Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

765.00/7–852: Telegram

No. 729
The Ambassador in Italy (Bunker) to the Department of State¹

confidential

Rome, July 8, 1952—4 p.m.

88. Fol is comment on Southern elections and their implications for 1953:

Pattern which appeared in scattered voting in South last year (Embdes 2279, Mar 28, 1952²) was confirmed this May, with CD Party dropping about four tenths of its 1948 vote in South, losing Naples, Bari and some other Southern cities to Rightists. Taking last year’s results together with those this year to have nationwide picture, CDs and minor democratic allies polled 51 percent of total vote (compared to 62 percent in 1948 giving them 64 percent of Chamber seats) while Social-Communists polled 35 percent and Rightists 12 percent.

But signs are not that Center coalition is currently in full retreat but that Center’s vote-getting power fell back from phenomenal 1948 peak very soon after that voting and has now more or less stabilized at level indicated by 1951–52 results. In those spots where voting last year was repeated this May, CD Party picked up votes, while Social-Communists and Rightists remained stationary. Even considering whole four-year period since 1948 Social-Communist vote remained stationary except in South where Leftist “vacuum” had existed—filled by intense organizational effort spreading over several years bringing Social-Communist strength as measured by 1952 elections closer to natl average. As for Rightists, besides signs of leveling off in past 12 months there is fact that South has consistently had high Rightist vote in post-war period. Sole exception was 1948 which came at uniquely favorable instant for CDs because “Common Man” Party had already spent itself and MSI had not yet emerged. Before and after 1948, CD vote has shown surprising stability. While this means that 1948 CD vote cannot be counted on again, it also suggests that present lesser but stable CD vote can be expected in 1953. Minor allies can also be expected to contribute approx same vote they did in 1951–52.

Foregoing suggests that Center coalition’s 51 percent of natl vote is not likely to drop further. There are also reasons to believe it will increase some between now and 1953:

1. Mechanics of 1952 electoral law resulted in over a million blank ballots, bulk of which will probably be democratic votes next year (Embdes 2997, June 22, 1952³).

2. Total vote cast was million and a half less than in 1948 while next year it should be as great or greater than in 1948 (because of population increase). Absentees in off elections are notoriously not the extremists.

3. There are signs that land reform and social projects have already made as many enemies as they are going to make and in spots they are beginning to make friends.

Consequently, still slim but slightly increased democratic margin seems likely, even if De Gasperi were not taking special measures to alter situation in his favor:

Worse conceivable possibility which Emb does not believe will materialize, and still assuming no special action by De Gasperi, would be further drift away from Center—putting it in minority. Then De Gasperi would have to (1) try governing as minority— which he has already done once on sufferance of Common Man Party and others in 1947, (2) try deal with Right, or (3) hold new elections, as no single bloc would be parliamentary majority. Although none of foregoing alternatives would promise stable govt, outright Communist victory would not in any case be immediate danger.

But De Gasperi and CD Party have indicated since 1952 elections that they do intend special action to alter situation in their favor: (1) by strong govt policy against extremists (Embtels 5396 and 5679⁴) and (2) by changing electoral law to achieve stable parliamentary majority even with reduced margin at polls (Embdes 2744, May 21, 1952⁵). Emb believes this program will be successful.

Only alternatives to retaining Center coalition and reinforcing it by above and all other possible measures, would be to broaden it to right or to left.

As regards right, adding Monarchist’s four percent of national vote would achieve little and would probably cause Republicans, Social Dems and some Liberals to desert coalition, leaving it weaker than it has been to present. In preelectoral negotiations this year Republicans served notice that they would leave govt if CDs even allied with Monarchists on local level in a few Southern cities. They could hardly stomach natl political alliance with Monarchists now. Even adding both Monarchists and MSI would not make up for minor party defections. Further danger is that minor parties, faced with “monarchicoclerico-Fascist alliance,” would be prey to Communists, whose main apparent preelectoral aim is to break out of the isolation successfully imposed on them by using “anti-fascism” and “defense of Republic” to separate Social Dems and Republicans from Democratic Center (Embdes 2833, June 5, 1952⁶).

