662.001/5–2552: Telegram
No. 103
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)
to the Department of State1
niact
1881. Sov note on Ger, text of which was submitted with my 1880, May 25, rptd Bonn 802 seems to me at first glance remarkable for its weakness, its mild discursiveness, its lack of enthusiasm, its failure to add to discussion any important new element with real appeal to Gers, and finally for tone of plaintive and almost injured sweet reasonableness with which it reiterates propositions most non-Commie Gers wld surely either not believe at all or have [Page 253] long since accepted as true but “so what?” the familiar elements—the charges that we are delaying the exchanges, that we want to create fait accompli, that this represents separate treaty of peace, that honest Gers are going to find themselves tied to dangerous policies of Atlantic Pact and Ger right-wing revanchists—wld hardly seem to have any shattering effect at this stage. What seems to us main new element—namely Four-Power control à la Potsdam as the answer to all questions concerning transition from elections to peace treaty—can hardly be expected to have any strong appeal anywhere, least of all to Gers, and seem to reflect much less of a dynamic polit attack on Moscow’s part than an apprehension of getting caught out in an unshod position on a dangerous subj. The bid for oral negots is perfunctory and without emphasis and no plans are taken to guard in advance against obvious answers from our side.
So far as Sov fon policy is concerned, there are several possible explanations for all this, and as usual they are not necessarily mutually contradictory. Among them I wld note fol:
- (a)
- That Kremlin, recognizing poor prospects of success in recent line and danger of loss of prestige to itself in any vigorous continuation of it, is setting about to disengage its own responsibility with respect to coming event in Ger, and preparing to leave dirty work to its Ger stooges. Something of this thinking may lie behind ref in note to Ger people being placed before necessity of “seeking their own paths” to peace treaty and unification. This element is in any case not new in sov approach to Ger. It wld, of course, not preclude extremely vigorous and dangerous actions by East Ger auths with respect to Berlin.
- (b)
- That Kremlin, whose suspicions are always particularly lively with respect to Ger Commies, has been in some way estranged by handling of this matter on part of latter, has gained impression they are going too far and too fast and attempting to exploit Sov support in some way, and is therefore disengaging itself in anger and leaving them with the burden;
- (c)
- That Sov attentions are at present absorbed with plans and undertakings elsewhere, most plausibly in Middle East, possibilities of which loom larger in their eyes than Ger at this moment.
Of equal interest to us here is bearing of note on governmental sitn here in Moscow. This note is not the authentic, terse, collected, menacing voice of Stalin’s Kremlin when functioning in high gear and pursuing an important Sov initiative. On contrary, document seems to me to show signs of having been prepared by hacks supplied only with grudging, cryptic and guarded instrs and told to make best of it.