Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

611.51/3–2153: Telegram

No. 575
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State¹

secret

Paris, March 21, 1953—6 p.m.

5176. This telegram gives our estimate of French objectives in Washington conversations. Our recommendations as to United States approach to individual agenda items will follow. See also Embassy telegram 5157² re French defense contribution and United States assistance.

Mayer announced at time of his investiture that he hoped shortly to confer with President and members of new United States administration and he, like so many other European leaders, considers early visit to Washington essential from point of view of national and personal prestige. Corollary is necessity bring back some material, or at least psychological bacon.

From both substantive and public relations points of view timing of visit is bad. Unless protocols are squared away before Mayer and Bidault depart from here, which would at least remove one negative factor from picture, French will be unable to point to any substantial progress toward ratification of EDC and they are acutely aware of Adenauer’s advantage in this respect. Even approval of protocols will be of little public interest in United States. Nor are they close enough to decision on EDC for favorable results of trip to have maximum impact on French opinion or even to give us assurance that subsequent demands will not be made prior to ratification debate.

With respect to EDC, we should remember however first that Mayer Government is improvement over Pinay Government which had deliberately kept situation on ice. Secondly, French ideas about NATO burden-sharing, formalization of “big three” relationship, increased aid for Indochina and “hands-off in North Africa”, while of great importance in themselves, will be presented as, and are, more or less directly related to EDC ratification situation. Mayer must be able to assuage nationalist sentiments fearful that France’s “great power” status will become submerged in EDC and that Germany, not burdened with overseas commitments, will overshadow France in Europe. If Mayer and Bidault push these points, they do so from weakness and not from strength. But they need our help in eventual EDC debate; thirdly, appearance of overt pressure will be harmful. This does not however preclude plain talk by us on appropriate occasions.

French position with respect to aid is covered in Embassy telegram 5157 and that on economic and financial questions in Embassy telegram 5175, March 20.³

We are afraid that they will not come well prepared for these conversations and will talk too much in generalities. This is a chronic problem with French, and in present instance it is also motivated by fear of being turned down on specific proposals. Mayer’s and Bidault’s pessimism about forthcoming talks also indicate this.

Dillon

1. Repeated to London.
2. Document 573.
3. See footnote 4, supra.