662A.00/5–2852: Telegram
No. 105
The Secretary of
State to the Department of
State1
7397. From the Secy. Embtel 7355.2 In tripartite discussion this morning Schuman characterized Sov note of May 243 as deliberately obscure and partially contradictory. He felt it threw no further light on Sov ideas as to commission or elections. He had noted three things. One was that Moscow contemplated no sovereignty for Ger before treaty went into effect; that on contract it advocated return to Potsdam and four-power control. This seemed clearly insincere. Second was that no treaty entered into by FedRep cld bind Eastern Ger after unification. While note did not say so, logical conclusion this argument was that GDR agrmts with Pol and Czech [Page 256] on Oder-Neisse line wld be similarly nonbinding. Third was implied threat to Berlin contained in sentence stating undermining of confidence in policy of Western powers “places Ger people in necessity of seeking its own way to peace treaty and natl unification”. This note, instead of referring to a progression of elections, establishment of all-Ger Govt and then conclusion of peace treaty, referred to peace treaty as first objective and therefore posed most difficult problem first.
Secy stated he had noted same points and felt note marked retreat from whole idea of elections and investigation of conditions. Rather than offering anything new, it merely referred to and misquoted earlier proposal. Moscow clearly considered that Potsdam shld determine nature of peace treaty as well as of regime. It wld be badly received in Ger, was a weak note and even its propaganda tone was half-hearted and perfunctory. He thought Western reply shld make three points: (1) that note revealed Sov desire to reimpose four-power control, (2) that lack of progress was due solely to Sov refusal to meet any of points made by West, and (3) that this note wld terminate present exchange or perhaps suggest low-level talks. He wld prefer former.
Eden felt that to date we had won battle of notes. We had gained the initiative and shld maintain it. Reply shld note Sov retreat and say that altho we were sorry Russia had rejected our proposals, we were still prepared to proceed in accordance with them. Secy and Schuman agreed to this line, latter adding reply must avoid giving impression of withdrawing previous offer.
Schuman felt that reply shld be sent soon, that four-week delay in replying to previous one had been too long. Eden agreed present reply cld be drafted more easily and quickly than last, which had been slow but good when finished. He suggested that broad preliminary coordination be effected here and final drafting coordinated in Washn. Secy’s offer to have Washn produce draft for preliminary consideration here first of next week was accepted.
After some discussion as to what Ger shld be told and when, it was agreed that they shld at present be told only that three Mins had taken occasion to hold preliminary exchange of views, that preliminary coordination of reply wld be undertaken in Paris next week and final drafting in Washn and that wld be given further info when preliminary coordination achieved. HICOM authorized to do so.
- Repeated to London, Moscow, and Bonn.↩
- Telegram 7355 suggested that the Department of State might wish to begin preparing a general outline of a reply to the Soviet note in view of the agreement that had been reached with Eden (see footnote 3 below) on May 26. (662A.00/5–2752)↩
- At a meeting during the evening of May 26 Eden and Acheson had discussed, inter alia, the reply to the Soviet note and agreed that coordination should take place in Washington following initial agreement in Paris. The two Foreign Ministers had also agreed that Adenauer should be consulted and Secretary Acheson read Kennan’s comments (telegram 1881, Document 103), which Eden thought were excellent. This discussion was reported in telegram 7354 from Paris, May 27 (700.00/5–2752).↩