Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Western Europe and Canada, Volume VI, Part 1

Conference files, lot 59 D 95, CF 121

No. 303
Summary Minutes of the Chiefs of Mission Meeting, London, September 24–26, 1952¹

top secret

[Washington,] October 2, 1952.

Participants:

• From the Department:

  • Under Secretary Bruce
  • Assistant Secretary Perkins
  • Mr. McWilliams
  • Mr. Williamson
  • Mr. Ferguson
  • Mr. Morris

• Embassy London:

  • Ambassador Gifford
  • Mr. Holmes

• Embassy Paris:

  • Ambassador Dunn
  • Mr. Achilles

• Embassy Moscow:

  • Ambassador Kennan
  • Mr. O’Shaughnessy

• Embassy Rome:

  • Ambassador Bunker
  • Mr. Horsey

• HICOG Bonn:

  • Ambassador Donnelly
  • Mr. Reber

• SRE:

  • Ambassador Draper
  • Ambassador Anderson
  • Ambassador Merchant

Session of September 24th—Morning

Mr. Bruce pointed out that this session was one of a regular series of meetings of Chiefs of Mission. He hoped that the conference would agree on general policy recommendations to be made to the Department. The meeting should concentrate on things to be done in the future. The recommendations would be used as a guide for the present Administration in making its recommendations for the 1953 budget as well as in recommending specific action which will have to be taken within the framework of NSC 135.²

Ambassador Kennan

Ambassador Kennan opened the meeting by referring to his recent despatch on the Soviet attitude toward NATO (Moscow despatch 116, September 8, 1952³). He stated that he was not unhappy about our present approach in general, but he did note certain inconsistencies in our policy and several places where it might be improved. The extent of the deterioration in diplomatic relations between the US and USSR was not fully realised. A total freeze has been placed on foreign diplomatic missions in Moscow in which the Soviet Government shows complete unconcern for Western reactions or for Western policy. Therefore there is no diplomatic cushion between peace and war and no area in which effective protests can be made. The actual threat of war would be the only way to dent this psychology. We should try to alter their impression of the outside world and dispel their exaggerated idea of the cumulative effect of our inherent weaknesses. Their attitude and policy is based upon their fundamental analysis of the weakness of Western capitalism. This analysis can be shaken. The political conventions in the US and the type of candidates nominated by both parties have presumably demonstrated that the US will continue to have a vigorous foreign policy. The Soviet leaders are concerned about this prospect since they had great hopes that an electoral crisis would take place in the US. The US and the West should avoid any signs of weakness or disunity. The Soviet Government will continue to worry about Western strength and will try many means to divide the West. However, in time and in the absence of any sign of weakness on our part, we can expect that the Soviet Government may want to do serious business with us.

The US has had three distinct policies toward the Soviet Union. (1) The policy of 1933 as followed by President Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins which made no distinction between the Soviet regime and other states. This policy ignored their bad manners in the hope that one day they would join the world community and conform to international rights. (2) The policy of complete isolation and ostracism. This policy, followed by Secretaries Hughes and Kellogg between 1920 and 1933, was marked by the complete absences of diplomatic relations. (3) An active policy which would attempt to weaken the Soviet regime and eventually overthrow its Government.

Whatever decision is made concerning the policy of containment, the three policies listed above should not be confused. Elements of all three policies should not be present at any one time. The present US Mission in Moscow was designed to take care of the first policy. Our policy in the UN follows the first policy, but now there is a great deal of talk concerning an active policy which would subvert the Soviet Government.

The most difficult and delicate problem at the present time is to determine Germany’s relationship with NATO and the impact which its membership therein would have on the Soviet Union. A compromise must be made between the military advantage to be derived by the disposition of NATO troops and bases in the areas near the Soviet frontier and the political effect which such disposition would have. This problem involves particularly Turkey and Norway. The US Mission in Moscow is hampered by a lack of precise information concerning NATO activities such as the construction of bases. The Soviet press has distorted NATO activities to a great degree but such distortions may reflect a real anxiety. Information is needed to evaluate the reports in the Soviet press and to ascertain whether they do indicate a real fear of NATO strength. It would not be desirable to keep such information on file in Moscow, so some other means for informing the Mission will have to be worked out.

The real question is to determine how acute is the danger of Soviet attack and what should we do in the main lines of our policy. Should we wait them out or exploit their weaknesses? Mr. Kennan expressed the view that we should go easy in NATO preparations and avoid provocative action. We should do all we can to prevent statements in the US that we are planning to overthrow their power. He believes that we should wait a few months to see what is forthcoming in the Soviet Union, and rely on the Western strength and our solution of problems in Western Europe which he feels have a healthy impact on Soviet leaders.

In response to a question from Mr. Bruce, Mr. Kennan amplified his analysis of the basis of Soviet policy by stating that the failure of the US to have an economic crisis had made the Soviet leaders extremely sensitive. A growing unity in the West would complete the demolition of this argument. The prevention of real divisions in the West, particularly between the UK and the US would deprive them of situations to exploit. He felt that Soviet policy was not completely rigid and demonstrated this by pointing out the avid interest with which the leaders ponder the significance of events in the West. He felt that their hope for security was not placed entirely on their military forces but on their feeling that the West would collapse before it could wage an effective war. Soviet reports from the West were probably good insofar as statistics were concerned but Soviet agents could not make any objective political analysis.

Mr. Kennan considered that it would be helpful if he filed an immediate complaint with the Foreign Office against each major distortion in the Soviet press concerning US policy. He also felt that the historic record of US–USSR relations should be corrected, particularly the report that the US tried to make a separate peace with the Germans in North Italy at the end of the war. In response to Mr. Dunn’s question concerning publicity, he stated that he was not sure how this should be handled. Mr. Dunn stated that it would be helpful if the same material which he used to refute the Soviet arguments were made available to the other Missions in order to clarify their position with those governments.