As regards left, Emb regards Nenni’s overture to democratic parties with extreme suspicion (Embdes 2833 also) and his current trip to East Berlin Partisans-of-Peace Congress tends to confirm it.

Extreme left-wing Social Dems and others offer somewhat special solution to problem of defending Ital democracy. They say: “If we were not forced by electoral laws to identify ourselves with CD Party—which compromises us with workers—and if we had real US financial and other support, we could cut into Communist strength and reduce its menace.”

Emb believes it very doubtful that ties with CD (linking, etc) are actual reason why non-Communist left has failed to crack Social-Communist shell, because (1) elections results do not show Social Dems suffered from linking (Embdes 2939, June 19, 1952⁷) (2) Cucchi–Magnani movement in year and half of effort with sizable covert financial support in past months (apparently from Jugoslavs, others) averaged only about one half of one percent of vote in Rome and Bari and even in selected smaller towns where candidates put up totals were negligible. Movement’s strength in Communist areas to north is if anything less. Furthermore much of support they do have was achieved by raids on Social Democrats. (3) In four years since 1948 with defections of Romita and others from PSI, formation PSU (whose aim was to convert Socialists) departure PSLI from govt on PSU insistence, etc. Social-Democratic vote has not increased at all.

The possibility of some new maneuver along lines suggested by left-wing Social Democrats being successful in months that remain before elections seems very small. On the other hand subtraction of present Social Democratic strength from Center coalition, would greatly increase likelihood of CD-Rightist alliance.

In conclusion, Emb believes that with hard work Center coalition will pull through next year’s elections and that departure from it would only increase dangers to Ital stability and democracy. Recommendations contained in Embtel 3275, Jan 21, 1952,⁸ and also views expressed in Embtel sent Paris 25, rptd info Dept 114⁹ seem best US course for next months.

Bunker

1. Sent also to London, Paris, and Moscow.
2. See footnote 5, Document 725.
3. This nine-page despatch viewed the 1951 and 1952 local elections as a measure of political trends in Italy. (765.00/6–2352)
4. Telegram 5396 from Rome, June 10, commented on the points of a communiqué issued after a June 5–6 meeting of the Central Committee of the Christian Democratic Party. (765.00/6–1052) Telegram 5679 from Rome, June 25, commented on the decisions reached at the Christian Democratic National Council meeting of June 21–24. (765.00/6–2552)
5. Despatch 2744 discussed the national electoral law and the views of the various political parties regarding changes in it. (765.00/5–2152)
6. Despatch 2833 reported on the public statements and the private overtures which the head of the Partito Sociale Italiano (PSI), Pietro Nenni, had made to certain Italian officials indicating he might take a line more independent of the Communist Party. It also analyzed the basic political strategy of the Communist Party. The Embassy concluded that, while reports from sources close to De Gasperi indicated that the Prime Minister did not believe Nenni to be sincere, the best policy for the United States, irrespective of the sincerity of Nenni’s overtures, was skeptically to await “concrete signs” of Nenni’s independence. (765.00/6–552)
7. Not printed, but see Document 726.
8. Document 722.
9. This telegram, dated July 9, and sent to Paris for SRE, included the following recommendations regarding U.S. military assistance to Italy: (1) at all levels the United States should quietly urge the Italian authorities to carry on as rapidly as possible the defense commitments already made without undertaking further commitments of substantial size, (2) the United States should maintain the level of aid to Italy at the highest point possible until after the elections, especially in the OSP field, (3) continuous attention should be given to the matter of restricting the size of American agencies, both civilian and military, so as to minimize the “overpowering ubiquity of Americans now in Europe engaged in defense operations,” and (4) care should be taken not to press the Italian Government into greater haste than its own political situation would permit. In this regard, increasing evidence was noted of resentment in Italy of U.S. officials urging the Italian Government to accomplish various goals by specific deadlines. (765.5 MSP/7–952)