion of a return to Potsdam patently includes the retention of a Sov veto power, which taken together with present action of Sov Govt to cut Eastern Ger off from association with Eur and outside world, is a clear illustration of Sov purpose for Ger as a whole. It is apparent that the Sov motive can be only to confuse the Ger people, meanwhile impeding the return of sovereignty to West Ger and its re-entry into a productive association with other countries on a normal basis.
• “5. The position of the Sov Union blocks impartial investigation of the conditions now prevailing in the Sov Zone. This attitude constitutes opposition to free elections and since such elections are prerequisite to Ger unity, constitutes Sov opposition to the achievement of such unity.
• “6. In the circumstances Sov Govt must bear the responsibility for preventing any progress towards unification of Ger. It is the failure of Sov Govt to meet the proposals of US Govt, including the failure to advance any other practical proposals, which causes the delay in unifying Ger and concluding a Ger peace treaty.
• “7. The notes of May 13 of the Govts of US, UK and Fr contain specific and constructive proposals for the realization of the essential first steps towards these objectives. These proposals remain open in the hope that after further reflection the Sov Govt will reconsider its position.”⁵

Acheson

1. Drafted by Jessup and Laukhuff; cleared with Bohlen, Perkins, Matthews, and Barbour, and signed by Secretary Acheson. Repeated to London, Moscow, and Bonn. A copy of the draft reply transmitted herein was left with President Truman on June 5. (Memorandum by the Secretary of State, June 5, 662.001/6–552)
2. Document 105.
3. Document 102.
4. Document 101.
5. On June 5 Kennan reported that he believed the thinking underlying this draft was excellent, but the language “lousy”, and suggested that when the draft was agreed one person be designated to give it “fluidity, continuity, force of expression and unity of style.” (Telegram 1948 from Moscow, 662A.00/6–552)