Mr. Kennan answered Mr. Bruce’s question concerning the UN by stating that he did not believe the Security Council or the Assembly was a good place for fighting our battles with the Soviet Union and that they should be carried out on the diplomatic level. He felt that we had overworked the idea of mobilizing votes in the Assembly against the Soviet Union and that they were impervious to its effect. We should, however, not let them get away with distorted statements in the UN concerning our policy and should combat them on a purely factual basis.

Mr. Donnelly stated that the Soviet High Commissioner in Berlin had expressed a desire for more contact with his Western colleagues. Mr. Kennan pointed out that if we remained aloof from the Russians we simply played their own game. He did not believe that we should have quadripartite meetings with them on Germany since they would turn out to be duels between the two sides. He felt that Vishinsky had always treated him in a serious and dignified fashion and that we should continue to handle basic questions with him on a diplomatic basis. He pointed out that Vishinsky told him that the present anti-American campaign is direct retaliation for the US activity in the Katyn investigation, the Grow Diary and other publications.

Ambassador Gifford

Ambassador Gifford pointed out that among all of our allies, the UK remains the strongest both in military strength and its determination to maintain national independence. We should continue to encourage progress in the UK defense program which is bigger than all Western European programs put together. Britain is taking an active interest in the growing integration of Europe and is showing a proper and enlightened viewpoint in the development of a strong defensive position.

A basic question involves the Middle East. The British have hinted that they might withdraw from the Middle East as they did from Greece. The US should keep them in the picture and support their policy, particularly since the US is not ready to take over the responsibility now exercised by the UK.

There is no major problem in the current political situation. The Labor and Conservative parties have the same goals in the international fields but display a difference in emphasis in reaching them. The economic situation is serious in view of the import requirements. The Socialist system has slowed down incentives and has curtailed production. The curtailment makes it difficult for Britain to meet international competition. In addition, the working people are better off in Britain than ever before, although this does not apply to other classes of the population. This situation makes it difficult to bring about technological improvement and increased production.

The British are very sensitive about the decrease in their prestige. We should not formally or publicly engage in any joint enterprise, such as a joint study committee, designed to find a long range solution for the British economic situation. Joint enterprise should be avoided since future stability in the UK will involve many fundamental and painful political decisions.

Mr. Bruce stated that serious consideration will have to be given to long term policy after the close of the Commonwealth Conference and the inauguration of the new Administration in Washington. He pointed out that British prestige is lower in the Middle East than the British are willing to recognize. Many believe that the US should take an active lead in formulating a new policy in the Middle East instead of following the British line. He doubted the ability of the US to replace Britain in this area particularly in view of the extent of nationalist movements and the fact that anti-Westernism in the Middle East made no distinction between the UK and the US.

Mr. Kennan stated that we could not let British prestige take a blow in this area. We cannot expect to be popular or to be liked in the Middle East, but we should be respected. We should demonstrate that we are prepared to act and that we mean business in the protection of our strategic interests. We should shift the emphasis in our policy in order to obtain this respect. We should not rely on individuals in Middle Eastern politics nor interfere with nationalistic movements except in the protection of our strategic interests. We must recognize and fight the elements of blackmail in the Iranian position. The national movements in the Middle East must oppose Communism because of the effect on them if the Communists won a predominate position. They should not be motivated by love of the US.

Ambassador Dunn

Mr. Dunn emphasized the strength of French policy as expressed by the Pinay Government. This Government had given the French people hope that it can stabilize the economy and preserve the value of the franc. Pinay has the support of individual members of other political parties such as the Socialists in seeking this objective.

He will face a real battle on October 7th when Parliament takes up the question of prices. Pinay will meet the opposition successfully and will probably carry on until the beginning of next year. There is no alternative Government in sight at this time. Pinay is not interested in international questions. He has neither the time nor patience for dealing with these questions as he is completely preoccupied with the domestic situation. He fully supports the defense policy as it has been expressed by Pleven. He supports Schuman in his efforts to create an integrated Europe. Pinay is a strong anti-Communist and will go as far as necessary in combating Communism. He has the support of public opinion in this respect.

The French are making a sincere effort to fulfill their NATO requirements but the drain of the war in Indo-China prevents full utilization of their potential national production. In North Africa, US and French interests coincide. The French must continue to stay in control of North Africa if the entire NATO structure is not to be weakened. We must find a way to reconcile our position with French needs.

The French plan no immediate action with respect to ratification of the EDC. Under no circumstances will the French ratify before the Germans ratify or before they get some idea of the general settlement of the Saar question. The debate on ratification will probably take place in January and there is little prospect of advancing it.

Mr. Bruce stated that there was a feeling in Washington to censor the French for delay in the EDC ratification since it was originally their own plan. He felt that French over-all interest would be served by speedy French action immediately following the ratification by the Germans. He stated that the US will vote for the inscription of the Tunisian item in the agenda of the General Assembly. It would be impossible for the US to state French policy in North Africa for them. He felt that the French should have their case presented by their best orator who by his stature and ability would be able to convince the Assembly of the sincerity of the French motives. Mr. Bruce stated that there was no possibility of changing the attitude of the A.F. of L. and C.I.O. on Tunis which was in direct opposition to the US position. He hoped that we could get the French to announce their position on inscription before the US announcement.

In response to a question by Mr. Perkins as to whether the French would make settlement of the Saar a precondition of EDC ratification, Mr. Dunn stated that he believed Schuman would wish a basic agreement with Adenauer which he could mention in the debate. He hoped a settlement would be reached before the end of the year since at that time the issue would be injected into the German elections.

