Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 2

751.5/3–2053: Telegram

No. 573
The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

secret
priority

Paris, March 20, 1953—8 p.m.

5157. MSA pass Timmons. This is joint Embassy–MSA Mission message. This telegram sets forth our appraisal probable French position during Mayer talks on questions relating to French contribution to common defense effort and possibilities United States assistance in support thereof.

I. Probable French position

French Government has deferred final decisions this field pending opportunity to consult on IC aspects with Letourneau who is expected in Paris tomorrow. However, from our discussions with various French officials, it appears likely that position will shape up along following lines:

(a) French apparently will make no specific aid proposals since they have serious doubts that at present moment United States administration would be prepared to make any new commitments, and they do not wish to run risk of rejection. Also they have intimated matter of aid is one to be decided in connection annual review. French officials have already given public indication that talks cannot be expected to produce solutions for all outstanding problems. This was sense Mayer speech before American Club yesterday and Bourges-Maunoury before Assembly Finance Committee (see Paris Tomus 616, March 19¹).

(b) French presentation will probably be more along familiar lines, emphasizing that heavy burdens carried by French in fields of IC, reconstruction and expansion of metropolitan economy, and economic development of overseas territories impose severe limitations upon resources which France can devote to European defense. French may make statement to effect that France is only European NATO country prepared to increase manpower contribution and that it seems most unfortunate that this is prevented by lack of funds. May allude here to 44 billion francs ($125 million) conditional section military budget, pointing out large part of this would go to increase in forces (see French reply SHAPE recd for detail this and budgetary effect in 1954). In this connection, although point may not emerge clearly from French presentation, it should be borne in mind that current thinking French Government appears to be that, given present tendency French economic activity to level-off, it will probably not be possible to envisage larger French contribution in 1954 than for current year.

(c) France may raise question of whether from point of view relations United States administration with Congress, it would be helpful to present any future United States aid (apart from deliveries of end-items for metropolitan forces) as being for purpose of assisting French effort in Indochina. This idea has been discussed at length past week by interested French ministries, but final decision on whether to propose it to United States or not has been deferred pending return of Letourneau. Important to note that question here is one of presentation, rather than substance, since no indication that current planning envisages substantial increase in French expenditures for IC. Thus, with exception few billion franc increase French IC contribution, any increase in United States aid over present levels would, in fact, permit increased French military expenditures in Europe. Mere shift within current level aid so as to apply it all to IC operations, rather than divided between NATO and IC expenses, would make no real substantive difference.

(d) Two arguments made by some on French side against earmarking all aid for IC. First, serious administrative problems which they see in connection with putting it into effect, since large portion French expenditures in IC is for troop pay, transportation charges, et cetera, which it would be difficult finance with United States aid. Also, administrative difficulties, foreseen from recent experiences, in negotiating and completing contracts for purchases. Second, French fear that the larger the United States share in total financing for IC, the greater the tendency of United States to supersede French influence and control.

II. Recommended Course of Action for United States

Our recommendations are based on assumption that United States will wish to confine its role during discussion of French defense effort and requirements primarily to one of listening and questioning, and will wish to avoid taking any new commitments at this time. We believe such a tactic can be used to excellent advantage to instill in minds of French participants a better understanding than they now appear to have about those elements of French situation which are troubling to United States. Such an approach, coupled with more detailed picture which talks should provide us re French problems and intentions, should constitute useful point from which to move to final decisions re balance fiscal year 1953 aid and fiscal year 1954 policy on aid to France. We believe that United States decisions on latter points should be made before NAC meeting in April, but suggest that no commitments re aid be given France during next week’s talks.

We suggest that United States questioning of France could most usefully be concentrated on following areas:

(a) Indochina

We concur fully in stress laid by Deptel 4907, March 19,² on need for development of program which gives promise of producing satisfactory military results within foreseeable period, and believe that emphasis should be upon ways and means to speed formation of national armies of Vietnam and other associated states and upon willingness to pursue aggressive tactics.

(b) French Defense Effort of Europe

Discussion this point is intimately related to problem of EDC ratification. Believe we should seek to impress upon France that whole future aid policy to Europe can only be determined when we are clear as to future defense plans of Europeans themselves and France in particular, not because we are in any sense trying to “buy” EDC, but because, as is also case for IC, if United States administration is to defend proposals for continued aid before Congress, it must have conviction that such aid will be used in support of workable and effective European defense program. We can also state that no determinations can be made pending developments in and the results of the annual review.

(c) Underlying Economic and Financial Aspects

It should be possible at many points throughout discussions to call to attention of France our concern about their failure to make faster and more substantial progress towards the creation of set of economic and financial conditions within France which would enable them to carry more easily their defense responsibilities and at same time to move in direction of freer trade and payments relationships with outside world, including dollar area.

We should emphasize to them that there is no hope of winning acceptance of United States Congress and public for continuing assistance to France (whether for IC or otherwise) unless we can demonstrate that France recognizes importance of adopting and pursuing economic and financial policies designed to lead them to eventual independence of aid. Such a conclusion could hardly be drawn from present situation where United States aid and other forms of extraordinary dollar receipts at annual rate of $750 or $800 million are barely sufficient to cover deficit, despite rigid network of controls on external trade and payments. Equally disquieting are reports that French Government is now beginning fear that unsatisfactory internal economic situation will prevent French Government from increasing its 1954 defense contribution above 1953 level, especially in face of increasing requirements. French could appropriately be asked what type of program they have in mind to reverse these unsatisfactory trends and to revitalize their economy so that it can carry load imposed upon it without continued assistance from United States.

Dillon

1. Not printed. (MSA telegram files, lot W–130, “Paris Tomus”)
2. This telegram summarized Paris working-level discussions on Indochina; for text, see vol. xiii, Part 1, p. 416.