Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 100

No. 337
United States Delegation Minutes of the Second Formal Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill, The White House, January 7, 1952, 5–7 p.m.¹

top secret

Washington, January 7, 1952, 5 p.m. to 7 p.m.

Present were:

• United States

  • President Harry S. Truman
  • Secretary of State Dean Acheson
  • Secretary of Defense Robert A. Lovett
  • Secretary of the Treasury John W. Snyder
  • Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Omar Bradley
  • Ambassador Walter S. Gifford
  • Mutual Security Administrator W. Averell Harriman
  • U.S. Air Forces Chief of Staff General Hoyt Vandenberg
  • Deputy Under Secretary of State H. Freeman Matthews
  • White House Press Secretary Joseph Short
  • Mr. David Lloyd, White House Staff
  • Mr. Charles Murphy, White House Staff
  • Mr. George Willis, Treasury Department
  • Mr. R. Gordon Arneson, Department of State

• United Kingdom

  • Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill
  • Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden
  • Lord Cherwell
  • Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks
  • Field Marshal Sir William Slim
  • Air Chief Marshal Sir William Elliot
  • Sir Christopher Steel
  • Sir Roger Makins

In opening the discussion, the President stated that under the law he was charged with responsibility for deciding on the use of atomic weapons. He fervently hoped that the time would never come when such a decision had to be made. Nevertheless, he was prepared to authorize the use of atomic weapons if and when the necessity arose. It had always been his own personal feeling that allies should be consulted on this matter.

Secretary Lovett stated that politico-military discussions had already taken place concerning situations that might or might not lead to general war and the consequent use of atomic weapons. He pointed out that under existing law there were strict limits on the extent to which military discussions could go forward. The Department of Defense was planning to recommend to the President that legislation be sought which would permit strictly military cooperation to be carried on to a greater degree. Reverting to the talks that had been held, he stressed that such talks had been, and would have to continue to be, without commitment.… The discussants had considered various contingencies which might or might not lead to general war and other contingencies where the issue had not been clear.…

Secretary Lovett said that arrangements were being made for the Prime Minister, upon his return from Canada to Washington, to receive an extensive briefing on SAC operations.

Prime Minister said that the problems of United States-United Kingdom relations in the atomic energy field was a long story. He recalled that at the outset the United Kingdom could have started up in Canada. He recalled, too, that the decision to go in with the United States had helped to put great moral pressure on President Roosevelt to undertake this great gamble. Everyone recognized at the time that it was a gamble on a gigantic scale. Until Almagordo no one could tell whether the bomb might not be a flash in the pan. The President interjected that a number of his advisers at the time had assured him that the bomb would not work. He said, however, that these advisers had not been heard from lately. The Prime Minister said he would not mind having the history of the wartime relationship made public, not as a matter of reproach but as a matter of record. He said he did not wish to dwell on the past, however, but preferred to look at the situation as it existed today. The United States had legislation which was restrictive. As for the United Kingdom, the previous Government had, with considerable expenditure of money, succeeded in making the bomb. He stated he had not been aware of this prior to his return to power. This bomb was now going to be tested in Australia. In the field of technical cooperation, the United Kingdom was not asking for anything outside the limits of United States legislation. What it was asking for and hoping for was fuller cooperation within the limits of the law. He hoped that Lord Cherwell, who knew about these things, could talk with the appropriate representatives in the United States Government to see what could be done.

The President said that his greatest wish was that atomic energy could be put to the service of peace rather than of war. He was quite agreeable to having talks proceed on technical cooperation.

The Prime Minister went on that the United Kingdom hoped for the maximum possible cooperation within the limits of the law and he hoped it would be agreeable to have Lord Cherwell discuss this problem with the Atomic Energy Commission and others.… He hoped the President would agree that Lord Cherwell and Sir Roger Makins might discuss this problem with his old friend, General Smith, to find out what could be done.

The President stated that what the Prime Minister had said made good sense to him.…

. . . . . . .

The Prime Minister said he was glad to see the extension of United States bases into French Morocco and Cyrenaica. He said he was personally glad to see the Spanish situation developing in such a way as to open up the possibility of securing bases in Spain also. He felt it was good that these developments were taking place so as to reduce the pressures on the United Kingdom.…

Secretary Acheson said there was one other problem which he would like to raise, namely the problem of security. The Prime Minister said that his Government was taking certain steps on the security matter. He said he realized that a tightening of United Kingdom security would help the United States in considering problems of closer cooperation. He felt, however, that this was a step which the United Kingdom would have to take on its own and should not be pressed from the outside to do so. He said that on shipboard on the way over, he had learned that the Cabinet was going ahead on its own to put before Parliament a scheme for strengthening security. He envisaged the adoption of a system whereby any applicant for a position involving access to classified information would be required to state, under oath, whether he was or was not a member of Communist or Communist front organizations and to give other information concerning his background. By this method an individual who had falsified could be prosecuted under the common law for perjury. This he thought was the sensible way of dealing with the matter. He said that these arrangements had not yet been put through, but the main Cabinet decision had been taken.

The President stated that this development would be very helpful.

The Secretary of Defense explained that the reason the United States attached so much importance to the security problem was that the recent amendment to our legislation specifically required that the Atomic Energy Commission must judge that the security standards of a recipient nation, as applied to the data to be communicated, are adequate. Mr. Matthews inquired whether the new personnel clearance procedures were intended to apply only to new personnel being taken on in sensitive work or whether it would also apply to those who were already in such jobs. The Prime Minister responded that the new procedures were to apply to all personnel who had, or would in the future have, access to classified information. He explained further that such procedures would apply to all persons having access to classified information in general and not only to classified atomic energy information.

The President said he thought the Prime Minister and he understood each other on these matters and suggested that the additional talks that had been suggested in the course of the meeting should proceed. The conference then passed to other items on the agenda.

R. Gordon Arneson

Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

1. The part of the meeting recorded in these minutes took place from 5 to 5:45 p.m. Regarding the remainder of the meeting, see the United States Delegation minutes, infra.