Ambassador Donnelly

Chancellor Adenauer has reported that he expects final action to be taken on ratification of the EDC by the end of October or early November. Adenauer says the SPD is reconciled to the fact that ratification will take place. The Supreme Court is expected to hand down a favorable decision about the end of October. The debate in the Bundestag will be affected by such issues as the Saar, war criminals and the activity of the East German delegation on German unity. The Germans will complain bitterly at any French delay in ratification and may request the US to implement certain portions of the contractuals prior to French ratification. They may specifically ask for the immediate creation of the Mixed Board on War Criminals and announce the three German members. Also there will be strong pressure for immediate steps to create the German army.

After ratification many problems will arise from the operation of the contractuals but the real issue will be German admittance to NATO. German participation in EDC cannot be justified without the recognition of full equality of NATO membership.

Adenauer is seeking a reasonable settlement of the Saar question and one which will not prejudice him in the elections or which can be used against him by the Nationalist elements. The US should not become directly involved in this issue.

It is difficult to get the British and French to go along with us in the Berlin situation. They are over-cautious. We do not plan any unilateral action there without full consultation with our allies but a dangerous situation might arise in which effective action is made impossible by the failure of the British and French to get instructions.

The Soviets can be expected to do everything to delay or prevent ratification and to weaken West Germany by dividing it on political or religious grounds. Adenauer will stand or fall on the issue of integration with the West. The succession of Ollenhauer as SPD chief will help and there is even some talk of a “grand coalition” after the next election.

De Gasperi’s visit to Bonn was a real success. De Gasperi told Adenauer that Italy will not wait for French ratification before taking action on the EDC which might be expected in November.

Ambassador Bunker

The test of our policy in Italy will come in the 1953 elections. Although the center parties had a slim margin in the administrative elections, a larger margin of victory may be achieved in the national elections in which the basic issue of Communism can be clearly defined. The progress in economic reforms will also help the Government as the cumulative effect will be noticed at the time of the elections to a greater extent than is now evident.

De Gasperi is confident that he will be able to form a coalition of the four center parties either before or after the elections. The Communist tactics of posing as a democratic party and avoiding overt action, however, is effective. The Communists lose ground whenever they turn to subversive tactics or political strikes as shown in the recent abortive railroad strike.

The basic problem continues to be economic. The Government’s record is good, but unemployment and part-time employment are still serious questions. Inflation has been controlled and a sound basis established for the currency. Reforms have also been made in tax collection, and income taxes now constitute 19% of the Government’s revenue.

In the military field, Pella says that Italy will meet the TCC commitment. There is strong support for the productivity drive and the rate of investment for 1953 will be increased. Emigration, however, still constitutes a major problem. The Italians were very disappointed at the low quota in the McCarran Act. Officials are now exploring the possibility of emigration to Latin America, particularly Brazil. It may be possible that some part of the excess manpower could be sent to Sardinia. Even the million new jobs which have been created recently do not take care of the backlog and in view of the limited opportunities open to Italy for relieving this situation some help should be given.

The Italian Government can be expected to take firm action with respect to the Communists. De Gasperi will do everything he can within the law and has asked for suggestions as to appropriate action. De Gasperi, however, will not be able to go as far against the Communists as he might have done immediately after the elections of 1948. He will have to go slowly particularly in view of the Communist tactics of stressing constitutional methods. It has been suggested that he might cut off revenue available to them through trade with the East by making this trade a state monopoly.

De Gasperi says that no Italian Government could survive unless it reaches a satisfactory solution of the Trieste question. He says that this problem will have a vital effect on the Italian ratification of the EDC but this is believed to be simply a tactical position. The timing and the nature of the Western approaches to Yugoslavia have discouraged De Gasperi. He says that the help given to Yugoslavia will make Tito less reasonable on the Trieste question. The Western Powers should not openly repudiate the March 20th declaration.

It is recommended in our policy in Italy that the US should be as self-effacing as possible and let the Italians get the credit for the material progress which has been made. The injection of the US into the Italian scene helps the Communists. We should always ascertain what political effect may be expected from the requests we make to the Italian Government. If these effects are favorable, we can expect a better showing for the center parties in the elections. We should try to associate Italy more closely with Britain and France in major European decisions.

Mr. Bruce pointed out that the Italians must not be optimistic about any forthcoming legislation in the US which could help the emigration picture. He felt that this fact should be stressed to the Italian Government.

Session of September 24th—Afternoon

Ambassador Draper

Ambassador Draper reviewed briefly recent developments in NATO, stressing the unanimous acceptance of American leadership in the appointment of General Ridgeway. There have been certain difficulties in the North Atlantic Council since the Lisbon meeting,⁴ including the psychological let-down in connection with the decision on the French aid program and Churchill’s statement regarding the stretch-out of the British defense effort. There has, however, been subsequent improvement in the NATO atmosphere, particularly as a result of the NAC discussion on Germany and the Soviet note. Political discussions are now developing in the NAC and will be extremely helpful.

SHAPE now estimates that progress towards the 1952 goals will be as follows: 24 out of 25 M–Day divisions, and 14 out of 25 M plus 15–30 divisions, or a total of 38 divisions by the end of 1952. US defense specialists in Washington, evaluating 1953 and 1954 goals in terms of cost, believe we will be short about four billion dollars in both 1953 and 1954. In the air, 1952 should achieve the 4,000 planned NATO planes, though a considerable number of these will not be modern. The British have suggested a strategic review of the effect of new weapons on the presently contemplated force goals. The US authorities feel that new weapons, which will only become available in quantity in 1956, will not reduce the need for conventional weapons and troops strength required for 1953–4. The British and French appear to have accepted this view.

