Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

611.51/3–2153: Telegram

No. 574
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

secret

Paris, March 21, 1953—6 p.m.

5173. Re Embtels 5157, March 20¹ and 5176, March 21.² While overall US approach to Mayer–Bidault talks Washington, and in some cases decisions on individual items on agenda, depend on factors outside our competence, Embassy submits following recommendations re specific agenda items:

1. Discussion of post-Stalin Soviet foreign policy affords opportunity to reaffirm basic policy of peace through strength and US determination to follow and develop it unless and until events justify any change. Occasion might also be taken to reassure French in this connection that US foreign policy vis-à-vis Soviet world will be carried out vigorously but in no sense recklessly, also to emphasize that Stalin’s death means no lessening of menace or urgency of developing Western strength and unity, including EDC.

2. Far East and Southeast Asia.

a. Indochina, covered by Embtel 5157.

b. and c. Extent of consultation US prepared to undertake depends on factor beyond our competence but from point of view of France–US relations we recommend general assurance of such consultation as any given situation may warrant, without giving French unduly favored position of binding ourselves to consultation under given circumstances. With respect to Korea we have in past given assurances considered satisfactory by French, re consultation prior to drastic new political or military initiatives and repetition such assurances seems desirable. Similar general assurances on China would be desirable if practicable. Present leaders have shown themselves less sensitive than British on substantive US actions in Far East but would like to be in a position answer critics in National Assembly on occasion new action by US Government by saying French were consulted in advance. They will probably be satisfied with very little substance from US on this.

d. Five-Power “staff agency” question now seems to be making desired progress but we believe that French have heretofore been disappointed that this matter has dragged on so long without tangible results. Tripartite declaration would depend upon nature and scope. Danger would seem to lie in statement by three major Western Powers which would give implication they, without reference to countries in area, were disposing of problems in that area.

3. NATO.

Our recommendations as to aid are given in Embtel 5157. US substantive decisions will presumably be based, aside from question of availability of funds, upon concrete factors relating to ability and determination of French to use our aid effectively in Indochina and to meet SHAPE requirements, upon future European defense plans, and timing also determined primarily by material rather than psychological factors. Nevertheless it should be possible, without interfering with military needs, to relate US statements and actions, timewise, not merely to present visit but to completion of annual review and possibly subsequent developments.

4. EDC.

US approach on EDC should be one of questioning designed to pin French down on (1) degree of determination to ratify and (2) timing. While ratification of anything by any parliament must be handled by government concerned in its own best judgment as to tactics and timing, French position on both has heretofore been highly unsatisfactory from US viewpoint. Points to be stressed would be (1) essentiality and inevitability of German military contribution, (2) impatience of US Congress and public with what appears excessive French procrastination, (3) difficulty of obtaining funds from Congress for France, whether in Indochina or Europe, in absence of improved prospects for early ratification. While we should use care to avoid any public impression of pressure, President and Secretary could nevertheless be very blunt in private talks with Mayer and Bidault. Bidault may be too preoccupied both with his personal problems and ideas to be greatly swayed by objective arguments but discussion and agreement with Mayer, with Bidault participating, on tactics and timing should be beneficial.

During past week there has been noticeable increase in optimism here, friends and opponents alike seeming to feel that prospects of ratification have improved. This is probably due to spurt of favorable speeches and corresponding press discussion. While timing of this has no doubt been inspired by government’s desire to improve climate for Washington visit, it does represent useful trend which should be encouraged. Mayer and Bidault might be particularly questioned as to their future plans for stimulating discussion and obtaining public, in addition to parliamentary, support.

Occasion might also be taken to reiterate US position re Saar.

5. Three-power cooperation.

See Embtel 4871, March 3,³ and 2b, c and d above. Anything indicating French relationship to US not inferior to that of UK will help.

6. Economic and financial problems.

See Embtel 5175.⁴

7. Middle East Defense.

Believe French will be primarily interested in our views on course Cairo negotiations and setting up MEDO in light these negotiations.

They will undoubtedly emphasize they expect to participate in decisions to be made on MEDO, particularly as they relate to Arab States other than Egypt.

On freedom transit Suez Canal, Foreign Office continues adhere to position that discussion between Three Powers on this problem essential to assure that when time comes to seek declaration from Egyptian Government, Three Powers should be in general agreement on basic principles. One way to handle this problem might be to suggest French inform us in writing of their position on basic principles which we could agree to examine with view to determining whether differences serious enough to necessitate tripartite discussions or whether they are of such minor importance that discussions not required. (French insist it should be possible to carry on such discussions without leaks.)

8. Balkans and Trieste.

No special recommendations. French thinking generally similar to ours.

9a. Noninterference in North Africa.

French have feeling, of which most concrete cause was Secretary’s statements to Bidault here in February, that new administration is more understanding than old on North Africa. Very little would be necessary during Washington talks, perhaps merely reference in communiqué to general accord of views, to reinforce this feeling with great advantage here. French pressure for statement on noninterference has been relatively dormant since Boegner–Waller informal conversation October 10, 1952 about which Utter and McBride informed. Boegner has nevertheless indicated that French silence should not be interpreted as lessened French interest. He stated French continue regard this matter as of importance and believed it should be raised with new administration. However, if current French confidence concerning new administration’s attitude can be strengthened, and [garble] by acceptable status of forces agreement, this problem may die natural death.

We are telegraphing separately on 9b status of forces in Morocco.

Dillon

1. Supra.
2. Infra.
3. Telegram 4871 informed the Department of State of the French desire for some reassurance that the United States would continue to treat France as an individual power and that ratification of the EDC Treaty would not mean a loss of national identity. (740.5/3–353)
4. Telegram 5175 briefly noted that the French hoped to exchange ideas concerning economic and financial cooperation between the United States, Canada, and Europe. Their presentation would be based on the conclusions of the Fourth Report of the OEEC. (611.51/3–2153)