The underlying memorandum for Mr. James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary,
National Security Council,1 transmitting a report on the effect of United States
backing of Chiang Kai-shek2 has been
cleared in the Department by FE, NEA, S/A,
and G. It will be appreciated if you will
hold up the transmittal of the memorandum and attached report until the
Joint Chiefs of Staff have transmitted to the Council their report on
the possible use of Chinese Nationalist forces and the defense of
Formosa.3
S/A will let you know when this has
occurred.
[Attachment]
Memorandum Prepared in the Department of
State4
top secret
[Washington, February 9, 1951.]
Report on the Effect Within China and Other
Eastern Countries of United States Backing of Chiang
Kai-shek
The Communists within China face widespread discontent and
opposition. It is difficult to gauge precisely the extent or nature
of this opposition. However, available evidence indicates:
- (1)
- The general enthusiasm with which the Chinese Communists
were welcomed in their sweep southward has given way to
disillusionment
[Page 1575]
and discontent as they failed to make good on their promises
of a better life. Heavy taxes ruthlessly enforced, enforced
purchase of public bonds, general stagnation of business,
unemployment in certain sectors of the urban population and
a sequence of natural calamities have contributed to the
growth of active and latent opposition.
- (2)
- This opposition is strongest in South China.
- (3)
- It is largely unorganized and leaderless, finding its
active expression in sporadic and generally uncoordinated
acts of banditry, violence against isolated Communist
officials such as rural tax collectors, and guerrilla
action.
- (4)
- Probably only a small percentage of the population
actively supports the Communists, but this percentage would
increase rapidly if the Communists were able to convince the
Chinese people that they were protecting China from foreign
aggression or exploitation. If it were to appear,
contrariwise, that Chinese Communist policies were actually
furthering foreign aggression and exploitation (from the
side of the Soviet Union), the popular support for the
Peiping regime might well be expected to decline. In like
manner, while Communist successes in Korea and the success
to date of the Chinese Communist intransigence in respect of
the United Nations efforts to negotiate a cease-fire
increase the prestige of the Peiping regime within China and
serve to stimulate Chinese self-esteem and to foster
subversive activity in Chinese communities elsewhere,
especially in the Far East, an ultimate Communist defeat in
the Korean war would be a severe blow to that
prestige.
- (5)
- While a substantial part, perhaps a majority of Chinese
would like to see the Communist regime overthrown, they do
not generally look upon the Chiang Kai-shek regime as an
alternative and only a small fraction of these would
consider Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek clearly preferable to
Mao.
In short, there is particularly in South China a latent and active
opposition which might be developed through skillful encouragement
and assistance. This opposition would be most responsive to the
appeal of a “third force” largely independent of both the Kuomintang
and the Communists and promising a “new deal” to China. It would be
much less responsive to a return of General Chiang and his personal
clique of KMT supporters.
The foregoing might be interpreted as meaning that if opposition to
the Communists in mainland China is to be developed and exploited
fully, General Chiang and his close associates should be replaced on
Formosa. However, this is believed to be an oversimplification of
the problem.
It is true that many great leaders of history have frequently gone
through periods of defeat and rejection by their own people only to
emerge strong again. Those who have effected such comeback, however,
are definitely in the minority. It is to be granted that General
Chiang Kai-shek possesses certain essential qualities of leadership,
[Page 1576]
namely, supreme
confidence in himself and his cause, political determination, and
stubbornness, adroitness in political maneuver and an unwavering
opposition to Communism. It is likewise true, however, that he has
as well grave shortcomings, prominent among which, as evidenced by
his failures of recent years, are his basic reliance on dictatorial
methods to achieve his aims, his ineptitude in gauging political and
social forces and his consequent grave shortcomings as a political
leader, his proneness to meddle in military actions, his basic
suspicion of all other potential Chinese leaders, and his
inclination to carry on Machiavellian politics in the domestic arena
without due regard to the overall effect of such maneuvers on the
country as a whole.
The removal of General Chiang Kai-shek by the United States would be
an exceedingly difficult, perhaps impossible task. With his position
substantially strengthened as a result of developments in Korea, it
is doubtful that he could be induced voluntarily to resign. Any
effort of the U.S. Government to remove him forcibly and set up a
succession would be difficult to carry out and would taint his
successor as a U.S. puppet. There would further be the possibility
that any change in leadership at Taipei, if effected through the use
of force, would introduce an element of disorder in the Formosan
situation which would work to the benefit of the Communists on the
mainland.