The primary short range objective is to get the German defense contribution, and in view of various factors such as elections scheduled for 1953, we must press ahead on this program. It is important for the US to set a deadline for the ratification of the EDC. The Dutch, Belgians, Norwegians, and Danes in particular have stressed the need for prompt ratification and also for German membership in NATO. It seems clear that the Danes and Dutch will not feel secure until the German defense contribution has been achieved. We should, therefore, perhaps have some alternative US plan, if EDC ratification fails, such as some special arrangement with Germany.

The US should seek to avoid a development in European integration in which a hard core of the six nations might withdraw from the context of the Atlantic Community. We will have to strengthen the economic aspects of NATO and draw up a program of commercial and investment policy which will be of benefit to the entire community.

Mr. Bruce, commenting on the EDC ratification, noted that the timing of the French ratification is the biggest problem, and since Italy will evidently ratify shortly, the Department should press the Benelux powers to do the same, as we did in the case of the Schuman Plan.

Mr. Bruce agreed that we should gather at the end of the year all the studies being made of commercial policy to arrive at a position which could be recommended to the new administration. It would be premature to make any specific recommendations at this time.

Referring to the East-West trade problem, Mr. Perkins inquired what the impact would be on the Soviets if we publicized our activity and success in trade restriction. Mr. Kennan replied there should be no bad effect providing we make it clear that the restrictions were for strategic reasons only, especially if Allied unity on this subject is clear and can be maintained. At the same time, added Mr. Kennan, we should for propaganda reasons make it clear that within a certain area at least, we favor East-West trade, noting that the US is not big and rich enough to provide alternatives for all such trade. Mr. Perkins remarked that for the clearly strategic items, there is little difference of opinion among the Western governments, the main differences arising in the field of those commodities which become strategic only if in certain quantities, such as rubber.

Mr. Perkins questioned the standards used in the conclusion that at the end of 1952 only 38, and not 50, NATO divisions, would be attained and whether this was not a bad performance. Mr. Draper pointed out the difficulties involved in training and equipment. He agreed that any public discussion must stress the progress made regarding the other 12, and that the overall achievement could in fact be considered satisfactory and a decided contrast to the situation a year ago. It was not a cut back from the Lisbon goals, but a cut back in the rate of growth in the defense effort. There are more troops in being now than in 1939, but the cost of equipment is so great that we cannot compare the present effort with the reserve system of 1939.

US Objectives with Respect to European Integration with Particular Reference to the Growing Strength of the Federal Republic

Following the above general presentation by the various Ambassadors, Mr. Bruce suggested that the meeting should discuss some of the special problems. The first item was US objectives regarding European integration with special reference to Germany. Mr. Donnelly referred to his telegram 887, of August 28, 1952, to the Department,⁵ the main German problems including refugees and the impressive achievements in the economic and financial field. Germany is already a serious competitor in world trade. He expressed the opinion that Adenauer’s coalition now has a good chance of winning the 1953 parliamentary elections. With respect to resurgent Germany, both politically and economically, he suggested that Germany threatens to dominate the EDC, for which reason it might be better, from the viewpoint of Allied control, to get her into NATO as quickly as possible. Moreover, she will certainly demand such full military equality.

Mr. Bruce commented that the solution of this problem involves the question of timing, since US policy has always favored German membership in NATO. This question obviously cannot be raised with our Allies until the EDC has been ratified. Mr. Kennan stated that, if US policy in fact favored German membership in NATO, it will have in his opinion profound implications for the Soviets and Europe. Will this not mean that no peaceful solution of the problem of the German unity can be achieved? The Soviets will feel that they cannot possibly give up Eastern Germany, the Germans will in time force the unification of their country, and with Germany in NATO, we will be involved in war. NATO is already so large a coalition it would be hard to agree on any terms of settlement with the Soviets, and with a dynamic and un-unified Germany added, this would be an even more serious problem since we would leave the Soviets no opportunity to settle the German question by negotiation. The Soviet leaders would choose war to political surrender. Mr. Donnelly pointed out that Germany actually will be a member of the EDC and that as a NATO member the US has given the EDC [a] security guarantee. Therefore for practical purposes we are already involved whether we like it or not. Mr. Kennan admitted that this NATO–EDC guarantee complicated our situation, though did not think it would be as difficult as we would face were Germany an actual NATO member. The latter would mean, he felt, political war with the Soviets, first in terms of Eastern Germany and the other Soviet Satellites, and then with the USSR itself, since the Stalin regime could not retreat to this extent. Mr. Kennan felt we should try and get agreement with the Soviets for a demilitarized unified Germany.

Mr. Kennan noted that this question is somewhat similar to that of subversion of the Soviet regime and system. Admittedly, there is no moral reason not to do so, in view of the Soviet attitude and behavior for over 30 years, but he had grave doubts as to the advisability of such a course. We have no real program or organization to succeed the USSR. If we should try this, we should in all honesty first break diplomatic relations. Mr. Donnelly raised the question whether there really could be peace in Germany until the country was unified. Mr. Kennan replied that he supported Germany’s integration with the West, but felt we must try all diplomatic means to unify Germany peacefully.

Mr. Bruce commented that the US Government decided two years ago on the necessity for a German defense contribution, presumably via NATO, and it was only subsequent French opposition which produced the EDC. He suggested that the question of German NATO membership will not in fact become actual for some time, and this has never been publicly announced as US policy.

