Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Germany and Austria, Volume VII, Part 1

662 001/5–1152: Telegram

No. 100
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

secret
niact

Washington, May 12, 1952—2:01 a.m.

5843. Secy has given most earnest consideration to Eden’s plea to get note in final shape by accepting draft as it now stands (urtel 5132²). Explanations urtel 5131³ were reinforced by representations of UK and Fr Embassies.⁴ Accordingly we will pass over many points in drafting which we would like to discuss.

There are however three points which go to heart of position our three governments have taken and which in our case have been reaffirmed as late as Friday by the President.

• First. We have taken clear position that in light of experience we do not intend to sit down now with the Soviets to negotiate German Peace Treaty before familiar essential prerequisites of elections etc. are met. From outset we have objected to opening note with general statement of willingness or eagerness to start such negotiations. New text of para 2 returns to old formulation and specifically refers to “these issues” which include peace treaty. Secy therefore considers it necessary to return to formulation first sentence para 2 ourtel 5808⁵ or at least variation thereof contained urtel 5129,⁶ although we consider our wording far stronger and more effective.
• Second. In new para 11 (i) must point out danger of formulation which places in hands of outside Commission power to say what steps must be taken to create conditions necessary for free elections. Its decisions might be entirely inadequate. Western Allies must retain some freedom of decision as to conditions they will demand. First sentence para 11 (i) shld therefore be amended to end “and, if not, shld recommend for consideration by the four powers what steps shld be taken to create such conditions.”
• Third. We feel it is very important to retain in para 11 (iv)a the clause “including the creation where necessary of the appropriate conditions”. It is not enough that this might be considered to be implicit in “agreement on elections”. As Secy points out, creation of necessary conditions is essential first step toward which both our notes are pointed. We must not fail to make explicit both to Sovs and the public opinion that this must indeed be first question discussed after report of commission. Omission of phrase particularly serious in London draft when taken together with phrasing of sub-para (i), since it reinforces impression that this question might be decided by Commission rather than four powers. Even with sub-para (i) corrected as we desire, however, Secy considers clause must be maintained in sub-para (iii), not as “addition of final hurdle” as Eden puts it but rather as statement of first and unavoidable hurdle.

Resubmission of these three points to President would involve such amount of time as to upset time schedule to which Secy appreciates Eden attaches such importance. Nor does Secy feel that he could recommend to President revisal his considered views on these points.

In addition Secy believes one additional point is of such importance that it should be taken care of. This involves deletion of modifying phrase after “permanent isolation” in third sentence para 6. Impossible to sustain thesis that Sovs have proposed that Ger be completely isolated on all sides. Their proposals wld in fact only have effect of cutting Ger off from western Europe. Secy believes it necessary therefore to restore phrase “from Western Europe” or to substitute some other similar phrase such as “from the free nations of Europe”. Other changes in this sentence acceptable except we wld prefer if possible to substitute “limited” for “her own” and addition of words “of her own” at end of sentence, in order more clearly to suggest inadequacy of what Sov Govt proposes to allow to Ger.

We also suggest that impression of writing off UN Commission cld be still further reduced by revising para 9 (iii) to read “Despite their strong preference for the procedure under (ii) above, HMG are ready to consider any variation of that procedure which the Sov Govt may wish to put forward, if it contains practical and precise proposals for an impartial commission of investigation and if it is likely to promote the early holding of free elections throughout Ger”. You need not insist on this change if Brit or Fr object.

If text can be agreed along above lines, London shld request that HICOMers and Commandants obtain reactions of Adenauer and Reuter. London shld also coordinate with Moscow time of delivery and release, bearing in mind desirability of 24 hour interval between delivery and release, and usual problem of coordinating differing Eur and US needs re press and radio release hours. Believe you shld repeat complete revised text of all paras changed from urtel 5132, as finally agreed, to all addressees, in order avoid any errors.

Acheson

1. Drafted by Laukhuff and cleared by Jessup. Repeated to Paris, Moscow, Bonn, and Berlin.
2. For text of the draft transmitted in telegram 5132, see the note from the U.S. Embassy in the Soviet Union, May 13, infra.
3. Supra.
4. No record of these representations has been found in Department of State files.
5. Document 97.
6. See footnote 3, Document 99.