Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

765.00/1–2152: Telegram

No. 722
The Ambassador in Italy (Dunn) to the Department of State¹

secret

Rome, January 21, 1952—8 p.m.

3275. Political scene in Italy presents, superficially at least, aspect of confused and frustrated drifting which is all the more discouraging since local elections in south are only three months off and natl elections little more than a year away. Situation has elements of real danger and political stability in Italy, depending as it does on work of one man—De Gasperi can no longer be taken for granted in our calculations. Some implications for our policy are suggested at end of this telegram.

Background of course is unremitting activity of whole Communist party apparatus in complicating difficult enough task of political, social, moral, and economic reconstruction of Italy after twenty years of fascism and destruction and demoralization of war and occupations. Overt aspects of Communism have for past two years remained essentially within frame of legality and have successfully concealed subversive objectives. By a never ceasing campaign of propaganda, closely keyed to internatl and internal events, exploiting fears of war of possible Soviet occupation; by imaginative use of possible Soviet occupation; by imaginative use of demagoguery, deception and fraud, by appeals to prejudices, by exploitation of appalling difficulties of govt, by control of the main tradition of Italian Socialism, all supported by seemingly unlimited financial resources, they have successfully identified themselves with the hopes, fears and frustration of 30 to 40 percent of electorate.²

Govt parties, faced with imminent elections, have suddenly realized that having concentrated for four years essentially on business of govt and their own private affairs, with only intermittent attempt to keep support of public opinion, field has been left virtually clear to Commies. Even such progress in social reforms as have been achieved has been turned against govt by clever distortion of Communists. Necessity for counterattack on same massive agitation-propaganda level is only now being appreciated. Importance of their getting underway in such a program and of our assisting in any appropriate way cannot be overstressed.

Tensions generated by appreciation of danger have resulted in intensification of factionalism, in apportioning blame and in proposing cures. One symptom or resulting search for political support is attitude of parties in each wishing to control its own labor organization (Embtel 3172, Jan 14).³

All democratic parties seem by their current actions to have forgotten anti-Communistic mandate given them by voters in 1948 and bickering and maneuvering for place and for party advantage a predominate note. Necessity of common action in larger interest of preserving democracy is seldom noticed in their actions.

As to individual parties, liberals have taken in some progressive elements and hope to increase their limited electoral appeal. Republicans have no chance of growth but, such as they are, remain fully committed to support of govt policies and to cooperation in coalition govt.

Democratic Socialists have eloquent testimony during recent congress at Bologna that unification last year was achieved on paper only. Left factions oppose participation in govt on principle but rationalize their position as tactic to “attract” support from tightly controlled Communist-Socialist alliance, made necessary by imbalance in size between PSDI and CDs. However, what voter now supporting PCI–PSI wants is more protection or satisfaction to his personal material interests than is now provided by Commies and he is not swayed by metaphysical web-spinning of intellectuals and politicians in Rome. He is not likely to be “attracted” by a pallid reflection of powerful appeal which Communist tactic makes to his often ignorant and prejudiced mind. PSDI has real but limited role to play and we shld particularly support those elements which recognize limitations of what they can accomplish in present situation and which are ready to share responsibility for govt. It is, however, understandable if they wish to stay out of govt for present to have freer hand for electoral campaign, and although Bologna Congress took firm position against linking with other parties in natl elections, this line may well be changed.

Christian Democrats representing all shades of economic interest from left to right are beset by factionalism, intensified by jockeying for position in preparation for their natl congress in June. Reconciliation of conflicting interests of these factions is overriding concern of CD leaders in govt and principal immediate threat to its stability. Situation described Embtel 2791, Dec 23,⁴ is breaking out again and opposition to Pella is a symbol of desire of some elements in party to bring govt down in order advance their personal interests. One consolation in this picture is that attacks on CDs by other parties, combined with undoubted commitment of church to unity of Catholic forces within CD Party, will suffice to hold party together and there is already noticeable a beginning of intense organizational activity in preparation for election.

On right, Monarchists have joined forces with neo-Fascist MSI and MSI and this coalition will get substantial proportion of right wing vote. CD leaders are doing their best behind scenes to break up this combination. Groups of Monarchists will probably join with CDs and other democratic parties in some places in local elections this spring, but harnessing of this right wing vote to democratic purposes in natl elections is very real problem. Some observers think that in showdown this vote will go to CDs, as it did in 1948, but present indications do not justify this optimism.

New natl elections will almost certainly be held under a new electoral law which will give CDs more seats than they wld obtain under straight proportional system now prevailing. Possibility of relatively high absenteeism in vote is greatest cause for concern. It is possible that set-back in local elections this spring, or internal or internatl events exposing once more real aims of Communists, will snap democratic parties out of current apathy but erosion of power and leadership is real problem.

