Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

No. 101
The Embassy of the United States to the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Affairs¹

[Moscow, May 13, 1952.]

1. In reply to the Soviet Government’s note of the 9th of April, the United States Government wishes to make the following observations in regard to the unity of Germany, the election of a free all-German government and the conclusion of a peace treaty with that government. It remains the policy of the United States Government to achieve these objectives on terms that will insure unity with freedom and peace with security.²

2. It is ready to begin negotiations with the Soviet Government on these issues; and it desires to do so just as soon as it is clearly apparent that it is also the intention of the Soviet Government to avoid the fruitless negotiations of the past. The United States Government and the Governments of the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union must therefore first reach a clear understanding upon the scope of the negotiations and upon the fundamental problems to be examined. Proper preparation is essential to success and to avoid long delays. The Soviet Government’s note of the 9th of April throws little new light on what it considers should be the means of insuring the success of any such negotiations.³

3. In its latest note the Soviet Government now stipulates that Germany must not be included “into one or another grouping of powers directed against any peace-loving state”. Germany’s proposed membership in the United Nations should surely make any such provision unnecessary. In any case the United States Government could not accept any provisions forbidding Germany to enter into association with other states which one of the signatories of the peace treaty might arbitrarily choose to regard as “directed against any peace-loving state”. It cannot admit that Germany should be denied the basic right of a free and equal nation to associate itself with other nations for peaceful purposes. It must assume that the Soviet Government likewise cannot object to Germany’s right to enter into defensive agreements.⁴

4. In its note of March 25,⁵ the United States Government pointed out that it is giving full support to the efforts which the free states of Western Europe, including the German Federal Republic, are making to bring into being a peaceful European community and thus to begin a new era in which international relations will be based on cooperation and not on rivalry and distrust. The United States Government welcomes the development of such a European Community in which Germany will participate. Germany is divided because Europe is divided. This policy of European unity cannot threaten the interests of the Soviet Union or of any country whose policy is devoted to the maintenance of peace. The United States Government will, therefore, not be deflected from its support of this policy. It is more than ever convinced that it represents the true path of peace.⁶

5. The United States Government has no responsibility for the failure to extend this cooperation beyond its present limits. It remains ready to examine with sincerity and good will any practical and precise suggestions designed to reduce tension and to heal existing divisions.

6. A German peace treaty can be worked out only if there is an all-German government formed as a result of free elections and able to participate in full freedom in the discussion of such a treaty. It is, therefore, not possible to hold discussions now about the provisions of a German peace treaty. The U.S. Government has already made known its views on some of the Soviet Government’s proposals especially its erroneous interpretation of the territorial provisions of the Potsdam protocol and its intention to confine Germany in a position of permanent isolation from Western Europe⁷ while obliging her to seek to provide for her defense solely through her own national armed forces. The Soviet proposals would mean permanent shackels upon Germany’s rights of international association and a permanent state of tension and insecurity in the center of Europe.

7. The all-German government resulting from free election must itself be free. Such freedom is essential both before and after a peace treaty has been negotiated. It must be able to maintain its genuinely representative character; to assume its responsibilities as the government of a reunited Germany and to play its full part in the discussion of the peace treaty. This question of freedom is, therefore, inseparable from the problem of elections. The Soviet Government has still failed to give any indication of its views on this subject. The United States Government must ask specifically whether the Soviet Government considers that an all-German government, resulting from free elections, would be under four-power control until after the conclusion of a peace treaty or whether they agree that it should have the necessary freedom of action and powers of government.⁸

8. The United States Government is happy to note that the Soviet Government now agrees in principle that there should be free elections throughout Germany. Such free elections can, however, only be held if the necessary conditions exist in all parts of Germany and will be maintained not only on the day of voting, and prior to it, but also thereafter. An essential first step is, therefore, to insure such conditions. Otherwise, no progress can be made. In recent years the eastern part of Germany has evolved in a direction increasingly divergent from the main path of German progress. This is a principal reason why an impartial inquiry is needed before elections can take place.⁹

9. The Soviet Government does not agree, however, that the international commission set up by the General Assembly of the United Nations should carry out such an inquiry throughout Germany. It bases this refusal on its interpretation of Article 107 of the United Nations Charter. But this reads as follows: “Nothing in the present Charter shall invalidate or preclude action, in relation to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory to the present Charter, taken or authorized as a result of that war by the Governments having responsibility for such action.” These words clearly do not preclude¹⁰ the United Nations from considering these aspects of German affairs. This interpretation was upheld by the United Nations General Assembly by an overwhelming majority. However, even under the Soviet Government’s erroneous interpretation of the Charter there is nothing to prevent the Four Powers from availing themselves of the United Nations Commission in order to determine the conditions in which genuinely free elections could be held throughout Germany.

