611.51/3–2853: Telegram

No. 586
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France1

secret

5015. Secretary met with Bidault [re] political questions morning March 27 while Mayer attended meeting Humphrey financial matters and Letourneau talked Pentagon with Defense officials. (Reports latter two meetings separate.2) Secretary and Bidault covered following agenda items, all French-suggested: [Page 1335]

1.
Korea. Bidault indicated reply Secretary’s question he believed topic sufficiently covered yesterday’s discussions Indochina.
2.
Soviet Policy. Secretary indicated we thought Soviet policies continued generally as before though internal position might be weakened as result death Stalin who had enormous prestige. He thought Soviets might relax external tensions temporarily pending reconsolidation internal position. He mentioned Soviets might now have more trouble satellite leaders especially Mao Tse Tung who had considerable standing and might no longer be content play second fiddle, and concluded noting we should of course examine Soviet peace feelers even though we considered they purely tactical moves. Bidault replied we were substantially agreed. He noted new Soviet leaders had never known any other system and it would be frivolous expect substantive changes. He stressed while expansion Europe stopped and situation Soviets Far East no longer so tempting, situation Middle East fragile. He said area composed series weak states dominated demagogy, corruption or both. In conclusion he agreed Secretary we must look carefully at olive branches. Bidault and Secretary likewise agreed prime tactic Soviet policy now division west especially US, UK and France.
3.

Middle East. Bidault stressed western powers should have united front this area as well as elsewhere against enemy and also show Arab states we were united. He said Arab states wanted get best price their cooperation, and Arab league merely propaganda agency. He said western presence Suez Canal indispensable and area defense must be organized. Freedom transit also major issue because unless guaranteed jugular vein free world strategy could be severed.

Secretary declared we realized importance transit Suez Canal and Suez base but noted we would not participate forthcoming UK–Egyptian talks though we hoped British would convey results French and ourselves. Byroade noted we had same objectives but sometimes differed tactics feeling approach western powers jointly to Arab state not always productive. He added new role Egypt area helpful and also may make Arab League more helpful. He said we all wished Canal remain international but thought timing bad tripartite talks because possibility leak which would be misunderstood by Egyptians and affect delicate situation there. Byroade continued we hoped Naguib would adhere international nature Canal but believed he should be approached when British-Egyptian problems further along. If we raised it now, we would run into Israeli blockade problem. He concluded we were probably near time when we could talk but suggested talks not high level avoid publicity. Re MEDO he noted Bidault said France wanted Italian and Greek participation and remarked this was question principle not yet decided [Page 1336] in US Govt, since original idea had been membership limited states area plus those countries which might aid its defense (now seven).

Bidault agreed Egyptians should not be informed such talks and was willing have them any level. Secretary suggested talk might be held before French delegation left arrange technical discussions.

4.

Balkan defense, Trieste, Yugoslavia. Bidault said France received Balkan pact with satisfaction, noting it provided only consultation so far, that communication its contents NATO depended Yugoslavs and Italy should adhere thereto when Trieste question settled. On Trieste he made point it was axiomatic retreat by ourselves 1948 position should be agreeable Italians. Merchant concurred our satisfaction Balkan pact and said we were opposed now discussing it NATO. He added possible have three-power talks Yugoslavs Washington SHAPE elements participating their national capacities. He noted we had nothing specific Trieste now, while agreeing French position settlement problem urgent.

This general field Bidault said France believed tripartite declaration guaranteeing integrity Albania would calm Yugoslav fears re Italy. He noted Turks might be helpful Albanian problem since they were not “interested parties.” Secretary said we would gladly study French text such declaration. He noted he did not know whether now was good time such statement but would certainly do no harm see what French had in mind.

5.
South America. Bidault asked if Secretary could reaffirm previous understanding which to effect we would not compete French cultural interests Latin America but would encourage them. Secretary said he was happy reaffirm we supported French cultural interests Latin America. Bonnet noted economic interests were also involved, and Secretary said we sought no special place ourselves this area but were generally sympathetic French cultural and commercial interests, though we were not specifically aware what was involved this particular reference.
6.
Status US forces France and Morocco.3 Bidault complained we were now “juridical no-man’s land.” Secretary stressed present administration pushing NATO status forces ratification vigorously Senate, and we realized public relations involved troops stationed foreign country even though they were performing common mission. Re Moroccan case Department officer said we hoped get new draft French two weeks at most which while altering French somewhat followed same general line being as close NATO counterpart as possible.

Dulles
  1. Drafted by McBride and cleared with Merchant, S/S, and NEA. Repeated to London, Bonn, Cairo, and Moscow. The minutes of this meeting, circulated as document FPT MIN–3 of Apr. 6, are in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 141.
  2. For a report on the economic talks, see telegram 5011 to Paris, Mar. 28, infra. For information concerning Letourneau’s meetings at the Pentagon concerning Indochina, see the editorial note, vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 434.
  3. For documentation on this subject, see vol. xi, Part 1, pp. 599 ff.