Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Truman Library, David D. Lloyd files

No. 338
United States Delegation Minutes of the Second Formal Meeting of President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill, The White House, January 7, 1952, 5–7 p.m.¹

top secret

Washington, January 7, 1952, 5 p.m. to 7 p.m.

After the atomic matter had been completed,² additional persons were admitted to the room, so that the attendance at the meeting was as follows:

• The President
  • Dean Acheson—Secretary of State
  • H. Freeman Matthews—Deputy Under Secretary of State
  • George W. Perkins—Assistant Secretary of State
  • Walter Gifford—Ambassador to the United Kingdom
  • Robert A. Lovett—Secretary of Defense
  • John Snyder—Secretary of the Treasury
  • W. Averell Harriman—Director, Mutual Security
  • Frank Pace, Secretary of the Army
  • General Omar Bradley—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
  • General Hoyt Vandenberg—Chief of Staff, Air Force
  • General John E. Hull
  • Admiral William H. Fechteler
  • Mr. Phillips—State Department
  • Mr. Ridgway Knight—State Department
  • Mr. Arneson—State Department
  • Mr. Barry—State Department
  • Charles S. Murphy—Special Counsel to the President
  • Joseph Short—Secretary to the President
  • David D. Lloyd—Administrative Assistant to the President
• Prime Minister Churchill
  • Anthony Eden—Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
  • Lord Cherwell—Paymaster General
  • Sir Oliver Franks—Ambassador
  • Sir Roger Makins
  • Sir Christopher Steel
  • Field Marshal Sir William Slim
  • Air Marshal Sir William Elliot
  • First Sea Lord Admiral McGrigor
  • Lord Ismay
  • Sir Norman Brook
  • Sir Leslie Rowan
  • Mr. Shuckburgh
  • Mr. Pitblado
  • Mr. Gore-Booth
  • Mr. Mallaby

The President then said that the next topic of discussion would be the caliber of the rifle.

The President stressed the importance of the problem saying that it was vital for allies to have ammunition that could be exchanged and pointed to the experience of other past wars when the ammunition of one country did not fit the guns of another. He then called on Secretary Lovett to lead off.

Secretary Lovett said that this subject was important as a symbol. People were saying if we can’t get together on this what can we get together on? He said that he had brought Secretary Pace to the meeting to discuss the matter.

Secretary Pace began by saying that there had been a number of conferences on this between the Defense Ministers and the experts. The technicians could not agree on what was the best weapon. All the technical problems had been thoroughly explored and there was no way of arriving at a decision in the technical field. The thirty caliber rifle had greater stopping power at short range, and on the other hand it had more revealing flashes. Considerations like these were not susceptible of being decided.

Beyond the technicalities, Secretary Pace went on, there were some larger factors. The United States was engaged in large production of the M–1 rifle and the thirty caliber bullet or cartridge. This was the same size bullet we used in all our machine guns. A change in caliber would mean retooling at a tremendous investment both here and throughout NATO. Another consideration which might be termed political was the fact that the muzzle velocity of a .30 caliber rifle is greater than that of the Russian rifle. There might be criticism if we adopted a rifle with less muzzle velocity. On the other hand, the British contend that the .30 caliber produced more stopping power than was necessary.

At any rate we were going ahead with the production of the M–1 or garand rifle. Standardization of ammunition was probably more important than standardization of the weapon. It was impossible to change from the present caliber of bullet, but we were developing a new cartridge—the T–65—which was superior to the old. Secretary Pace suggested that we might standardize this cartridge or case but still have different rifles. We could then turn out ammunition that the British could use.

General Hull then corroborated and amplified Mr. Pace’s statement.

The Prime Minister could not understand how the two countries could standardize ammunition, if the bore or caliber of the rifle is different.

General Hull said of course the English would have to change to the .30 caliber rifle.

The Prime Minister said that he was no expert in this field although he had fired several score rounds with both weapons and managed to hit the target pretty often. He thought they both had their points, but he took the view of Secretary Pace that it was a terribly serious thing to change the bore of the service rifle. He said that such a change should be made in time of peace. It took a long time to make rifles in quantity and in a war there had to be a pool of rifles. In a war, rifles were used like matches or like cigarettes—they were thrown away. The pool of rifles was the important thing. He understood the United States now had twelve million rifles. The United Kingdom had had six million at the end of the war, but now they were down to two and one-half million and he did not know where the others had gone. Generally speaking, the production of rifles was slow and difficult. It was easier to produce cannons. Therefore in this time of danger, he wanted to live in a big pool of rifles. This meant that the United Kingdom should go on with its pool of .303’s and he suggested that the United States should go on with its pool of .30’s, at least for the present.

