Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

611.00/4–1354: Telegram

No. 437
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Aldrich) to the Department of State¹

secret
niact

London, April 13, 1954—3 p.m.

4523. For the Acting Secretary from the Secretary. Following is résumé of my final meeting with Eden this morning:

1. We agreed to communiqué already sent you in separate message.²

2. United action in Southeast Asia. I told Eden I intended to press French re real independence for Associated States, and hoped he would use influence in same direction. Also told Eden after we completed this trip we would get in touch with British to see how best we might proceed in organizing united will to resist aggression in SEA. One possibility was to establish informal working group in Washington. Eden thought this good idea and said Makins would be available.

3. We discussed Trieste briefly and Thompson is sending message on this.³

4. UN Disarmament Commission. Eden raised possibility of Disarmament Commission meeting in London about May 7. UK regards this as cold war exercise designed to put Soviets on spot and believes USSR vulnerable since they have always insisted that any sanctions be subject to veto in Security Council. Eden thought it important to have disarmament discussions on comprehensive plan in London so that it would not get intermingled with debates in Security Council on Arab-Israel and other matters. I told Eden that if it would help UK to have discussions in London I would go along. I also told him that I thought Disarmament Commission talks should be separate from discussions on President’s December 8 proposal re atomic energy⁴ which was a different aspect of atomic problem and should be carried on through diplomatic channels, at least for coming period. Eden agreed. Re report that suggestion might be made for Disarmament Commission to meet in Paris rather than London, Eden and I both agreed that meeting in Paris would be most unwise, Eden commented that meeting in London would get Jules Moch out of Paris which would be helpful for EDC.

(For General Smith: It is important that we get someone to represent us on the Disarmament Commission in view of possibility of London meeting May 7. In fact Eden suggested there may be some form of working group meeting in New York after April 20. I would appreciate hearing from you after my return on how we stand re the names we discussed for this job prior my departure.)

5. Korean phase Geneva Conference.⁵

(a) I said we had two basic thoughts: We must carry ROK with us in any proposal which we put forward at Geneva since without their acceptance proposal was meaningless.

(b) We regard Geneva as serious negotiations and while not over-hopeful wish to try for settlement involving unification and independence at Korea, therefore we should have some give in our position so that we can make concessions. We should not give up all our trading possibilities. While we would fully consult with other 16, US should have pretty much control of tactics. The Communists at Geneva will show a single will and if all 16 try to quarter-back operation we will get nowhere. Since US seems to have principal responsibility for trying to reach agreement and bringing ROK along we must have a tactical flexibility.

I outlined our view on opening position at Geneva based on UN Commission designed to oversee Korean elections explaining that this Commission’s work had been interrupted by aggression in 1950 and that we could make a plausible and honorable case that it should carry on with the task given it by the UN. I recognized this would not be acceptable to the Communists but felt that we could stand before the bar of world opinion in putting it forward. Eden said that my presentation cast different light on situation, thus far he had only seen reports that we intended to have elections in North Korea and not in South Korea. Propagandawise this would be a very difficult position to maintain and he stressed the importance of carrying not only British but world opinion with us. He said UK had been thinking of a German type formula similar to Berlin. In light of my comments, however, he felt UK might be be able to support opening position I had outlined above. He believed Communists would come forward with specious proposal and UK would like to counter with something that seemed eminently reasonable but probably would not be accepted by Communists. He had not liked what he heretofore understood US proposal to be since he thought it tactically unsound to put forward a case which would be shot down and then produce another proposal. Now that he understood the proposition we had in mind he felt much better. He asked whether we could spell out for his people our presentation and I told him we would be glad to do so, and could probably discuss it in Paris next week. (Alex Johnson should draw up draft of US presentation at Geneva for my consideration next Monday.)

Selwyn Lloyd doubted that we would obtain unified Korea and asked whether we evisaged other measures which might make the armistice safer and more durable. For example, if the neutrals on UN Commission were no longer willing to remain in Korea what would we do and what would replace UN Commission. I said we would also give thought to this point.

6. There was brief discussion on the composition of the Indo-China phase of the Geneva Conference. Eden fully agreed that the Big Four would invite all participants. He also believed that very early at Geneva we would have to discuss composition of Indo-China phase. Last night at Churchill’s dinner⁶ I mentioned to Eden possibility of having following participants in addition to Big Four and Communist China: Three Associated States–Thailand–Burma–Ho Chi Minh. Eden said he rather liked the idea of Thailand and Burma and thought Ho’s participation essential. Re possible participation of Ho we agreed that it would be unwise for us to press the French and Associated States on this or take any initiative in raising it.

Aldrich

1. Repeated to Paris for the Secretary’s party.
2. Telegram 4513 from London, Apr. 13. (790.00/4–1354) For the text of this communiqué, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 26, 1954, p. 622.
3. Telegram 4520 from London, Apr. 13. (750G.00/4–1354)
4. For the text of President Eisenhower’s speech before the U.N. General Assembly on Dec. 8, 1953, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 813–822, or Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 21, 1953, pp. 847–851.
5. For documentation on the Geneva Conference, see volume xvi.
6. Regarding Churchill’s dinner on Apr. 12, see the memorandum of dinner conversation, supra.