611.51/3–3053: Telegram
No. 589
The Secretary of
State to the Embassy in
France1
5040. Paris pass Bruce. President presided over final meeting with Prime Minister Mayer and French delegation at White House March 28.
Final communiqué was agreed after further discussion concerning Saar (handled by Mayer) and France’s status as world power as reflected in communiqué (handled by Bidault)2
Mayer obviously attaches primary importance to Saar settlement as condition precedent to French ratification and insisted that even if French Government took different position (which it does not) he was positive Parliament would not ratify EDC until accord on Saar had been reached. Promised however French would work toward Saar settlement with greatest speed possible and that lack of Saar settlement would not prevent Government from playing active role in promoting ratification both in country and in Parliamentary circles and thus creating proper kind of public opinion in France favorable to EDC. He expressed hope Adenauer would also be made to understand US position that Franco-German differences concerning Saar should not impede ratification.
President assured Mayer US Government in no way belittles economic and political importance of Saar to France and it was our hope that we could help in settlement of matter. We believe it pointless to discuss which should come first: Saar settlement or EDC ratification. Instead we prefer to take position that both should be pushed forward in parallel fashion with greatest speed. President then again made point that basic American hope was that nothing would be allowed to delay progress on EDC because of its fundamental importance. He added that we would take same general position toward Saar with Chancellor Adenauer as we had taken with Mr. Mayer, and that as friends of both sides we would urge most rapid progress possible.
Reference to Indo-China, President said of course we were intent upon doing nothing which in any way might increase France’s difficulties [Page 1342] there. Instead we wanted to help. As matter of fact, statement was now being prepared within US Government concerning Far East, and Indo-China and Korea would be linked therein. President added that US representatives had been somewhat disappointed in plan which had been outlined by Mr. Letourneau at Pentagon on March 27 a.m.,3 particularly by slowness of its timetable. He wanted to make clear, however, that while there was no US commitment to support this plan likewise there had been no US refusal to do so. Plan required more careful study and President noted that this should be possible as Mr. Letourneau was planning to stay until March 31 p.m.
Re Indo-China plan, Mayer said concerning slowness of its timetable that while raising forces takes time it might perhaps be possible to accelerate this even if human factors involved might lead to somewhat lower quality of forces. However perhaps more difficult is fact that there exists as yet no agreement concerning military requirements. Mayer suggested that elaboration of this plan could be completed in Saigon with participation of US officers which Pentagon might care to send there for this purpose and that this aspect of problem could thus be covered by further discussions between military technicians.
President said that US technicians will be glad to cooperate with French along above lines.
- Drafted by Ridgway B. Knight and cleared with MacArthur and Bonbright. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Saigon. According to a memorandum by Knight, dated Mar. 30, MacArthur and he agreed that this telegram adequately covered the substance of the discussion and that no separate minutes were required. (Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 141)↩
- For the text of the final communiqué, which was issued on Mar. 28, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 6, 1953, pp. 491–492.↩
- Regarding these talks at the Pentagon relating to Indochina, see the editorial note, vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 434.↩