With regard to the .280’s, the Prime Minister said that a certain amount of tooling had been done but that he would propose that only a few score thousands be turned out for use by paratroops and other specialized units. This would be a sort of experiment. He added that you have to be like a gangster anyway to handle these new weapons. They were not like the old case that he had been accustomed to all his life. In these new ones, the tendency was to fire off all the ammunition. There was nothing to that, he said. In his day, he was supposed to keep the soldiers from firing off all their ammunition.

However, with respect to the future, he thought that both countries ought to go ahead with the rifles they now had, planning and experimenting on new types meanwhile. Then, after a few years, they would agree on and make a new rifle for the free world. But, he added, “We ain’t going to have the ideal rifle until we get out of these critical times.”

He wondered if this solution could be agreed upon.

Secretary Pace said that we should be careful in the way we talk about the problem. There had been too much public comment and criticism on the matter and it had been built up into an issue. We should say that we will try to achieve the rifle of the future.

The Prime Minister added the word “together”—we should try to achieve the rifle of the future together. This policy could be made public. We would each stay in our own pools of rifles and the British merely develop the .280 on a small scale, experimentally. Ultimately, he said with some irony, he supposed it would be a wonderful thing if we developed the perfect way of killing our fellowmen. He then called on Field Marshal Slim for comments.

Field Marshal Slim said that we are mesmerized by the question of calibers. The aim should be to have a NATO pool consisting of a new and better rifle. This could not be done very soon. The United States military were urging on the British to take and use the United States ammunition, the T–65. However, he hesitated to build the British armament around this particular type of ammunition because if they did, they would probably find that in ten to fifteen years, the United States would have developed a better round than the T–65 and the United Kingdom armament would be obsolete.

The Prime Minister said we should agree on the .303 for the United Kingdom, .30 for the United States and the production of twenty to thirty thousand .280’s for paratroops and similar groups.

The President said that it should be stressed that we want mass production of rifles for both countries. The Prime Minister agreed but said we can’t do that until the present danger is over. He continued saying, “Nothing will induce me to plunge out with a new rifle, unless we plunge out with you. But not with your present rifle—probably with a better one.” The Prime Minister added this was no time to make fundamental changes in the mass weapon. He suggested that a statement be issued on this subject.

The President said that it should be agreed on promptly and suggested that the meeting get out a clear statement on the subject on which all could agree.

The President then turned to the next item on the agenda, the question of the Atlantic Command. He asked Secretary Lovett to state the problem.

Secretary Lovett said that the position on SACLANT was well known. All the NATO had agreed to a Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic with the exception of the United Kingdom. The problem was being too widely publicized in the press and had become a serious issue.

The basic fact was that an over-all commander for the Atlantic was needed. If there were another war, the Battle of the Atlantic would be serious. The Russians now had six times the number of submarines which the Germans had at the start of World War II.

Secretary Lovett said that the need of a central command had first been pointed out by the United Kingdom in 1949. The area of command of the Atlantic commander would not interfere with the British control of shipping at the receiving end of trans-Atlantic convoys and shipping. The Prime Minister, in his speech of December 6, 1951, had made the point that the British should control shipping at the receiving end and we agreed.

Secretary Lovett suggested that the original decision be adhered to and proceeded with at once. He said that we were prepared to name the officer to take the command. He added that Admiral Fechteler was present and could discuss the matter further.

The President asked the Prime Minister to state his views.

The Prime Minister said that he had never been convinced of the necessity of a Supreme Command in the Atlantic. Personally, he had lived through two world wars in the Atlantic. The lives of the British, he said, depend upon command of the Atlantic. If the naval war goes wrong, the British people would not live. It is astonishing, he said, how much a country learns about a matter if its life depends on it.

In practice, he said, things must be settled between the United States Chief of Naval Operations and the First Sea Lord. This is the way it had been done in previous wars. If these officers differed, the matter was referred to the heads of our governments for decision. He said the same organization could be carried out under NATO. In a descending chain of command, you would have first the heads of the governments, then the standing group, and then the two commanders, the Chief of Naval Operations and the First Sea Lord. If the commanders differed, the difference goes to the standing group and then to the heads of the governments.

Within this framework, he said, it would be possible to suggest a naval adviser to the standing group who could be given the title of Admiral of the Atlantic. This officer would advise the standing group and do the planning for the standing group. He would also decide questions arising between the CNO and the First Sea Lord, provided the matter were so urgent that it could not be discussed in the usual way by the standing group and the heads of the governments. This would be the preferable arrangement. He did not see why we should create a vast new staff apparatus. He said he urged this on practical grounds and not out of any vainglorious spirit or desire for fame for the “Luxy Navy.”

The President said that he had decided views on this subject. He believed strongly in a unified field command. He said that in World War II, we had had a unified sea command in the Pacific under Admiral Nimitz and in Europe we had a unified field command under General Eisenhower and General Bradley as his field commander. It was better to have a unified field command than eleven or twelve separate commanders. The situation in the Atlantic, if there should be another war, would be very different than ever before. He was therefore convinced it was necessary to have a single allied commander in the Atlantic. The President said he did not care who the commander was so long as he was competent to do the job. He asked the Prime Minister to take seriously the arguments of his staff on this subject.