Present democratic leadership has been engaged for almost ten years in daily critical struggle for establishment and preservation of democracy. It is small wonder that leadership, meagre as it is after twenty years of fascism, is tired, and fails to give dramatic lead to public opinion or to take kind of forceful actions which wld draw support away from Communists.

Unparalleled catastrophe of recent floods was material disaster requiring diversion of enormous financial resources from other important uses. Worse than this, handling of problem by govt demonstrated defects of leadership and as result was exploited by Communists.

Astonishing economic recovery of Italy has concealed relatively much slower progress in psychological and moral recovery. Stimulating effect of Gen Eisenhower’s appointment in Europe and vigorous start which was given to rearmament for common defense has virtually petered out. Support of public opinion for NAT has not waivered but most of officialdom and leaders of democratic parties are convinced that expenditures for social purposes must have priority over additional defense expenditures.

Magnitude of long-range problem of unemployment and of population in relation to productive capacity and resources intensifies sense of discouragement. Some hope is seen in potentialities of tackling these problems in larger framework of developing European unity but progress in this is still too slow to have substantial economic effect in next few years.

All parties increasingly rely on nationalist appeal as measure of genuine self-assertion and to distract from internal difficulties. Long years of dependence on US relationship, combined with insistent attacks on left and right for “subservience” to US, is having its effect. Govt increasingly feels need to demonstrate its independence in internatl field, particularly in its relations with us.

Some implications of this situation for our policy are:

(1) US leadership and patient encouragement of democratic forces is more necessary than ever and if wisely exercised will be welcomed;

(2) We must be exceedingly careful to avoid public criticism of conditions in Italy by US officials in any branch of the govt. Such criticism will simply make matters worse;

We must also recognize tendency to transfer responsibility for troubles to others, even to us. We must be patient and influence which we bring to bear must be brought in private;

(3) We must recognize necessity of doing everything we can to help hold together political forces which formed coalition govt after 1948 elections. (Together they got 55 percent of vote in local elections last spring—compared to about 62 percent in 1948.) With 30 to 40 percent of electorate on left and 10 percent on right controlled by those intent on subversion of entire govt system, there is little room to maneuver. We must not be deluded into breaking up any elements of that coalition with illusory hope of being able to compete in demagoguery with Communists;

(4) We must plan our actions both public and private in support of democratic political parties with view to assuring their success in elections regardless of whether we are satisfied with their composition or with all their policies;

(5) Civic comites, which have been training political activists for precisely this task, will have same crucial part to play as they did in 1948 in getting out the vote on non-party anti-Communist basis;

(6) Most fruitful work which USIS can do is in support of efforts of Itals themselves. Overt US propaganda labeled as such cannot do much to help situation. We must, of course, keep before Ital public full explanation our purposes and policies but, to extent there is feeling against US, identifiable US activities intensify it rather than cure it. …

Dunn

1. Repeated to Paris for the Embassy, OSR, and MacArthur; to London for the Embassy and Spofford; and to Moscow, Bonn, Brussels, and The Hague.
2. In despatch 1606 of Jan. 10, the Counselor of Embassy in Italy, Thompson, offered his reflections “on the nature of the Italian Communist Party at the present juncture of international developments”. Following a three-page analysis of the relationship between the Italian Communist Party and Moscow, Thompson stated, “On balance it would seem that Moscow should be highly displeased with a party that next to the French CP is the most important section of the Cominform abroad and claims a membership of over two million members while controlling the best organized trade union in the country but which with all this is capable of causing so relatively little harm to Italian reconstruction”. Moreover, he concluded that Italy had reached the point “where barring Red Army invasion any internal disturbance on a large scale directed by Communists would arise not because of any master plan of the Kremlin and its fifth column but rather because of a desperate social and economic situation that could be exploited by the CP. Accordingly there are grounds for being relatively optimistic on the condition that the Italian Government makes a serious effort in the direction of convincing its citizens that they have stakes in the country that are worth defending even by arms if necessary”. (765.001/1–1052)
3. Telegram 3172 described developments at an interregional convention of Christian Democratic workers at Turin early in January at which Party Secretary, Guido Gonella called for a solely Christian Democratic labor organ and criticized the non-political stand of free trade unionism. (865.062/1–1452) A more complete report on developments at this convention is in despatch 1699 from Rome, Jan. 22. (765.00/1–2252)
4. Telegram 2791 reported on Senate passage on Dec. 21, 1951, after much opposition and amid rumors that passage would precipitate a government crisis, of a bill giving expanded powers to the Minister of the Budget, Giuseppe Pella. (765.34/12–2351)