Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
No. 397
Prime Minister Churchill
to President Eisenhower1
[London,] April 11, 1953.
Thank you so much for sending me an advance copy of your proposed speech.2 This is indeed a grave and formidable declaration. [Page 971] You will not I am sure, expect me to commit Her Majesty’s Government to the many vital points with which it deals except to say that we are, as ever, wholly with you in the common struggle against communist aggression.
- 2.
- I believe myself that at this moment time is on our side. The apparent change of Soviet mood is so new and so indefinite and its causes so obscure that there could not be much risk in letting things develop. We do not know what these men mean. We do not want to deter them from saying what they mean. Hitherto they have been the aggressors and have done us wrong at a hundred points. We cannot trade their leaving off doing wrong against our necessary defensive measures and policies which action demands and has procured.
- 3.
- Nevertheless, great hope has arisen in the world that there is a change of heart in the vast, mighty masses of Russia and this can carry them far and fast and perhaps into revolution. It has been well said that the most dangerous moment for evil governments is when they begin to reform. Nothing impressed me so much as the doctor story.3 This must cut very deeply into communist discipline and structure. I would not like it to be thought that a sudden American declaration has prevented this natural growth of events.
- 4.
- All this comes to a particular point upon Korea. I was hoping that at least we should secure at this juncture a bona fide, lasting and effective truce in Korea which might mean the end of that show as a world problem. Indeed, if nothing more than this happened everyone would rejoice. I hope that you will consider what a tremendous score it would be for us all if we could bring off this truce. It seems to me very unlikely that the terms you require for a later political settlement of Korea as set out in your statement would be accepted as they stand by the other side. I fear that the formal promulgation of your five points at this moment might quench the hope of an armistice.
- 5.
- Anthony and I have in mind important comments we could make on your text, but we are not putting them forward now as we hope that our arguments will persuade you to bide your time. We cannot see what you would lose by waiting till the full character and purpose of the Soviet change is more clearly defined and also is apparent to the whole free world. I always like the story of Napoleon going to sleep in his chair as the battle began, saying “Wake me when their infantry column gets beyond the closest wood”.
- 6.
- In Anthony’s unfortunate but temporary illness I have had to take over the Foreign Office. But this telegram is addressed to you as part of our personal correspondence. I am however showing it to Makins and Aldrich.
- 7.
- Pray let me know what you decide.
Kindest regards,
Winston
- The source text was attached to a letter from Makins to President Eisenhower, dated Apr. 11.↩
- Transmitted in telegram 6665, supra.↩
- Documentation on the doctors’ plot, announced in the Soviet press on Jan. 13, 1953 is scheduled for publication in volume viii.↩