Mr. Perkins remarked that it was hard for him to see the difference between German membership in NATO, and the German membership in the EDC with a NATO–EDC guarantee, to say nothing of the security guarantees we have already given Western Germany and Berlin. He suggested the Soviets will in fact regard this as fully equivalent to German membership in NATO. Mr. Bruce also pointed out that the EDC setup, including the relationship between divisions and corps, is intended to make unilateral German aggression impossible, and should insure that any EDC or NATO military action must in fact be on an unanimous basis. He felt, however, that before long any US Government must and will favor complete German sovereignty and the removal of restrictions on Germany, since this inevitably follows the basic US decision in 1950 on the necessity for a German defense contribution. Mr. Kennan admitted that he has long felt that Germany must act as a buffer and defense for Western Europe from the Soviets, that the Soviets are a greater danger to us than a resurgent Germany and that we cannot defend Western Europe from both the Soviets and Germany.

Mr. Draper asked if the US could in fact accept a demilitarized Germany? Although there was no specific reply to this, the above decision on the necessity for a German defense contribution implies that a demilitarized Germany would not be acceptable to the US. Mr. Holmes pointed out that this whole discussion indicated that a divided Germany could hardly continue indefinitely without probably provoking war. Several fears were expressed that this is so.

The larger question is the nature of European integration in which our activity had major political implications, as, for example, the allocations of OSP orders. Mr. Bruce expressed the view that a judicious application of US aid can be made but there is probably little we can do to control German resurgence. He asked: what kind of European integration do we want and how can Germany be fitted into an integrated Europe. Should such integration include the present Soviet Satellites? The US clearly favors European integration but do we in fact have a policy on our relation to such a Europe? While urging others to surrender sovereignty, the US is unwilling to do so itself. Mr. Draper inquired if any fears had been expressed in Washington regarding the emergence of the Community of Six as a “3rd Force” which would not be subject to US influence and might in fact oppose us. Mr. Bruce replied that little consideration has been given in the US to this possibility. He pointed out the overwhelming and uncritical Congressional and public support of European integration.

Session of September 25th—Morning

This session was devoted to a discussion of military questions by General Gruenther. No record was made of this part of the Conference.

Session of September 25th—Afternoon

Berlin

Mr. Donnelly began the discussion of the Berlin issue by noting that in recent months there had been a number of harassments affecting our access to and rights in the city. The basic problem was: Should we just make more protests, or should we try really to meet this challenge? A survey of possible countermeasures has now been made, both in HICOG and Washington. Although the recent Dreilinden MP patrol issue was settled to our satisfaction, the other MP patrol issue has been outstanding since last spring, involving our right to send these patrols on the Autobahn between Berlin and Western Germany. Mr. Donnelly still felt that we should try his latest proposal (Bonn’s telegram No. 1198 of September 17, 1952, to Department⁶) although the British and French are evidently leery about it, and the US military in Germany has just expressed opposition. Mr. Donnelly emphasized there should be no danger of any shooting.

Mr. Bruce asked whether there is not a distinction between our basic right to stay in Berlin and our right to send the MP patrols? The latter is only a right by usage, and is it really vital?

Mr. Kennan commented that the important problems are that of unrestricted access to Berlin, and where we make our stand against Soviet encroachments. A protest on the Moscow level would presumably only be effective if accompanied by some pressure from us. However, Mr. Kennan could not help feeling seriously concerned regarding the MP issue and our apparent willingness to concede to the Soviets the right unilaterally to decide whether or when specific Berlin communications should be denied us. He again suggested his proposal for a demand for prior consultation, which Mr. Donnelly might well make orally to Chuikov in order to help emphasize it.

Mr. Donnelly reported that HICOM is just about ready to do this. He also mentioned the closing of Rothensee since August 15 and our inability to get any tripartite counteraction as yet.

Mr. Kennan noted that Western Berlin is now cut off completely from its natural economic hinterland, the result of gradual encroachments over a period of years, which in the long run increasingly threaten the morale and resistance of the Berlin people.

In reply to a question from Mr. Bruce, Mr. Donnelly suggested we face three specific problems now: that of Allied unity, the problem of possible counter-measures, and that of the MP patrols. Mr. Bruce pointed out that US policy calls for firm action in general, and as regards the MP issue, it is mainly a question of whether we make a stand on it, and if so, how? Mr. Perkins explained that in the recent discussion in Mr. Matthew’s office in the Department on this problem, it was feared that Mr. Donnelly’s proposal of mixing troops with the MP’s might end up by our having the troops blocked as well. Mr. Bruce asked why we could not send the MP’s out dressed as ordinary soldiers. Mr. Donnelly replied it was important to get the principle recognized.

Mr. Donnelly was asked whether he thought the British might agree to block access to the Berlin Radio building in their sector to Soviet MPs as a counter-measure to force the MP Autobahn issue. He expressed doubts that the British would agree to such a plan.

Mr. Bruce then asked what we should do in the case of some more vital encroachment such as closing the Autobahn entirely. Mr. Donnelly recommended meeting this issue head on; i.e. being prepared to force our way through if need be. Mr. Kennan again suggested demanding prior consultation from the Soviets on such cases, or even demanding an overland corridor to Berlin.

Regarding the specific MP issue, Mr. Kennan suggested the only way to impress the Soviets, besides counter-measures, would be to emphasize the completely cynical and unjustified Soviet pressure on the Berlin population resulting from the whole scheme of Soviet encroachments. This line might embarrass them. He also suggested that Mr. Donnelly should approach Chuikov and intimate that the Allies would be forced to consider serious measures if the MP patrols were not restored.

Mr. Dunn recalled the agreement of the three Western Foreign Ministers taken last spring in London on the necessity for firm and prompt measures in Berlin, suggesting we should remind our Allies of it.

