661.65/7–2552: Telegram
No. 730
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union
(Kennan)
to the Department of State
173. Eyes only Secretary from Kennan. Have learned from authoritative source1 fol re Nenni’s visit here and recent talk with Stalin.
Interview with Stalin was arranged at Sov suggestion and came as pleasing surprise to Nenni, who has impression he is first Stalin prize winner to be personally received. He had previously met on several occasions with Malenkov and with Molotov, though it was not clear whether any of these mtgs took place on occasion present visit. This first time he had met Stalin.
[Page 1585]Stalin appeared in excellent health and vigor, physically and mentally. His questions were keen and reflected extensive knowledge of subjs discussed. (Nenni, incidentally, ridicules rumors that Stalin is not in sitn of continued complete authority in Politburo, altho he does say he thinks Malenkov most likely candidate for succession.) Stalin’s questions early part of interview were focused sharply on Ital domestic political sitn and included shrewd and well informed queries about several matters, including nature of electoral law which will govern next elections. It was quite evident center of his interest was possibility overthrow of De Gasperi Govt and introduction of left-wing govt which would adopt different fon policy line. Stalin inquired for details about idea of neutralized Italy under great power guarantee which Nenni had once advocated. When Nenni explained he had envisaged joint guarantee by US and USSR, Stalin had promptly declared this to be out of question, as being incompatible with prestige great power like Italy. Stalin had then made some sort of reference to possibility or desirability of Ital-Sov non-aggression pact as goal toward which people shld work.
Above represents what is reported of conversation from direct statements later made by Nenni. However, fol significant facts may shed further light on subjs and tenor of discussion. In interview given to Sov magazine Ogonek prior to mtg with Stalin, Nenni had stressed seriousness of Ger sitn and had stated that the division of Ger cld create a new Korea in the heart of Europe. After talking with Stalin, however, Nenni voiced opinion in conversation with my informant that Ger was not necessarily greatest danger spot, that concept of any single outstanding danger spot was misleading one, that sitn was always in state of flux, that one day it might be Ger, another day Japan, another day Italy or again even Iran.
Furthermore, Nenni said he had been told by other people in Politburo entourage that Stalin regarded present interchange of notes as completely phony and futile and believed that what was in the cards in Ger for immed future was estab of new equation of forces to be determined by success of both sides in their efforts to rearm Gers. My informant says Nenni also told him that he had previously (some months ago, I gather) spoken with Pieck and Grotewohl who had said at that time that policies being pursued by Sov Govt were ones which would call for great sacrifice from them and that they might soon be forced into position on Ger comparable to that of Nenni in Italy, by which they presumably meant that of a left-wing minority in a parliamentary system. My informant had impression that this earlier statement was adduced by Nenni to indicate contrast with present sitn, in which Nenni considered that danger envisaged by Pieck and Grotewohl was no longer acute. [Page 1586] What was being strongly hinted at, my informant thought, was firm Kremlin decision to accept division of Ger and make the best of it.
Nenni had inquired of informant about myself and asked whether I really entertained friendly feelings toward Russia. Informant says he replied that I had come here in hopes of bettering sitn and of getting some idea of thinking of Kremlin on present internatl problems.
Of interest in connection with Stalin’s questioning of Nenni is fact that at recent Polish natl reception (July 22) which I did not attend, Budenny approached Ital Amb and spoke to him with some force about Ital-Sov rels, stating that Sovs willing to forget Italy’s participation in war, that they were interested in future not past, that it was still possible for Italy to make change in her orientation, and that Ital statesmen who failed to hear and obey will of Ital people wld be harshly dealt with when day of judgment arrived. Budenny, who was ranking Sov official at party, had opened conversation by pointing to rather absurd division of that gathering into western and eastern social huddles and had observed that this sort of thing cld not go on much longer. It is to be doubted, in my opinion, that Budenny would have undertaken this sort of conversation without some sort of higher encouragement.
Nenni has been asked to attend opening of Volga-Don Canal scheduled July 27 and may thereafter return to Moscow. While here he has been kept in suburban Dacha and Sovs have shown great solicitude for his health, sending Kremlin doctor him, etc. As far as I can ascertain, this solicitude was extended spontaneously as friendly gesture to older man and did not arise from any request of his, but this point is somewhat vague. Nenni has also been invited visit Commie China, but doubts that time will permit him to do it.
So much for info. Fol is my comment. It is quite clear that Italy is number one in Sov hopes for driving a divisive wedge into Atlantic Pact group. This is for several reasons, including outstanding position of Ital Commies as strongest and most successful Commie party in any non-Commie country, Italy’s strategic position militarily and politically, outflanking Yugo and Albania as well as Greece and Turkey, and possibility that resistance to Communism in Mediterranean area generally may be seriously shaken, in Kremlin’s hopeful view, by events in Iran, North Africa and elsewhere. Shld Nenni’s followers, in combination with Ital Commies, succeed in over-balancing center in coming elections it is possible Kremlin might prefer, in accordance established practice, that fellow traveller Nenni take over as Premier, share responsibility and help confuse and soothe populace during period while Commies [Page 1587] are consolidating hold over police, army, labor, education, etc. hence intense Kremlin interest in his person, health and state of mind. Of how much of this he is aware is unclear. My informant considers him sincere intellectual marxist, but perhaps seriously blinded by personal ambitions.
Wld doubt that this story can long be held by others who now have knowledge of it and suspect Dept will soon be hearing repercussions of it from various sources. Believe that Canadians, for special reasons will be given complete fill in. However, feel strongly that we shld not let ourselves appear source of leaks and recommend close hold of it on our part. Wld suggest that two or three days from now, not sooner, this msg be repeated by Dept to Rome, Bonn, London and Paris, and at Dept’s discretion to MacArthur for Ridgway, as top secret communication.2
- In telegram 302 from Moscow, Aug. 15, Kennan stated that the appearance of a newspaper column by Joseph and Stewart Alsop giving the full story of Nenni’s interview with Stalin had caused Kennan the deepest embarrassment in his relations with the Italian Ambassador in Moscow, Mario Di Stefano, who had been Kennan’s source. Di Stefano had also told Kennan that he was the only person in Moscow given the full story. (661.65/8–1552)↩
- An attached memorandum for the files indicates that the message was repeated on July 30 to Rome, HICOG Bonn, London, Paris, and to MacArthur for Ridgway. In a memorandum of Sept. 4 to Acheson, Bonbright expressed his belief that developments since July 25 tended to confirm Kennan’s opinion regarding Soviet hopes to use Italy as an opening wedge to rupture the unity of Western alignment. Bonbright also expressed his fear that recent actions by the United States and other Western nations might have helped the Soviet Union’s chances for achieving its objectives, in that Italian officials had evidenced a steadily growing feeling that Italy was isolated diplomatically and that its interests and desires were given little weight by the Western nations. Although he doubted that Soviet designs for Italy would succeed in the short run or that the Italian Left would be able to defeat the Center coalition in the 1953 national elections, he nevertheless felt that the margin of safety was extremely slender. In order to reassure the Italians and “to nip in the bud the idea already bruited about by right-wing nationalists that Italy’s interests would be better served by less willing and less complete collaboration with the West,” Bonbright recommended several courses of action for the United States, including the continuation of making every effort consistent with other U.S. objectives to bring about a compromise settlement on Trieste, and the extension of economic aid to Italy “in an amount sufficient to prevent feelings of national affront and renewed suspicion of a lack of regard for Italy as a member of the Western alignment”. (765.00/9–452)↩