Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

CFM files, lot M–88, “London Ambassadors Meeting—Sept. 1952”

No. 302
Briefing Memorandum Prepared for the Under Secretary of State (Bruce)¹

top secret

[Washington, September 18, 1952.]

Purpose of meeting

Although this meeting of Chiefs of Mission will be represented in the press as one of the series which has been held periodically since 1949, the nature and scope of the discussion will go beyond the usual agenda for meetings of this type. Its purpose will be to define the problems which lie ahead in our policy of blocking further expansion by the Soviet Union and to examine the stresses and strains in the organization of European defense in order to strengthen our position and to improve the defenses of the free world. The recommendations made at the conclusion of this meeting will be useful in providing a framework for informing the incoming administration exactly what we face in Europe and recommending what steps might be taken to achieve our objectives.

In doing this, it will be necessary to deal with short-term problems which exist now or will require decision during the NATO ministerial meeting in December. But, we must also anticipate and define the long-term problems of the organization of Europe to meet the Communist threat in order that our current and future operations take into account our present strength and the direction in which we are headed.

The agenda is designed to encourage a discussion of this type. Only a few problems are listed specifically. Until now, the chief question we have faced was to determine ways and means to block any further Soviet aggression in Europe or any further expansion of their power. The next step, however, is equally important. Can we organize Europe and meet the Soviet threat in such a way as to weaken the Soviet position, thereby convincing the Kremlin that its present policy is so dangerous that it must be modified, resulting in a rollback of Soviet power in Europe. There are risks in such a policy, but any dynamic policy involves a risk. Unless we can have a dynamic policy, we run another and equally dangerous risk that our organization for mutual defense will be weakened by internal strains to such an extent that local actions by the Soviet Government will be possible in the peripheral areas.

Therefore, the main questions we face may be stated as follows:

1. Under what conditions and in what manner can the West attempt to weaken the present Soviet position in Europe and what risks will be involved in doing so.

2. How can the unity of Europe be developed and maintained, within the larger framework of the Atlantic Community, in order to serve as an effective deterrent to Soviet aggression, either on a general or local scale. Are US programs contributing to the development of a suitable European unity.

3. Are the present US programs of military and economic assistance adequate in providing the basis for mutual defense. If not, what programs should we adopt.

4. How can German strength be utilized in the system of Western defense without weakening the political and economic structure of Western Europe by the creation of mutual resentment and suspicion. How can we deal with the key problem of German unification after the ratification of the EDC.

These problems, stated in very general terms, are the basic ones we face in Europe. During the discussions on specific areas and specific fields of political, economic and military activity, they can be given precise and definite form. The discussion will revolve about two points: what can we expect from the Soviet Union in the future, and what can be done in Europe.

A number of specific questions might be raised for discussion with the participants. Some of these questions are listed below. No attempt has been made to provide answers for these questions although many of them are discussed in the briefing papers. Their purpose is to provoke discussion of basic issues at the meeting and, in doing so, to provide the answers.

Questions which might arise during the conference

I. Soviet Union

Kennan has not yet commented on the agenda proposed on August 22 except to approve it in general terms. He has drafted a paper on the Soviet attitude towards NATO which has been sent to the various posts. See Tab M.²

In determining the adequacy of our policy towards the Soviet Union, some of the following questions might be raised:

Our policy paper (Tab A³) calls for consideration of means for the general weakening and the decay of Soviet power and for the development of rifts between the USSR and the satellite states in order to weaken and reduce the Soviet orbit. Precisely how can Moscow’s control over the satellites be weakened? What satellite states would be most susceptible to a policy having this objective? What wedges can be driven between the satellites themselves to weaken the unity of Soviet control?

How far can we push in the development of our program for bases in the peripheral areas without provoking Soviet retaliation?

How do the Soviets propose to deal with the ultimate problem of German unification knowing that East Germany is inferior in numbers and strength to the Federal Republic? (Tab B⁴) If their objective is to obtain a unified Germany either under Communist control or friendly to the Soviet Union, how do they propose to achieve this goal? They must recognize that an anti-Communist unified Germany would completely swing the balance in Europe against the Soviet Union. What risks therefore are the Soviets willing to take with respect to German unification?