In conclusion Mr. Bruce suggested that Mr. Donnelly should review this whole Berlin subject further upon his return to Germany, together with the British and French and with Mr. Kennan (who will be there next week) and present the Department with concrete proposals including, if he desires, one concerned with the MP Autobahn problem. Mr. Bruce suggested that consideration should be given particularly to the problem of what we should do unilaterally in the absence of tripartite agreement, as well as what action we should take, including consideration of the use of armed force, if the Soviets should interpose some fundamental obstruction of our free access to Berlin.

US Policy Toward the Community of Six

Mr. Draper considered that the question of relationship of the community of six to the Atlantic community was an important and even dangerous one, particularly in view of the intense Congressional interest in any form of European unity. The US does not have the same competitive reasons for watching this development as do the British. This development should be watched, however, in view of the possibility that the coal and steel community may become a great international cartel. The development of the regulations concerning pricing and financing should be studied from the point of view of coal and steel operations as well as the effect it will have on our concept of the European community.

Mr. Bruce stated that everyone agrees with the desirability of U.S. representation to the coal and steel community and felt that everyone present endorsed the idea of political federation. He referred to the proposal that a study be made of the coal and steel community by Mr. Humphrey. Mr. Draper outlined the need for this study to make known the facts to the iron and steel interests in the United States. Mr. Bruce expressed the fear that such a study might be regarded as U.S. interference in a matter of European domestic concern. The High Authority might like to have an outside study made at a later time. At the present time, however, it would be embarrassing if such a study resulted in U.S. opposition to the development of the coal and steel community simply on the basis of our attitude towards cartels. We should, of course, be present as observers, but should function only in a reportorial fashion. Mr. Bruce felt that the British can make some kind of a deal with the High Authority but the U.S. does not have the same need. There has been no official request for any U.S. financing which would require a detailed study. He considered that the plans for European federation should be left to the European states until a direct national interest is involved in the operation of these plans. We should not participate in the formulation of these plans. In view, therefore, of the political implications which such a study might have, it was generally agreed that it should not be made at this time.

Effectiveness of US Policy in Meeting the Soviet Threat

Mr. Ferguson briefly discussed the contents of NSC 135, explaining the nature and purpose of the reappraisal of our programs in order to meet the changing nature of the Soviet threat and to define our policy objectives in the period from 1954 to 1956.

Mr. Kennan responded by stating that he operates in Moscow by vacillating between hope and despair. On balance, he was inclined to take a gloomy view of our present approach. He felt that the development of military strength in the West was a task which had to be carried out. It was originally conceived for dialectical purposes, i.e., to be used in conducting successful negotiations. It appears that we may now have lost that original purpose. Strength and decisiveness in the West can sway the Soviet leaders, but they must also be convinced they have an alternative which can be achieved through negotiation. Mr. Kennan felt that the main issues involved in our relations with the Soviet Union are Germany, Austria, and Japan. The problem in these areas not only arises from the presence of Soviet troops but also from the power vacuum which our post-war policy created in these areas by removing them as effective buffer states. Agreement must be reached on the three areas if war is to be avoided.

Our present position takes it for granted that things cannot get better in our relations with the Soviet Union. But we cannot maintain the present balance without intolerable financial burdens. The Japanese question was settled without Russian participation. A settlement in Austria depends on settlement in Germany. In our present policy we are losing our freedom of action to talk to the Soviets. The basic Soviet thesis has long been that of the irreconcilability of the two systems, and there is now a real danger that our present policy constitutes acceptance on our part of this same idea. Only at the present time are we in a position to talk to them on equal terms. The Soviets are so suspicious that they regard our Embassy in Moscow as a center for espionage and not as a means of carrying out its fundamental diplomatic purpose. We should watch the situation carefully and take advantage of any wavering in the fundamental Soviet position in order to utilize that change in position for negotiation.

Mr. Kennan considered that we had dissipated our power of decision in NATO and had pushed the Western European countries too much in accepting our position and programs. He felt that this situation was being exploited by Soviet propaganda.

Mr. Kennan considered that the proposal for the subversion of Soviet power in the satellite areas might be the logical result of our policy in Germany. We should not attempt action of this type unless we are prepared politically and militarily to carry it out to its fullest extent. There can be no half-way measures in such a policy. If the policy of subversion extended to the Soviet Union, we should remove our formal diplomatic mission from Moscow.

Mr. Bruce pointed out that any proposal for settlement in Germany was affected by the deep distrust in the US—both by the Government and among the people—of entering into diplomatic negotiations with the Russians unless we have sufficient power to lead these negotiations to successful conclusion. He did not see any way to accommodate the Russians in Western Germany. We would have to be in a position to maintain our position by force if the negotiations broke down or if the Russians violated any agreement which might be reached.

Mr. Perkins agreed that there could be no basis for accommodation unless each side had confidence in its own strength to meet the situation which might follow the negotiations.

Mr. Kennan considered that we should negotiate to attempt to get the removal of Soviet military power from Germany back to the Pripet marshes. Russia habitually has had a large army but in earlier days buffer states existed between Russia and the rest of Europe. The problem is to secure the removal of Soviet military power from its advanced position in Europe.

