Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

611.00/4–953: Telegram

No. 590
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

top secret
priority

Paris, April 9, 1953—8 p.m.

5401. To Secretary from Dillon (eyes only). Re Deptel 5140.² I saw Mayer this afternoon and let him read the summary of the President’s speech for April 16.³ He was very grateful of this opportunity to see the preliminary summary and wants to convey his appreciation to the President. He read the summary very carefully and felt that in general it was excellent and would serve a very useful purpose. He said that he had told Bedell Smith in New York last Tuesday⁴ that it was important for the United States to take the initiative on the peace front. He feels we should push the Soviets to a concrete decision of substance to them as rapidly as possible. He sees such a decision in the Austrian Treaty as here the work is practically complete and a yes or no answer could be obtained in short order. Acceptance of an Austrian Treaty by the Soviets followed by the evacuation of their troops from Austria, Hungary and Rumania would, he feels, be a concrete indication that they are willing to consider peaceful solutions of other problems. He has a real fear of a four-power meeting to cover all issues as he thinks the Soviets could drag such a meeting out interminably and meanwhile the free world would necessarily be more or less marking time in their rearmament effort. He said that he had talked this problem over with Bidault on the voyage home and that Bidault was in complete agreement with his reasoning.

He had one comment of real substance on the summary which he specifically hoped that I would pass on. He is afraid of creating a reunited Germany which he assumes would be a neutralized and disarmed Germany before an agreement is reached with the Soviets on disarmament. A reunited Germany, he feels, would have more temptation to consider dealing with the east and unless a world-wide disarmament program is in effect, he fears the possibility of reunited Germany joining with the Soviets and then being armed by them against the free peoples. He said that France could not permit the creation of such a free and united Germany unless it was done simultaneously with the achievement of a real disarmament program. He hopes very much that the President will take this position when he makes his speech. He also referred to his statement of yesterday at Le Havre which he said was made after much thought that “equilibrium must be achieved in the world and it can be achieved in two ways, either by general disarmament or by building up the strength of the free peoples until we achieve such equilibrium.” Thus he feels we should proceed with the EDC and the rearmament of Western Germany until the Soviet agrees to general disarmament. Only then can we agree to a disarmed and united Germany.

His final comment was on Indochina. He felt that the first statement regarding an end to direct and indirect attacks upon the security of the peoples of Indochina was excellent but he pointed out that the points immediately following all related to Korea and contained no specific mention of peace in Indochina. He hoped the President could strengthen his statement regarding the necessity for an Indochina settlement simultaneous with or immediately following a Korean settlement.

Dillon

1. Repeated to London eyes only for Aldrich and to Bonn eyes only for Reber.
2. Same as telegram 6665, Document 396.
3. President Eisenhower consulted with Prime Minister Churchill, Chancellor Adenauer, and Prime Minister Mayer concerning the text of his “Chance for Peace” speech which was scheduled to be delivered on Apr. 16 before the American Society of Newspaper Editors. For the text of this speech which was delivered after some revision, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 179–188, or Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 27, 1953, pp. 599–603.
4. Apr. 7.