In those circumstances it would appear advisable that the U.S. view
sympathetically and covertly support the development of any
resistance movement on the mainland in as much as such a movement
would be both a potential threat against the Peiping regime and
would be a natural influence exercising pressure on the National
Government on Formosa to adopt more effective policies. Such
resistance movement might in due course become more important for
the rallying of anti-Communist support of the Chinese people than
the recognized National Government on Formosa. In the meantime, it
is believed that the U.S. should continue support to the National
Government on Formosa, avoiding any commitment of U.S. strength or
prestige to the return of that Government to the mainland and
leaving to the Chinese the question of any change in Governmental
leadership. At the same time we should use our political influence
and the leverage of American aid to strengthen those military and
political leaders on Formosa who seem worthy of confidence. American
support should in so far as possible not be identified with Chiang
Kai-shek as such, but with the National Government.
Reaction in Eastern countries to this policy would probably be
divided along the lines of recognition policy toward Peiping. In the
Philippines our action in supporting the National Government would
[Page 1577]
be seen for what it
is—making the best of a bad situation—and while our action would
evoke little enthusiasm we would probably receive more support than
criticism. It is believed the Philippines would consider our support
of the National Government a lesser evil than our abandonment of it
and loss of Formosa to the Communists. The Associated States and
Thailand have little concern in what happens to Formosa except in so
far as developments there affect Chinese Communist military pressure
on their own borders. Japan, for security reasons, might well be
expected to support those moves which would have as end result the
denial of Formosa to Communist control, and would presumably be more
interested in the first instance in the effectiveness of the means
adopted than in the means per se.
The Eastern countries which have recognized the Peiping regime,
namely, India, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, and Pakistan, may be
expected to criticize, if not actively oppose, continued U.S.
support of the National Government. India exercises a large measure
of influence in these countries, with the exception of Pakistan.
India, which for the most part follows Nehru’s personal
interpretation of Far Eastern developments, has already advocated
turning over Formosa to the Chinese Communists and may be expected
actively to oppose U.S. support of the National Government. This
attitude probably arises in part from Nehru’s belief that Mao
expresses the new spirit of Asia while Chiang Kai-shek does not; in
part from Nehru’s desire to be proven right in his opinion that the
National Government is wholly discredited and finished in China; and
in part because he fancies that such an attitude helps his standing
at Peiping and strengthens his position as a “peacemaker”. It is not
believed that under present conditions Indian opposition to U.S.
support of Formosa would be substantially lessened even though a
change were made in the top Chinese leadership on the Island. If
such a change occurred as a result of direct U.S. intervention,
Indian opposition might, indeed, be increased rather than decreased
thereby. In short, India wants Formosa turned over to Communist
China—and is likely, in present circumstances, to oppose any course
of action that we may take to prevent this. Indonesia, which is
strongly influenced by India, would probably have the same attitude.
Ceylon, Burma and Pakistan would oppose U.S. support to the National
Government but probably much less vigorously than would India and
Indonesia. The support of the aforementioned East Asian countries of
the Peiping regime, and their opposition to U.S. support of the
National Government on Formosa, would alike probably increase in
direct ratio to their favorable appreciation of the political and
economic acts of the Chinese Communists and their parallel
unfavorable appreciation of the moral and political standing
[Page 1578]
of the National
Government. Any turn in events, however, which might cause a
depreciation of the standing of the Peiping regime and/or
appreciation of the position of the National Government or of a
mainland resistance movement would presumably bring about changes in
their respective political positions. The growth of a Chinese
Communist threat of aggression against Southeast Asia and South
Asia, for one thing, could logically be expected to result in some
change in the attitudes of the nations under threat.
Although we should continue to support the National Government on
Formosa, we should not, in view of the indifferent support which
Chiang Kai-shek has received in the past and receives still from the
Chinese people, and the many political obstacles arising from his
complete defeat on the mainland, place principal reliance on him to
lead an opposition movement within China.
It is assumed that our basic objective within China is to further the
development of active resistance to the Chinese Communists to the
end that a vigorous opposition movement may emerge capable of
progressively challenging Communist control. It is believed that the
fall of Formosa would be disheartening to actual and potential
resistance groups. To the extent that denial of Formosa to the
Communists is helped by our support of the National Government, this
support likewise contributes to our objectives on the mainland.
However, it would likewise be discouraging to mainland opposition
groups were they to be convinced that U.S. policy was directed
solely toward the return of Chiang and his KMT Government to the mainland. If all U.S. assistance
were funneled through Chiang, he would become in Chinese eyes the
chosen and exclusive U.S. instrument for contesting Communist
control on the mainland. We should avoid a course of action which
would lead to this conclusion. … In an environment of Communist
repression, we should expect a process of natural selection and
survival of the fittest to eliminate the weak and bring the
strongest to the top. By this essentially Chinese process, we should
expect the leadership of any unified opposition movement to evolve.
Similarly, while we should work for the ultimate merging of mainland
and Formosan opposition forces, the terms of such merger and the
part, if any, which Chiang and associates would have in any unified
opposition movement is a Chinese problem in which we might intervene
only at grave risk.
