Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

611.65/7–3052

No. 731
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Western European Affairs (Byington)

top secret

Washington, July 30, 1952.

• Subject: United States–Italian Relations

Participants:

• Mr. Tarchiani, Ambassador of Italy
• The Secretary
• Mr. Perkins, EUR
• Mr. Byington, WE

The Italian Ambassador said that he was leaving early next month for Italy and had come in to say goodby and to have a general review of U.S.–Italian relations prior to his departure. He hoped to visit with Prime Minister De Gasperi during Mr. De Gasperi’s holiday in the mountains and on that occasion would take up with him the matters discussed here.

Italian Elections

First and foremost were the Italian national elections which would take place next spring in April or May. At that time the whole fate of Italy would be in the balance and what would decide the outcome would be what we had done between now and then. He had discussed with Mr. Matthews the question of a close collaboration between the Embassy and the Department in order that things that could be done to help the situation should not be overlooked until the last moment when they would be ineffective.¹ He was also going to take up the matter in Italy and urge a similar close collaboration between the Foreign Office and the American Embassy there. The Secretary said that he was in full agreement that we should bear in mind the importance of these elections and that we should work together as closely as possible for a successful outcome. Mr Tarchiani said that the real danger was Communism and that the Nationalists would also make some inroads, but not as great as in the recent elections in the south.

. . . . . . .

Trieste

The Ambassador then referred to Trieste which he described as the most important single factor affecting the outcome of the elections. He said that it was imperative a settlement be reached with Yugoslavia prior to next April. After five years in office since the Tripartite Declaration of March 20, the Government could not afford to come before the electorate with a record of no achievement with regard to Trieste. He produced two maps showing the Italian line during the Bebler–Guidotti conversations² and the Yugoslav line. He pointed out that the Italian line represented a serious attempt at an ethnic solution and that the Yugoslav line could not possibly be regarded as a serious effort to negotiate on such a basis.

The Secretary agreed with Ambassador Tarchiani’s view but pointed out that the final solution could not be based on Italian insistence on the line that Mr. Tarchiani showed him. We had given considerable study to this question and had felt that there would have to be substantial concessions from the Italian position, maybe as far as to Priano.

The Ambassador said that of course the Italian line did not represent a final view and they were anxious to negotiate towards some such solution as that envisaged by the Secretary. They felt it impossible, however, to get anywhere with the Yugoslavs when Marshal Tito kept attacking them publicly every day and the Yugoslav Government took a consistently adamant position towards any concession whatsoever on their part. Furthermore, the Yugoslavs’ demands seemed to become greater rather than less, and they kept insisting that the present time was not propitious to negotiate. The Ambassador said that he really considered in dealing with Yugoslavia we must not think of them in terms of New England, but in terms of the Balkans, and that as long as Tito was able to obtain the military and economic assistance which he desired from us, there would be no possibility of persuading him to be reasonable with regard to Trieste.

The Secretary said that the Yugoslavs felt that we had been partial to the Italians and resented the recent arrangements regarding the Zone A administration. The Secretary then related the developments in London during his conversation with Mr. Eden concerning Trieste and said that we were now studying the matter further with the British with a view to seeing whether we could not now make a further approach to both parties that they should sit down and start negotiating again, emphasizing that the negotiations should be swift and must not bog down as they had before.

The Ambassador reiterated the importance to Italy of this question and repeated that its solution was essential to the forthcoming elections in Italy.

Greek–Yugoslav Staff Talks

The Ambassador then took up the forthcoming Greek–Yugoslav staff talks.³ He said that regardless of what the Yugoslavs or Greeks might tell us he was sure that they would discuss Albania. Italy was very concerned about this. Albania is only 55 miles from Italy and commands the outlet to the Adriatic Sea. Greece and Yugoslavia might very well make some plan for action in Albania regardless of the danger involved with the the Soviet Union. The other countries of the west might suddenly find themselves faced with a reckless Balkan move in that country. Italy itself considered that any division of Albania between Yugoslavia and Greece would be totally unacceptable and that our policy should always be for an independent Albania.

The Secretary said that we were in full agreement with regard to this. We continued to favor strongly the preservation of Albanian independence and were fully aware of Italy’s interest in the matter. We had had no information that the Greeks and Yugoslavs in fact intended to discuss this subject.

Defense Assistance

The Ambassador referred to the recent unfortunate developments in the Italian balance of payments which resulted from reduction of trade between Italy, the United Kingdom and France. The estimates which had gone into making up the Italian figures should be revised and the Italians were in fact in the process of drawing up new figures to present to us. He believed that the reduction of the original $110 million figure of economic assistance for Italy to $77.5 million⁴ would represent an unrealistic amount of aid inadequate to sustain the Italian defense effort or to meet the internal economic problems of the Italian Government during the pre-election period. The Secretary said that we were very sympathetic to the Italian postion and were studying it very carefully.

The Ambassador also referred to the political necessity that Italy be included in the first list of countries to receive an allotment of defense support assistance for the Fiscal Year 1953, especially since Yugoslavia, France and the United Kingdom will probably be included.

The Secretary replied that it is not planned to publish a list of such allotments and that pending a final decision on defense support assistance which will follow the NATO Annual Review, allotments will be limited to countries having serious immediate balance of payments difficulties, and countries toward which we have special commitments. In specific cases allotments may also be made to allow orderly and timely procurement of commodities and equipment and we understood that Italy’s needs would also be studied by MSA in that connection.

Trade Restrictions

The Italian Ambassador referred to the recent difficulties of Italy in connection with the restrictions placed on cheese and garlic and expressed appreciation for the Department’s support in having these restrictions removed. The Secretary affirmed that our opposition to such restrictions remains unchanged.

Immigration

Ambassador Tarchiani expressed the interest of the Italian Government in the Administration’s Bill for admission in three years of 300,000 immigrants, one-third of which would be Italians. The Secretary said we shared the Italian opinion on the desirability of this Bill, but that it was a matter that was up to Congress and we should not be optimistic as to its early passage.

. . . . . . .

U.S. Claims

At the conclusion of the conversation, the Secretary requested the Ambassador while in Italy to present to his Government’s attention the need for further action by the Italian Government in settling the claims of U.S. citizens for war damages under Articles 78 of the Peace Treaty. The Ambassador said that he thought Italian performance was improving and specifically mentioned the recent settlement of the Standard Oil claims. In any event, he said that he would take this up with the appropriate officials in Rome.

1. For a record of this earlier meeting between Tarchiani and Matthews, see Document 727.
2. Documentation on Trieste, including the Bebler–Guidotti conversations, is scheduled for publication in volume viii.
3. Documentation concerning the Greek–Yugoslav staff talks is scheduled for publication in volume viii.
4. A memorandum prepared in the Office of Western European Affairs which commented on the proposed reduction in economic assistance to Italy for FY 1953 and which was attached to a memorandum from Ridgway B. Knight to Martin, July 11, is printed as Document 264.