123 Clough, Ralph: Telegram
The Consul General at Hong Kong (McConaughy) to the Secretary of State
2149. I commend to careful consideration of Department following excellent analysis written by Ralph Clough,1 on basis six months observation Hong Kong, summarizing Chinese Communist intentions, strengths and weaknesses and suggested US action. Since pro-Gimo sources in Hong Kong are few, Embassy Taipei may wish to make comments taking fuller cognizance KMT view.
“Chinese Communists fully committed to “liberation” Asia as junior partners USSR and if necessary to carry out this program prepared [Page 1572] risk war with US which they convinced is their implacable enemy. This increasingly apparent from: (1) statements by CCP leaders; (2) intervention in Korea and aid to Viet Minh and Malayan Communists; (3) campaign to root out every trace American influence from China; (4) nation-wide defense activities; (5) preparation for building modernized army; (6) increasingly ruthless suppression counter-revolutionary elements; and (7) intransigence in dealings with UN.
Since outbreak of war Chinese Communists political control country has become stronger rather than weaker. This brought about by large-scale guerrilla suppression campaigns arrest and execution of individuals suspected of anti-Communist leanings and indefatigable organization of all segments of population. Communist successfully intimidating political opponents, and lack unified vigorous resistance movement on mainland has given rise to growing feeling that resistance hopeless.
Chinese Communist economic system although suffering from numerous defects, is workable and effective. Transportation facilities have been rapidly restored, essential commodities made available where needed, and price foodstuffs risen relatively little since outbreak Korean war. Heavy taxes have been collected and put to government use with relatively small losses through corruption or negligence. Chinese Communist administration with respect both efficiency and honesty has been considerably better than Nationalist Government up to time expulsion from mainland. Chinese Communist propaganda and political indoctrination gradually becoming more effective longer people cut off from other sources information. Moral and material support USSR is strong bulwark to regime.
Above strong points Communist regime somewhat offset by widespread popular dissatisfaction and basic economic weaknesses. Chief cause dissatisfaction is lowered standard living, second is stringent political control, and third Korean war and policy leaning to one side. Korean war has saddled Communists with enormous burden military expenditure while tightening economic embargo will be felt increasing shortage essential industry materials. Very violence their suppression opposition and urgency their defense measures indicate Communists aware resistance movement can still be serious threat to their control.
Military action Korea combined such economic sanctions as may be possible persuade other UN members to invoke, while greatly increasing pressure on Chinese Communists, are unlikely in themselves to compel them to refrain from further ventures in Southeast Asia. Means must be found for exploiting internal weaknesses China just as Soviets now exploiting weaknesses other Asian countries with governments friendly to US. This means assistance to Taiwan, but also clandestine support of anti-Communist “united front” including all anti-Communist Chinese willing to cooperate. Such united front would have far greater power attract wavering elements in China and potential dissidents in CCP itself than KMT alone.
Regardless efforts to maintain secrecy, knowledge US material support organization would become known. (It already widely believed [Page 1573] among politically conscious Chinese Hong Kong that US aiding guerrillas. Knowledge that US firmly supporting anti-Communist political organization would give great encouragement to movement. Effort should be made to give Chinese students and intellectuals in US important part in organization and should be encouraged to spread rapidly through Southeast Asia assisted by US diplomatic support wherever feasible. Should have political program frankly accepting and advocating further improvement of good aspects Communist regime, such as austere living for officials, honesty in government and inculcating respect for dignity of labor. Beyond this its primary appeal should be to nationalism calling for true independence for China and calling halt to bleeding of China’s economy for benefit Soviet imperialistic ambitions. While older leaders with prestige would lend names to organization primary reliance should be on able dedicated young men and women from whom new leadership for China can arise.
Organization should direct guerrilla operations utilizing tactics which proved successful for CCP. Early stages chief aim should be control country so as to deny grain to Communists and exploit their economic weaknesses (pitched battles or landing Taiwan troops in force on mainland should be avoided). To this end establishment mobile free Chinese broadcasting station on mainland would be extremely potent psychological factor.
Minimum aim program would be to slow Communist advance into SEA and thus gain time our rearmament while avoiding measures which result all-out war with China. Maximum aim would be to reverse tide Asia and eventually replace Chinese Communist army with one friendly to US. Following admittedly difficult problems would have to be solved: (1) how secure cooperation KMT without allowing it exclusive control over membership and funds united front; (2) how limit membership to those willing undergo hardship and self-sacrifice and avoid having organization turned into refuge for broken down politicians; (3) how improve standard living people in areas occupied by organization’s guerrilla forces so as to obtain support people against Communists; and (4) how secure cooperation or least avoid opposition of British and our other Allies.
It is realized Department has undoubtedly already devoted much thought to possibility action similar that outlined. Above offered simply as personal opinion based on contact with large number politically conscious Chinese. Prompt action is essential to arrest further development defeatism among our potential supporters on mainland.”2
Sent Department 2149, repeated information Taipei 242.