Secretary Lovett said we must consider the convoy and supply problem. We now had eleven countries in the picture, more than ever before.

The Prime Minister interrupted to ask how many of those have any navy to speak of, aside from Canada and France, which has only one flotilla.

Secretary Lovett said he was not talking about their naval forces but about the convoy problem. Norway, Denmark, and others all have transports. He then asked Admiral Fechteler to speak on this question.

Admiral Fechteler began by saying that the Atlantic command proposal had originally been drawn up by officers of the Royal Navy and the United States Navy in anticipation of what we were likely to confront in a third world war. He said that while we won the two earlier wars, we came perilously close to losing both to the submarines.

This next time he hoped it would be different. We had fast carriers and planes and we planned to go after the subs at their bases. That was the place to hunt subs. The worst place to hunt the sub is where we hunted him the last time—when he was on his target. Such an offensive operation against submarine bases requires close command control.

As to the British authority over the reception end of the shipping lines, Admiral Fechteler said, those waters would be excluded from the Atlantic command. He agreed to the proposal of the “100 fathom line” and said that it was agreeable to Admiral McGrigor although it would have to be approved by NATO. Speaking for himself, Admiral Fechteler said he did not want the responsibility of command within that line.

Admiral Fechteler said that the concept of having a huge headquarters and staff, which had been raised by the Prime Minister, was not accurate. Admiral Fechteler said he had worked on this command problem at Norfolk, together with some British officers, and it worked out well. There was no need for even a single building.

The Prime Minister said that he too had given a great deal of thought to the problem. He admitted there had been an agreement to set up an Atlantic Command. He said he was asking now for release from that agreement. Furthermore, he said, if there were an Atlantic Commander, he should sit in England and not over here in the United States.

To clarify his position, the Prime Minister read a statement which he had drafted.³ This outlined the proposal he had made previously. It provided that the policies should be under the control of the standing group, and war operations should be under the Chief of Naval Operations and the First Sea Lord. The areas to be controlled by the Chief of Naval Operations and the First Sea Lord would be divided by a line to be drawn from Greenland to Portugal or from Iceland to Portugal—the closer to the British Isles the better. This paper included some other details about the handling of convoys.

The Prime Minister went on to say that it was incredible to him that all this difficulty should be raised. In his view, there was no need for it. He said of course the British would not raise the question because the United States has the larger fleet.

As to past experience, he said he wanted to point out that in 1943 the German submarines were decisively defeated in the Atlantic. At this time, all the United States strength was in the Pacific. The United Kingdom did it all—all except the United States troop convoys.

The United Kingdom had real knowledge of U-boat warfare and of the even more deadly and more important mine warfare. In both these fields, he said, Britain has the greater experience, and it was dearly bought. Britain, therefore, should be equal in the councils.

The Prime Minister said that it was clear we could not agree on this, but he said, “Let us persevere, patiently.” It was a great blow, he said, to the United Kingdom when it was told not only that it would not have the command but that it would not even have an equal voice.

Admiral Fechteler said that if the plan was not agreed to by the United Kingdom, we would have to [go?] back to the NATO counsel [council?].

The Prime Minister agreed that this was so but suggested that the British side be permitted to consider it further.

The President terminated this very heated discussion by saying that he believed he was to have the honor tonight of dining at the British Embassy.⁴ The Prime Minister said that he could have no greater honor than to be the host of the President at the British Embassy. The President said that he thought there would have to be two meetings tomorrow.⁵

The Prime Minister said that if there ever was a Supreme Atlantic Command, there was no officer whom he would raise less objection to than Admiral Fechteler.

Secretary Acheson said that at the next meeting they would have to consider the Middle East command which was on the agenda for this afternoon but which they had not yet reached.

The Prime Minister said “What is this about the Middle East Command? We have all the troops and what we want is a four-power arrangement.” This discussion was broken off by questions and arrangements concerning the next meetings. It was agreed that in the morning, tomorrow, the Middle East command, the Far East and Southeast Asia would be discussed, with Europe coming up probably tomorrow afternoon.

The President made a brief statement about security and information for the press, and then adjourned the meeting at 6:30 p.m.

1. The minutes were dictated by Lloyd. Another set of minutes, taken by Knight and designated TCT MIN–2 which are the same in substance, but lack some of the detail present in this text, is in Conference files, lot 50 D 95, CF 100.
2. For a record of the discussion of atomic matters, see the United States Delegation minutes, supra.
3. No copy of this statement has been found in Department of State files.
4. Regarding the dinner at the British Embassy, see the memorandum, infra.
5. For the records of the two meetings on Jan. 8, see Documents 340 and 344.