Office of the Historian

PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Great Britain”

No. 436
Memorandum of Dinner Conversation, by the Secretary of State

top secret
limited distribution
[London,] April 12, 1954.

Guests attending:

  • Anthony Eden
  • Winthrop Aldrich
  • John Foster Dulles

The PM’s physical condition seemed to have deteriorated, although there was no evidence of any definite physical ailment. He enunciated about as usual, and at the end of the evening, walked down the two flights of stairs with me to the door where we were [Page 1024] photographed together. He seemed, however, mentally less robust and more pliable and more dependent upon guidance from Eden.

The following topics were touched on:

1.
Nuclear Weapons. The PM spoke approvingly of the idea, which Eden and I had discussed, of a possible moratorium on large experiments.
2.
Relations with Russia. The PM repeated the theme that the Russian people wanted a better life with more diversion, and that if we cater to this, we would give them more of a vested interest in peace. He said he realized that peace had not always come out of good economic and commercial conditions, but still he thought it worth while trying within limits. He said he would not want to “take a chance” by giving them too much. He did not speak of a three-power meeting.
3.
Satellites. The PM said that he did not think you could have permanent peace in Europe so long as the satellite countries were held closely under Soviet rule. I said that possibly something like a Finnish relationship might evolve. Eden said he felt that this was difficult, because considerable autonomy was permissible to Finland from Russia because Finland was “the road to nowhere”, but the satellite countries were “the road to somewhere else”.
4.
Egypt. I complimented the PM on the new approach to the Egyptian problem, and said that the idea of substituting civilian technicians for military was a statesmanlike and resourceful solution. Mr. Churchill merely grimaced to show his distaste for the proposal.
5.
France. The PM followed his usual line. He said that only the English-speaking peoples counted; that together they could rule the world.
6.
India. He again reiterated his bitterness at the “give-away” of India. He said the Labor Government had given India away to the accompaniment of US plaudits, but that the result was something we would have to live with painfully for a long time.
7.
Israel. I referred to the fact that I understood that he had sent a message to Sharrett. I hoped that this would lead him or Eden to tell me of the long reply which Eden told me Churchill had received. However, Churchill evaded this, merely saying he had sent a personal message because of his known Zionist sympathy. (Eden had told me earlier that the reply had indicated that the policy of reprisals was now a definite government policy.)
8.
President Eisenhower. I conveyed the President’s warm personal greetings, and said that the President had considered the possibility of suggesting that instead of my coming to London, he and I and the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden might have met together at Newfoundland. However, he had not proposed this, because he [Page 1025] knew it would create too much of a crisis atmosphere, and also it would raise more acutely the problem of French omission. The PM sent his warmest greetings to the President. He said he would like to have him come to London, and also later he said he himself planned to come to Washington again.
9.
US Relations. The PM said he thought that not more than one-fourth of the Labor Party, which meant one-eighth of the House, was anti-American. He supposed there was a similar percentage in the US that was anti-British. He particularly deplored threatening speeches such as the recent one of Senator Knowland, which threatened to cut off military and economic assistance unless the British did what we wanted. He said that was no proper basis for a good relationship.
10.
Labor Opposition. Eden asked the impression I had received from my private talks with Attlee and Morrison at his luncheon.1 I said that I had, I felt, explained the misunderstanding created as a result of our prompt press guidance on the recent Soviet note concerning NATO.2 I also presented briefly our thoughts about Indochina. I said these latter had been listening to it attentively and with no apparent evidence of disapproval. Mr. Eden remarked that often Mr. Attlee and Mr. Morrison appeared to acquiesce, but later on attacked openly in the House. Mr. Churchill indicated that he did not like having any talks with the opposition, who, he felt, were always playing politics.

  1. No record of this luncheon has been found in Department of State files.↩
  2. For documentation on the Soviet note of Mar. 31, proposing, inter alia, Soviet membership in NATO, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 487 ff.↩