Mr. Bruce did not consider that the proposal for negotiation was in accordance with the generally-accepted analysis ascribing imperialistic motives to the Soviet Union. He asked if security were really the only concern of the Soviet Union and whether agreement on the three areas (of Germany, Austria and Japan) would resolve Moscow’s drive for imperialistic expansion. Mr. Kennan replied that he could not tell whether the Soviet leaders were sincere in stating their position. The expansion of power is a long term trend in the Soviet Union in which the leaders operate on their own laws. The rivalry with the West is an established fact in their own minds and according to their view the struggle is going on at present. This position pre-supposes aggressive designs on our part but they believe that they can win by utilizing their present methods. The Soviet leaders do not desire a world war. Consequently, if we are strong enough, they will negotiate with us. Mr. Kennan did not believe that we were losing the cold war and pointed to the growth of the spirit of resistance in Germany and Austria, the loss of Moscow’s control in Finland and Yugoslavia and the victory over the Communist guerrillas in Greece.

We must recognize the consequences of a withdrawal from Germany. If Germany is unified, an entirely new situation will exist in Europe in which a large part of our defense structure such as NATO and EDC would disappear. But in its place there could be a unified Germany which would serve as a buffer state against the Soviet Union.

Mr. Bruce felt that we had had enough propaganda sessions with the Russians but stated that it was agreed in Washington that we would negotiate with them if we could do so on exact and constructive terms of references. Mr. Dunn pointed out that we must be aware of the effect on other states of our negotiations with the Russians, a point on which opinion might be seriously divided.

Mr. Draper asked what guarantee we would have that the Soviets would not re-occupy Germany if there was an agreement for withdrawal. He also asked whether the Soviets would continue to maintain political control over the satellite states. Mr. Kennan replied that he did not know what situation would exist in the satellites. He felt, however, that Titoism may be strong in some areas. A unified Germany, however, would be a counterforce and a counter-attraction in the satellite areas. He felt that despite all of these difficulties we should clarify the atmosphere by showing ourselves ready to talk about Germany.

Mr. Bunker asked what effect the U.S. withdrawal would have on the economic situation in Europe and whether it would not weaken the European states to such an extent that they would fall victim to Communism. Mr. Kennan replied that in economic matters Europe could take care of itself. Mr. Dunn suggested that a study might be made of various plans for strengthening the European economic structure by use of their own resources for improvements in trade relations, production and distribution.

Mr. Draper stated that any negotiation must provide a world settlement which includes Korea and Japan. He inquired whether we could expect the Russians to stay behind their borders militarily and not try to use their position to subvert other governments. Mr. Kennan replied by pointing out that the Russians could not understand why other nations did not use their police power to control or to destroy Communist movements within those states. He believed that such an exercise of police power would convince the Russians that they must abide by any agreement which is reached.

Mr. Bruce commented on the question of the continuation of economic aid. Everyone would like to see this aid terminated but with the current growth of the productive capacity of the US, it was impossible for European plants to produce for a revived world trade. They could not compete at any time with the US. We may find ourselves in a position of asking European states to take our products so we can maintain full employment at home. He felt therefore that aid in one form or other would have to continue for some time to come.

Session of September 26th

Mr. Draper stated that, as far as he was concerned, the views outlined by Mr. Kennan in the last two days opened up a whole series of new possibilities. The general world trend is certainly toward war, and the West presumably will not be militarily equal to the Soviet Bloc for another two to three years at least. The question therefore arises as to the desirability and timing of any real negotiations with Moscow. Mr. Draper recommended that a further study should be made of this whole problem.

Mr. Bruce suggested that the strength of the West, with specific reference to jet fighters, may be growing vis-à-vis the Soviets a good deal faster than we think. He thought we may reach a good deal sooner than has generally been realized the point from which we could negotiate with the Soviets from a position of strength.

Italian Manpower

Mr. Draper commented that this is essentially a political question and anything we could do to help De Gasperi before the elections would be good. Referring to the fact that there are still two million unemployed in Italy and the population growth continues to present a real problem, he suggested that if possibilities for new employment and emigration could each be stepped up by about 100,000 a year, it would help greatly. Could we try to make a token gesture in the U.S. by a law to admit even 10,000 additional Italians, and at the same time provide perhaps $50,000,000 to help other Italians to migrate elsewhere, both just before the elections? We should also try to urge our Allies and friends to do whatever they can as well.

Mr. Perkins suggested that the US could probably help most effectively by financing Italian migration to other countries, particularly with regard to travel expenses and costs of settlement.

Mr. Dunn urged that anything which could be done in this field within the NATO framework would be helpful in promoting the NATO organization and spirit.

Mr. Bruce concluded that this is a problem everyone should try and help with and the Department will do its best in Washington, with particular reference to the two specific suggestions of a token gesture in the way of immigration to the U.S. and financial assistance for migration elsewhere.

French Government Paper re NATO Strategy

Mr. Draper mentioned and summarized a French paper submitted to the NAC in September which among other things; expressed concern over the stretch-out in military programs; suggested that the maintenance on a constant level of American participation in the re-establishment of European forces tends to slow down the pace of the latter; raised the problem of the proper relationship between covering and reserve forces; inquired as to any available information on the perfection of new Allied weapons or the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. which might lessen the dangers in Europe and recommended that, in the course of the current Annual Review, attention be paid by the Standing Group in Washington to the fundamental facts of world strategy and the relation between NATO operations and those in other parts of the world, as well as to the desirability of not compromising the economic and financial stability of the various NATO member states in attaining an equitable distribution of any deficit, and the desirability of establishing an over-all production plan extending for more than one year. Mr. Draper pointed out particularly that these latter points reflect the French desire to have the Standing Group become equivalent to the Combined Chiefs of Staff of World War II and to get US assistance on more than a purely annual basis.

Mr. Bruce pointed out that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington would certainly not agree to turning the Standing Group into a body with global responsibilities, and that Congress and US budgeting practices would, of course, not permit the extension of US aid commitments beyond the current fiscal year.

