Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

740.5/3–2653: Telegram

No. 584
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

top secret

Washington, March 26, 1953—7:39 p.m.

4992. Paris pass Bruce. This morning’s meeting on board Williamsburg devoted to presentation of President’s views and of Mr. Mayer’s.

Re EDC President stressed major importance attached thereto both by American people and himself. EDC vital not only because it provides best means obtain German contribution without which no real defense of Europe can be undertaken but also because it provides means for eventual European viability; also impossible keep Germany much longer under occupation status.

President declared that EDC so important in American eyes that American people would not support aid to France if they were given impression that France resorting to dilatory tactics in order to postpone ratification this vital development. Therefore when setting forth any conditions precedent to ratification French must be very careful to point out why these conditions are in fact vital to France and not inconsequential details or obstructionist moves.

Concerning Indochina President expressed full American sympathy for valiant French struggle as part of overall fight against Communist aggression.

He recognized this struggle not just another colonial war but advised French to make this very clear as many Americans still under misapprehension. President expressed great American interest in French program leading to solution of Indochina problem making clear that he was not talking in terms of a complete victory. However requests for further American assistance could not be considered without full knowledge of French political and military plans permitting US Government to see why its assistance was required and how it would be used. President expressed great interest in measures being taken by French to obtain greatest possible support by local populations through convincing them they were fighting their own war for their own independence.

Referring to French position in Atlantic Alliance Mayer asserted that France had fulfilled her Lisbon goals in early 1953. Re French 1953 budget he briefly mentioned $125 million short-fall in aid but did not press point. He emphasized importance April NAC meeting² when levels of forces should be established compatible with economic and financial possibilities of each country. He referred to Alphand memorandum and to great importance placed by French Government on long term planning instead of annual programs as best means use more efficiently limited resources at common disposal.

Re Indochina Mayer started by referring to NAC Resolution December 1952 re “continuing aid” from NATO Governments.³ He said French political and military plans would be communicated to us later during the talks. Meanwhile he stressed his full agreement with President that the task was two-fold: militarily, Associated States Armies had to be developed for victory and for internal pacification. Politically it was necessary to develop popular basis for national governments to protect them from eventual take-over by Vietminh forces. While expressing the greatest interest in Gen Clark’s report following visit to Indochina Mayer was careful to point out differences between Korea and Indochina.

Letourneau said that details of recent Dalat agreements⁴ would be given to us later but that in meanwhile he can say that these will permit presentation of a Franco-Vietnamese plan which should lead within two years to reduction of Vietminh to a negligible factor in Indochina if no material increase in Chinese or Soviet aid in meanwhile. Letourneau expressed confidence that popular support for local governments was increasing day by day, pointing to success of January elections in Vietnam, to fact that much more officer material is now available for National Armies and that all enlisted men needed under present financial limitations were available on volunteer basis. Finally he expressed confidence that local populations supported local governments more vigorously now that Vietminh was clearly recognized as the agent not only of Communism but also of traditional Chinese enemy.

Mayer devoted considerable time to importance of Saar to France and to reasons why a Saar settlement with Germany had to be a condition precedent to French ratification. He did not specify how detailed such agreement should be but time and emphasis he gave to this question clearly indicate that he is thinking in terms of much more than agreement in principle. Specific substantive points which he made included fact that US in January 1950 had recognized, supported and accepted the French position on Saar which had been constant since 1945. He also referred to exchange of letters between France and Germany when Schuman Plan signed and which provided for Saar settlement either in peace treaty with Germany or in substitute therefor. In French opinion Contractual Relations represent such substitute.⁵ Mayer also pointed out several reasons Saar settlement necessary before EDC could become operative such as military status of Saarlanders, stationing of troops in Saar, industrial and strategic importance of Saar.

Re ratification Mayer also mentioned briefly need for closer UK association with EDC (to be covered in greater detail later with Secretary Dulles) and also requirement that French people be sure that membership in EDC will not isolate her. Consequently, “longer association between EDC and Atlantic Community may be necessary” and France’s role in Asia and Africa must be understood and recognized—hence requirement for protocols.⁶ Whether or not France can with her own resources play both her role in the EDC and in the world is another matter which will be discussed later in talks. Meanwhile he stated that non-impairment of French world position through membership in EDC is essential requirement for French ratification. Mayer stressed his determination and that of every member of his cabinet to achieve ratification of EDC Treaty as interpreted by protocols.

Meeting took place in frank and cordial atmosphere.

Dulles

1. Drafted by Ridgway B. Knight and cleared with Merchant. Repeated to London, Bonn, and Saigon. For text of the minutes of this opening meeting, circulated as document FPT MIN–1 of Apr. 2, 1953, see vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 429.
2. For documentation concerning the North Atlantic Council meeting, Apr. 23–26, 1953, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 368 ff.
3. The resolution under reference, expressing support for the French effort in Indochina, was adopted by the North Atlantic Council during its meeting in Paris on Dec. 17, 1952. For the text, see footnote 5, vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 321.
4. The Dalat agreements of Feb. 24, 1953, in which France agreed to expand the Vietnamese National Army and transfer additional responsibilities to it; see footnote 3, vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 395.
5. For documentation concerning contractual relations with the Federal Republic of Germany, see vol. vii, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.
6. For documentation concerning the EDC protocols, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 571 ff.