Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

711.11 EI/4–853: Telegram

No. 396
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

top secret
priority

Washington, April 8, 1953—4: 37 p.m.

6665. Eyes only Aldrich. Pls inform Churchill and Mayer in strict confidence that in light apparent shift in Sov tactics since death Stalin, Pres has decided he shld in near future address American people on present world situation. Broadcast now planned for Apr 16. In view importance of issues involved and necessity at this critical time closest consultation between us and our major allies Pres desires them to be informed line he proposes take.

There follows summary main points proposed address for info Churchill and Mayer. No objection their reading summary but copies shld not be left with them. You shld stress necessity holding this info strict secrecy.²

FYI. Secy will similarly inform Adenauer tomorrow.³

Begin summary.

At the end of World War II all men hoped for a just and lasting peace, but in the eight years that have passed, the United States and the other free nations have followed one road to security, while the Soviet Union chose another. Adhering to principles of mutual trust and mutual aid, our way was faithful to the spirit that inspired the United Nations, whereas the Soviets have sought the path of power superiority at all costs. The amassing of Soviet power has compelled the free nations to rearm and to adopt measures of collective self-defense. The result is that mankind seems to face alternatives of atomic war at worst, or life of perpetual fear and tension at best. Is there no other way the world may live?

With the death of Stalin, the new Soviet leadership has the opportunity to make its own future and to free itself, if it wishes, from the incubus of the past. This new Soviet leadership confronts an aroused free world which knows that Western Europe can and will be made secure against attack only by swift completion of the structure of the EDC. It also knows that Western Germany must be made a free and equal partner in this community, this being for Germany the only way to full and final unity. The free world also knows that aggressions in Korea and in Southeast Asia are threats to the whole free community to be met by united action.

Will the new Soviet leadership take advantage of this present moment of decision to help turn the tide of history? Recent Soviet statements and gestures give some evidence of recognizing the critical moment before us, but we are impatient of mere rhetoric. We care only for sincerity, tested by deeds.

With all who will enter upon the work in good faith we are ready to strive to a real peace and carry out four great necessary tasks.

The first task is the ending of the wars and aggressions in Asia. This means much more than a truce in Korea. It means a secure and united Korea—and an end to the direct and indirect attacks upon the security of the peoples in Indochina and Malaya. We are ready to take our part in restoring in Korea a peace that will include the following:

(1) the immediate cessation of hostilities coincidentally with the voluntary exchange of prisoners;

(2) the holding of free elections under UN supervision in the reunited part of Korea;

(3) the extending of American aid to rebuild housing, transportation and industries in all parts of Korea;

(4) the establishment of a “neutral zone” in northern Korea along the Yalu river;

(5) thereafter the withdrawal of all foreign troops from a free and secure Korea.

The second great task is the achievement of just political settlements for other immediate and specific issues between the Soviets and the free world:

(1) We are ready to begin by speeding the conclusion of a treaty with Austria which will free that country from economic exploitation and occupation by foreign troops.

(2) We are ready not only to press forward with the present plans for closer unity of the nations of Western Europe but on that foundation also to strive to foster a broader European community conducive to the free movement of persons, of trade, and of ideas.

(3) This community would include a free and united Germany, with a government based upon free and secret elections.

(4) It would mean the return of the Eastern European nations to the community of free nations, and so end the present unnatural division of Europe.

The third great task is the reduction of the burden of armaments. We are ready to enter into most solemn agreements including the following:

(1) the limitation, by absolute numbers or by an agreed international ratio, of the sizes of the military and security forces of all nations;

(2) a commitment by all nations to limit to a small fixed percentage (or even a sliding-scale percentage) of total production that proportion of certain strategic materials, particularly steel, to be devoted to military purposes;

(3) international control of atomic energy to ensure and to promote its use for peaceful purposes only and prohibition on weapons of mass destruction;

(4) the enforcement of all these agreed limitations by adequate safeguards, including a practical system of inspection under the United Nations.

The fourth and greatest of all the tasks, stemming from the successful carrying out of the first three tasks, would be a new kind of war, not upon any human enemy, but upon the brute forces of poverty and need. The United States Government is ready to ask its people to join with all nations in devoting a substantial percentage of the savings achieved by disarmament to a fund for world aid and relief to help other peoples to develop the underdeveloped areas of the world, to stimulate profitable and fair world trade, to assist all peoples to know the blessings of productive freedom.

By carrying out these major tasks we are ready to make the United Nations an institution that can effectively guard the peace and security of all peoples.

What is the Soviet Union ready to do? Is its new leadership prepared to use its decisive influence in the communist world, including control of the flow of arms, to bring not merely an expedient truce in Korea but genuine peace in Asia? Is it prepared to allow other nations, especially in Eastern Europe, the free choice of their own forms of government and the right to associate freely with other nations in a worldwide community of law? Is it prepared to act in concert with others upon serious disarmament proposals to be made firmly effective by stringent UN control and inspection?

If not, where then is the concrete evidence of the Soviet concern for peace?

If we fail to strive to seize this moment’s precious chance to turn the tide, the judgment of future ages would be harsh and just, but if we strive, but fail, it will be clear who has condemned humankind to this black fate.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Bonbright and Thurston and cleared with Matthews and Nitze. Repeated to Paris and Bonn, eyes only for Dillon and Reber.
2. Regarding Mayer’s reaction to the proposed speech, see telegram 5401 from Paris, Apr. 9, Part 2, Document 590.
3. Regarding the discussion of the proposed speech with Adenauer on Apr. 9, see Riddleberger’s memorandum, Apr. 9, vol. vii, Part 1, p. 447.