Mr. Perkins suggested that it might be helpful to have some indication of an over-all US plan to provide assistance for the next two to three years, as was done in the case of the Marshall Plan. Mr. Bruce pointed out the difficulty is that, unlike the Marshall Plan, we can not really estimate how long the military program would be required, in view of the nature of the Soviet threat.

Mr. Kennan commented that he did not like the hint in this French paper that, unless we can prove that the Soviets are still likely to attack Western Europe, we could ease up on our defense effort. He suggested we must emphasize that our defense program is the kind of thing which any prudent man must continue to endorse for the foreseeable future, regardless of how the Soviets seem to be behaving at a particular moment. He felt that this was one of the weaknesses of the current Western defense effort, i.e. the way in which the public is only willing to accept the sacrifices involved in view of continuing assurances from the political leaders that a Soviet attack is imminent. He felt that this approach merely plays into the hands of the Soviet “Peace” campaign.

Interim Period in Germany After German Ratification of EDC

Mr. Donnelly mentioned several points on which we will undoubtedly face German pressure and other problems with which we will be confronted in the period immediately following the German ratification of the EDC and contractual agreements, and before complete ratification has been obtained. The major problem will be increased German pressure on the war criminal issue. The Federal Government may presumably request that the Mixed Board begin to operate. There will also be continued and increased pressure from the Soviet Zone on the subject of German unity. Other problems which we will have to face will include: the German financial contribution to EDC, including the amount for Allied support, and what consideration should be given to expenditures for the support of Berlin and refugees, as well as the problem of equipment for the German forces.

Mr. Bruce pointed out that the French can be expected to stand firm on refusing to give the Germans anything through the EDC and contractual agreements until the ratification process has been completed. If we were to push such points meanwhile, it would cause real trouble with the French. Mr. Bruce therefore suggested that Mr. Donnelly should try and moderate such German demands for pre-ratification implementation of the content of these agreements, particularly those of a clearly contentious nature which would merely make ratification more difficult in Paris. He also pointed out that this meeting should make positive recommendations along this line.

Mr. Dunn pointed out that the main problem is the position of Schuman, and he would be willing to approach Schuman informally to get his reaction as to the possibility of doing something on any particular matter which might be raised.

Mr. Draper inquired what alternative the French have, if any, to the ratification of the EDC. Mr. Dunn replied that he believed the lack of any alternative will produce French ratification. The final result may be somewhat delayed. Mr. Bruce commented that the French Parliament had better begin to tackle this problem before the new US Congress meets on January 20, 1953. He recommended that Mr. Bunker should press the Italians to go ahead with ratification without waiting for the French.

Iran

Mr. Bruce pointed out that, as in the case of Berlin and Germany, a point might be reached when US policy would so far diverge from that of the British in the Middle East that a serious split might take place. Mr. Gifford suggested that we should wait and see what the British decide to do about the latest Iranian note.

In response to a request from Mr. Bruce, Mr. Ferguson summarized Washington views on the Iranian oil problem. He stated that one difficulty is that the British have for the last year or more taken positions which we do not feel really meet the realities of the situation. The British have now arrived at a position with which we agree. The Iranians have clearly not moved very far, presumably because Mosadeq’s policy is essentially an anti-British one which does not require constructive thinking. The likelihood of any settlement between Britain and Iran is very slim, apart from the possibility that a solution might be adopted under which there would be some oil deliveries. It is hard to believe, at the same time, that the present blockade will remain indefinitely. Mr. Ferguson predicted that the Abadan Refinery would be put into operation and that foreign buyers would appear. He mentioned that there is a certain amount of tanker tonnage available for charter.

Mr. Bruce pointed out that in talking with the British, the problem arises as to whether the US should continue to support the blockade, should become neutral, or should even encourage buyers to go to Abadan. Mr. Holmes emphasized that the British believe that they are over extended in the Middle East and fear the consequences of our policy. He urged that the US should not overlook the British interests and that we continue to work with them.

Mr. Bruce suggested that Mosadeq believes that if he can drive a wedge between the British and US and, on the plea of the urgent Communist danger, he can eventually obtain substantial US assistance.

Mr. Gifford urged that in view of the unity shown by the recent Truman–Churchill approach to Iran,⁷ it would be regrettable if the Department now indicates that this unity has ended. Mr. Bruce concluded there was obviously no action or recommendations on the Iranian problem for us to take at the meeting, and authorized Mr. Gifford to send his views to the Department.

Future Meetings

Mr. Bruce inquired as to how everybody felt about these Chief of Missions Conferences, which had originally been planned to be held three or four times a year.

It was generally agreed that they have been profitable. Mr. Bruce said that the Department would consider Mr. Donnelly’s suggestion that one or two US representatives from the Satellite states should be included, in order to broaden the meetings. Mr. Bruce also agreed that we should aim in the future for two regular such meetings per year, on the understanding that supplementary sessions could be held if needed.

1. These minutes, along with a cover sheet and a table of contents, were circulated as document LAM Minutes. The drafter has not been identified. A summary of this 3-day meeting was transmitted to the Department of State in telegram 1804 from London, Sept. 27, and the text of this telegram was subsequently repeated to the Embassies in Western Europe in an unnumbered circular airgram of Oct. 1. (120.4341/9–2752 and 10–152, respectively)
2. Concerning NSC 135, see vol. ii, Part 1, p. 56.
3. See footnote 2, supra.
4. For documentation concerning the Ninth Session of the North Atlantic Council held in Lisbon on Feb. 20–25, 1952, see vol. v, Part 1, pp. 107 ff.
5. For text, see vol. vii, Part 1, p. 355.
6. For text, see vol. vii, Part 2, p. 1299.
7. For documentation concerning Iran, see volume x.