In view of the intensity of the Soviet reaction to MAINBRACE, would other demonstrations of Western force be desirable or helpful in pursuing our objective of deterring Soviet aggression? Is so, in what areas should such a demonstration take place? … Would a demonstration of force in Berlin be helpful? (Tab C⁵)

II. United Kingdom

In recent months there have been many indications of a growing timidity and fear in British foreign policy, particularly an unwillingness to take any action which might provoke the Soviet Union. Is this timidity due to any new orientation in international policy or is it the result solely of internal political difficulties? Can we expect, for example, a return to previous British policy now that the Labor Party has rejected the Bevan proposals?

The British have raised the question of reduction of forces in Germany and Austria unless a solution can be found to provide for their upkeep or to increase the German contribution to mutual defense. Is this desire to reduce military activity abroad due solely to economic factors or does it reflect a change in emphasis on British responsibilities abroad? If it is the former, how can we help prevent a decrease in British military effort abroad?

III. France

Ambassador Dunn’s telegram 1520, September 11 (Tab E⁶), raised two important questions which he stated might be discussed. In the first place, the Germans may be expected to point out that the contractual relationship with the US, UK and France is not compatible with the equality which would be accorded to Germany in a political federation. Dunn states that if any idea is expressed that the contractual controls would disappear after the ratification of the EDC, that ratification by France would be seriously in danger.

He raised the question whether US relations with Germany might not be revised in order to insure that our continuing leadership in the Atlantic Community would be carried into our association with the European Community. This telegram is contained in the briefing book and the problem is discussed in the paper on “Germany’s Position in Europe After Ratification.” (Tab F⁷)

Another question which might be taken up is the perennial one whether France is capable in a political and economic sense of maintaining its present contribution to NATO and fulfilling its responsibilities in opposition to communism outside of France.

We have been putting continual pressure on France on a variety of questions, such as Germany, Tunis, Morocco, expansion of the armaments industry, Indochina, and many others. What effect will this continuing pressure have upon French political orientation? Will it contribute ultimately to the development of a neutralist spirit? Will it affect adversely French political stability? What can the US do to balance its pressures in France? Should we relax our pressures on the whole field listed above and concentrate on the more important aspects of the French role in European life?

How real are the French fears concerning the expanding economic strength of West Germany? How do the French propose to deal with the problem of the expansion of German strength, the introduction of its armed forces into Western defense and the utilization of its armaments industries? Do they fear that France ultimately will be replaced by Germany as the leader of the Western European Movement? Would France wreck the Western European defense system to prevent such a development?

IV. Germany

Donnelly’s excellent telegram 887, August 28 (Tab G⁸), contained in the briefing book, has given rise to much comment. It raises the question of the resurgence of German productivity and vitality and the difficulties which this will create in Western Europe by upsetting the balance of power between Germany and France. Donnelly also raises the question of the effect of this German dynamism on Eastern Europe in that it will tend to make the denial of the Eastern territories more intolerable to the Federal Republic. It raises finally the unity question and urges a positive policy on our part in rolling back Soviet power and obtaining during this process the ultimate unification of Germany. This telegram poses some of the key questions for the future of European politics and should be the subject of detailed discussion. It involves such problems as the reconciliation of Franco-German difficulties over the Saar. (Tab H⁹)

The problems raised by Donnelly might be discussed in the following order:

What can be done to speed up the work on the interim EDC Committee to assure prompt action on German association with the West. (Tab I¹⁰)

How can the necessity for action on ratification of the EDC and contractuals be further impressed upon the Germans since we cannot expect other European nations to take similar action until approval has been given by the Federal Republic. How should we deal with Eastern Germany? Should we attempt to squeeze Eastern Germany and reduce its economic value to the Soviets as well as its war potential? Could this be done by such simple devices as encouraging the defection of Eastern Germans from the People’s Army?

Following the ratification of the EDC, how will we deal with any possible German request for full membership in NATO?

Finally, what thoughts have we on the question of unification of East and West Germany? Pending the roll-back of Soviet power, what interim measures could be taken aside from the exchange of diplomatic notes which would encourage this goal and insure that a unified Germany would be on the Western side?

V. Italy

How real is the Communist threat in Italy? If a Nenni type government comes into power in the next elections, will it withdraw Italy completely from the Western European picture? Would a victory by the Nenni forces encourage similar forces in other European states?

Should we encourage a closer rapprochement between Italy and West Germany? Aside from any substantive value which closer bonds might have, could such a rapprochement be used to bring pressure on France to reconcile its differences with Germany?