10. The Soviet Government suggests instead that responsibility for the inquiry could be entrusted to a commission formed by the four occupying powers. Before the United States Government could feel assured that this suggestion would result in an impartial inquiry it would need to know what would be the composition and functions of such a body. A commission composed solely of members with direct responsibilities in Germnay would be both judge and party. Experience during the period of four-power control of Germany suggests that it would not be able to reach useful decisions. Thus the elections would be greatly delayed. Nor can the United States Government overlook the fact that the appointment of a four-power commission might be interpreted as a step towards the re-establishment of four-power control in Germany. This would be a retrograde move, out of keeping with constitutional developments in the Federal Republic.¹¹

11. For these reasons the United States Government maintains its preference for the United Nations Commission: It is already in being, its functions have been laid down and it can take action without delay. Nevertheless, the United States Government is ready to examine every possibility of determining whether conditions of freedom exist throughout Germany for the holding of genuinely free elections. The United States Government in agreement with the United Kingdom and French Governments and after consultation with the German Federal Government and the German authorities in Berlin, accordingly makes the following proposals:

(i) An impartial commission should immediately determine whether there exist in the Soviet Zone of Germany, as well as in the German Federal Republic and in all sectors of Berlin, the conditions necessary for the holding of free elections and, if not,¹² should recommend for consideration by the Four Powers exercising responsibilities in Germany what step should be taken to create such conditions. The Four Powers should give the necessary facilities for the investigation of such a commission in the German Federal Republic, in the Soviet Zone, and in all sectors of Berlin. The three Western Powers and the German Federal Government have already stated their willingness to do so.

(ii) The Four Powers should utilize for this purpose the United Nations Commission which is already available. This seems the quickest and most practical course.¹³

(iii) Despite its strong preference for the procedure under (ii) above, the United States Government is ready to consider any other practical and precise proposals for an impartial commission of investigation which the Soviet Government may wish to put forward, on the one condition that they are likely to promote the early holding of free elections throughout Germany.

(iv) As soon as the report of such an impartial commission is available, representatives of the United States, United Kingdom, French and Soviet Governments would meet to consider it, with a view to reaching agreement on:

(a) The early holding of free elections throughout Germany, including the creation where necessary of the appropriate conditions; and¹⁴

(b) The assurances to be given by the Four Powers that the all-German government, formed as the result of these free elections, will have the necessary freedom of action during the period before the peace treaty comes into effect.¹⁵

1. Source: Reprinted from Department of State Bulletin, May 26, 1952, pp. 817–819. It comprises the draft transmitted in telegram 5132 from London, May 11 (662.001/5–1152) and, as indicated in the footnotes that follow, the revisions proposed by the Department of State in telegram 5843, supra, and a few other minor drafting changes that were made in London or Moscow to coordinate the text with that of the British and French. The note was delivered to the Soviet Foreign Ministry at 11 p.m. (Moscow time) on May 13.
2. This paragraph is the same as that transmitted in telegram 5132 with the exception of the substitution of “United States Government” for “HMG”. This substitution was made in all similar instances below.

3. Paragraph 2 of the draft transmitted in telegram 5132 reads:

   “2. They are ready to begin negots with the Sov Govt on these issues at the earliest possible date. But HMG and the US, French and Sov Govts must first reach a clear understanding upon the scope of the negots and upon the fundamental problems to be examined. Proper preparation is essential to success and to avoid long delays such as led to the failure of earlier mtgs. The Sov Govt’s note of the 9th April throws little new light on what [they] consider shld be the means for ensuring the success of any such negots.”

4. This paragraph is the same as that transmitted in telegram 5132 except that “its” and “It” are “their” and “They”. Similar changes apply in subsequent paragraphs.
5. A footnote in the source text at this point indicates that the U.S. note of Mar. 25 is printed in Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 7, 1952, pp. 530–531.
6. Paragraphs 4 and 5 are the same as those transmitted in telegram 5132 subject to the drafting changes indicated in footnotes 2 and 4 above.
7. The draft transmitted in telegram 5132 did not have the phrase “from Western Europe”.
8. This paragraph is the same as that transmitted in telegram 5132 subject to the drafting changes indicated in footnotes 2 and 4 above.
9. This paragraph is the same as that transmitted in telegram 5132 subject to the drafting changes indicated in footnotes 2 and 4 above.
10. In the draft transmitted in telegram 5132 this sentence began “This language clearly does not preclude”.
11. Paragraphs 10 and 11 are the same as those transmitted in telegram 5132 subject to the drafting changes indicated in footnotes 2 and 4 above.
12. The draft transmitted in telegram 5132 does not contain the remainder of this sentence, but reads “what steps shld be taken to create such conditions”. Additionally that draft uses the term “Four Occupying Powers” throughout the rest of the note in place of “Four Powers”.
13. Subparagraphs ii, iii, and iv are the same as those transmitted in telegram 5132.
14. Subparagraph (a) in the draft transmitted in telegram 5132 reads “(a) The early holding of free elections thruout Ger; and”.
15. This subparagraph is the same as that transmitted in telegram 5132.