Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 100

No. 336
Memorandum by the Director of the Bureau of German Affairs (Byroade) of a Meeting of Secretary of State Acheson and Foreign Secretary Eden at the Department of State, January 7, 1952, 4 p.m.¹

secret
TCT CONV–3

January 7, 1952, 4 p.m.

Present:

• U.S.

  • Secretary Acheson
  • Mr. George Perkins—EUR
  • Mr. Henry A. Byroade—GER

• U.K.

  • Mr. Anthony Eden
  • Sir Oliver Franks
  • Sir Roger Makins

Memorandum of Conversation on the European Defense Force

Eden opened the meeting by stating that he believed the recent visit of the Prime Minister and himself to Paris had been useful.² He stated that he believed they were able to give Schuman all the reassurances he wanted and that Eisenhower had appeared satisfied with the meeting there. Eden stated that he believed the climate had been improved by their gesture of going to France before coming to the United States. He stated that he was going to endeavor to make a trip to France soon after their return from the United States for the same reason.

Mr. Acheson indicated that he would give Eden an oral summary of our understanding of developments in the recent meeting of the six Foreign Ministers on the EDC in Paris.³ For this purpose he summarized for Eden most of the substance of Bruce’s summary report and recommendations contained in 3958 [3957] from Paris of January 3.⁴ He stated that two factors were outstanding in his mind from this summary. (1) The extent of French–German–Italian agreement on institutions of supra-national character and on the other hand the close agreement among the Benelux nations in opposing such far reaching solutions, and (2) the fact that we could now see no ready alternative to the solution of getting Germany into the defense except through agreement by the Europeans themselves on the EDF. He then gave Eden the substance of the Dutch and Belgian positions as reported by Bruce in paragraphs a through f of the above cable.

The Secretary indicated his desire that the British join us in persuading Benelux to go towards the French–German–Italian position. He stated that he thought the United States could give some assurance to them which might be helpful. We could indicate that the United States is more likely to preserve interest in maintaining troops on the continent and assisting European defense if EDC is made effective than if the present situation continues. He spoke briefly about our Congressional situation and the fact that legislation clearly commits us to support moves towards unity on the continent. He also thought that we could reassure the Benelux of our continued interest and support of NATO. In this connection he felt that the continuance of some form of TCC exercise within NATO would be helpful to the smaller countries.

The Secretary then spoke briefly of disagreements among the French and Germans. He reported that Schuman and Adenauer had discussed security restrictions against Germany without conclusion but that there seemed to be some hope that they could work out a solution acceptable to the United States and United Kingdom if the EDC were brought into being along their lines. He stated that Bruce and McCloy felt that it would be preferable to allow them more time to work this out rather than to have US and UK initiative at this particular time. Mr. Eden agreed.

The Secretary then brought up the points on the question of Germany’s financial contribution which Adenauer had raised in a meeting. The first of these was that TCC should make a recommendation on Germany’s total contribution. This would allow Adenauer to say before the Bundestag that Germany had received the same treatment as other countries. Mr. Eden said the procedure sounded sensible to him and we should see if such action were possible. The second point had to do with the fact that support of US and UK forces should be arranged through the EDC mechanism; i.e., Germany’s total contribution should go to the EDC with EDC acting as a paymaster in paying back that portion of the German budget for support of our forces. Mr. Eden said he thought that procedure had been agreed to in Europe last month. Mr. Eden was reminded that he had raised the matter himself in one of our Tripartite meetings but that no agreement had been reached.⁵

Mr. Byroade indicated that there was a subsidiary point as regards the TCC matter. The Germans wished to have country submissions to TCC so that they could see what contributions were contemplated by other nations. We had agreed to release US data but the French and British had not as yet agreed. Mr. Byroade promised to furnish Makins with the identification of the TCC documents concerned. Mr. Eden said they would look into the matter.

Mr. Acheson said that he planned to speak to the two Benelux Ambassadors here and hoped that Mr. Eden would find it possible to help also. He stated that the British could particularly help by convincing the Dutch not to “water down” the concept in the hope of getting British participation. He stated that Murphy was going back to Brussels in an effort to help. He would see the Dutch Prime Minister as soon as possible after he arrives and thereafter Chapin would return to The Hague to work on this problem.

Mr. Eden indicated that they would do everything they could to be helpful. He stated that the broad lines of their association with the EDC had been given in the Churchill–Pleven Communiqué.⁶ The British Cabinet had recently approved a paper which listed specific things they might do to follow out these generalities. He thought the greatest possibility lay in association of their air force units with the EDC. There had been much experience coordinating air units during the War and he felt this would probably be not too much of a problem. He also spoke of the possibility of exchange of divisions between the UK and the continent. He spoke in terms of one division indicating some arrangement whereby an EDC Division could be in the UK and a British Division in the EDC (his exact meaning was not clear). Mr. Byroade expressed the great importance we attach to the Communiqué issued here on the subject of the EDF. He wondered whether the British could be more specific than in their recent Paris Communiqué. Eden and Makins indicated the type of things they had in mind would not look well in a Communiqué and in any event should probably be communicated to the EDC countries directly. Sir Oliver Franks summarized what was needed was some way of being more specific than in the Paris Communiqué as there would always be doubt and confusion as long as they stuck to vague generalities. The Secretary indicated that this was the point. Eden said they would consider the matter from that point of view.

1. Drafted on Jan. 10.
2. Prime Minister Churchill and Foreign Secretary Eden visited Paris, Dec. 17–18, 1951.
3. For documentation on the Foreign Ministers meeting of the countries participating in the Conference for the organization of a European Defense Community held in Paris at the end of December, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 755 ff.
4. For text, see ibid., p. 985.
5. Regarding the tripartite meetings under reference here, see the editorial note on the Foreign Ministers meetings at Paris and Rome, November 1951, in Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iii, Part 1, p. 1312.
6. For the text of the Churchill–Pleven communiqué, see the New York Times, Dec. 19, 1951, p. 24.