Could Italy be used to promote the cause of European integration? Italy is outside the Franco-German complex and is not necessarily affected by Franco-German differences.

Could we revive the Italian policy of negotiating customs unions with neighboring states such as France and Austria?

European Political Integration

The paper on the European Political Community raises a number of points which will require intensive discussion. (Tab J¹¹) The basic questions are:

(a) What type of integration in Europe would best suit our interests in building an effective and efficient deterrent to Soviet aggression?

(b) How can we assure that such an integrated Europe would have positive and dynamic objectives rather than being merely a defensive or third force movement?

(c) What is the best means whereby the US may maintain contact with the Community of Six, both in terms of representation and in our foreign aid legislation, without slighting the larger interests of the Atlantic Community? (Tab K¹²)

(d) Should we push the Community of Six rapidly through a transitional state until the different national sovereignties are merged into one state?

(e) Is the Community of Six the best way to deal with the German problem? How long can we expect it to be an adequate device for absorbing Franco-German differences? What will replace it if it proves to be inadequate for channelizing the expanding German strength into mutual efforts for defense.

(f) How can we prevent our policy of support for the Community of Six from weakening our present close relations with the UK? Should we associate ourselves with British efforts to provide a link with this group without incurring responsibilities of close association, or should we oppose the Eden Plan? Will we continue to support the UK and its economic associates on the same level we do at present or concentrate on an integrated Europe?

Conclusions

The final report of the conference might be a series of recommendations based, for convenience, around the four questions listed earlier. These recommendations should propose positive steps which can be taken in these fields over a long-range period. They will be useful in determining precisely how our basic policy papers can be implemented.

The recommendation can be composed around the following points:

1. The adequacy of our policy towards the Soviet Union and the course of action to be followed in seeking a decrease in Soviet power in Europe.

2. What kind of a unified Europe do we seek which takes into account both the larger interests of the Atlantic Community and its positive value in preventing Soviet aggression and obtaining a modification in current Soviet policy.

3. How can we obtain a unified military program in Europe without sacrificing the present momentum in mutual defense efforts or creating strains which will weaken or destroy the regional organizations.

4. What are we going to do about Germany, both in terms of uniting German productive abilities with Western efforts and solving the problem of German unity which will be a disruptive force in European diplomacy as long as the present division continues to exist.

The detailed form of these recommendations can be given only in the light of the discussion and the agreement which is reached.

1. This briefing memorandum, presumably drafted in the Bureau of European Affairs, was used as an introduction for a notebook with background papers prepared for the use of Under Secretary Bruce who was to serve as chairman of the Chiefs of Mission meeting in London. None of the papers cited in the text below is printed herein; for information concerning these background papers, see footnotes 2–12, below. Copies of these background papers are in CFM files, lot M–88, “London Ambassadors Meeting—Sept. 1952”, and in Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 121.
2. Tab M, not printed, is despatch 116 from Moscow, Sept. 8, 1952, in which Kennan evaluated the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the Atlantic Pact. The text of despatch 116 is printed in Kennan’s Memoirs, vol. ii, pp. 327–351.
3. Tab A, not printed, is a 4-page policy paper with recommendations concerning a reappraisal of the sources of strength of the United States and the ways they might be utilized in meeting the Soviet threat.
4. Tab B, not printed, is a brief summary of Soviet policy toward Germany prepared in the Office of German Political Affairs and circulated as document LAM D–3/3.
5. Tab C, not printed, is a 5-page discussion of the Berlin problem prepared in the Office of German Political Affairs and circulated as document LAM D–3/1.
6. Tab E, not printed, contained questions which Dunn thought should be discussed in the proposed Chiefs of Mission meeting at London.
7. Tab F, not printed, is a 7-page paper prepared in the Office of German Political Affairs and circulated as document LAM D–3/4.
8. For text see vol. vii, Part 1, p. 355.
9. Tab H, not printed, is a 3-page paper prepared in the Office of German Political Affairs and circulated as document LAM D–3.
10. Tab I, not printed, is a 6-page paper concerning the German contribution to the defense of Western Europe prepared in the Office of German Economic Affairs and circulated as document LAM D–3/2.
11. Tab J, not printed, is a brief 3-page paper prepared in the Office of European Regional Affairs and circulated as document LAM D–2/1.
12. Tab K, not printed, is a 6-page résumé of the problems in the European military build-up prepared in the Office of European Regional Affairs and circulated as document LAM D–2/2.