611.51/3–2753: Telegram
No. 585
The Secretary of
State to the Embassy in
France1
5001. French delegation met with Secretary, Secretary of Treasury, Director Mutual Security (Defense represented by Assistant Secretary Nash) for three hours yesterday afternoon. Ambassadors Cambodia and Vietnam attended initial portion session devoted general exposé Indochina situation. Following their departure further discussion Indochina problem took place and Secretary also replied to points made by Mayer to President during morning2 but which latter had not had time answer. Last portion session devoted French desire recognition her worldwide position and east-west trade.
Mayer in introducing Letourneau made it clear Vietnam and Cambodia independent states and their peoples fighting maintain their freedom. Letourneau stressed French interest in creating strong free states Indochina that would later not lose through political weakness what they had gained militarily. He also highlighted importance recent “Dalat decisions” providing increased Vietnamese financial effort and creation 54 new Vietnamese battalions comprising 40,000 men. He said new units would be light, mobile [Page 1332] type best suited Indochinese war and would result in more rapid pacification many areas permitting release French troops for offensive operations. He noted plan for 54 additional battalions in 1954 if funds available and concluded no alternative to Dalat decisions now existed. While he could not promise complete victory he believed implementation this plan which is reasonable and practical would result in breaking back Vietminh in 24 months. Finally he stated his conviction true Vietnamese nationalism resided Bao Dai and his government and supporters and not Vietminh who were Soviet-controlled.
Cambodian and Vietnamese Ambassadors made brief remarks. Secretary concluded this portion meeting reiterating our realization this was common war which while now restricted Korea and Indochina, might break out anywhere. He expressed hope for program commensurate with peril which we realized might call for additional assistance our part. He concluded such assistance depended on many factors most important was whether plan France and Associated States was practical.
After departure Associated States Ambassadors Secretary stated we understood French feeling tiredness in Indochina after seven years warfare but expressed conviction feeling would evaporate in face of positive constructive program and concluded we must not be immobilized by fear.
Mayer and Letourneau posed questions what we would do event Chinese Communist offensive Indochina and if we didn’t think Korean armistice might cause considerable risk Chinese attack Indochina. Secretary said he thought Chinese Communist attack unlikely because they realize would start chain disasters far outweighing any possible gains and while there no question land invasion of China, vista of trouble through sea and air attack would be strong deterrent to them. Nash stated recent talks on five-power cooperation Southeast Asia had made considerable progress and mentioned forthcoming meeting Honolulu where five-power talks would continue on invitation Admiral Radford.3 Secretary agreed might be necessary for military reasons talk about what we would do in event evacuation but concluded firmly he convinced there would be no evacuation. He also noted, in unlikely event Korean armistice, that if Chinese obviously simply concluded such arrangement order transport troops attack Indochina, armistice would have automatically failed purpose. Finally he referred to integral [Page 1333] connection two wars as contained President’s State Union Message.4
Secretary also commented on points raised by Mayer with President. He said we agreed with French it would be easier if sustained level expenditures over considerable period time for aid France could be effected but legislative processes made this impossible. He added he hoped we might be in position say more during NATO meeting Paris. On EDC he recognized progress made in obtaining acceptance protocols and noted we recognized French Government making strenuous effort obtain ratification. Secretary added we were so far along road to EDC he saw no turning back and no acceptable alternative. (EDC to be discussed more fully today.)
In reply Mayer’s presentation to President, Secretary also commented on Saar problem saying we understood importance area to France and also political difficulties it raised Germany, and recognized importance early settlement. However he said Saar settlement did not appear as condition precedent EDC ratification our view. He added we prepared use our good offices in matter and such influence as proper.
To point expressed in morning to President re France’s world position Secretary said we recognized this position and would continue do so long as France continued furnish leadership in world as she had since war. He stressed world power position cannot be artificial but based on facts life. He said French post-war record should lay at rest any anxiety this score and characterized France one of elite nations in world with vision and courage.
Bidault continued this point saying France wondered if in future she would be just one of many European countries after EDC and EPC went into effect and referred to notes to US and UK on French proposal periodic tripartite consultations and concerted action. Secretary said we had considered this very carefully and had no objection in principle meeting together time to time as occasion requires and we had no idea French world position would decline as result EDC and EPC. With regard British attitude Bidault quoted Eden as saying concept US–UK–France should be directing members of free world went without saying but he was uncertain what exact framework should be. He expressed hope there could be talks with British and US on question Paris next month. He said EDC meant resurrection for Italy and Germany “with arms in their hands” and must not mean decline France. He concluded tripartite declaration on consultation would do much dissipate French fears these points. [Page 1334] Secretary indicated it should not be difficult find way clarify problem but we felt no formal machinery should be set up. He pointed out we do work intimately with French and British but it often better not appear do so, and we intended preserve present relationship with France. Bidault said France was not asking formal machinery but just talks say once a year. Secretary concluded saying he thought this exchange views useful.
Meeting closed with discussion east-west trade problem. US side said hoped see French reestablish position leadership trade control field with British and US. We indicated we thought would be most helpful if other countries would join us in stopping trade with Communist China, which was not consistent interests free world. We noted UK recently indicated it would increase controls and said it would have excellent effect if French would make similar declaration including statement re COCOM. Bidault replied with general statement French position and indicated because of commercial treaty provisions, he could not change French position “secrecy issue” in Europe but was willing if satisfactory text prepared issue public statement on Chinese trade controls. It agreed experts would discuss draft text.5
- Drafted by McBride and cleared with Merchant, S/S, PSA, and the Department of Defense. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Saigon. The minutes of this first plenary session, circulated as document FPT MIN–2 of Apr. 6 are in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 141.↩
- For a record of this morning meeting, see telegram 4992 to Paris, Mar. 26, supra.↩
- For documentation concerning these meetings, see vol. xii, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.↩
- For the text of this message, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 12–34.↩
- The statement on Chinese trade controls was incorporated into the final communiqué issued on Mar. 28; for the text, see the Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 6, 1953, pp. 491–492.↩