689.90D/11–851: Telegram

The Ambassador in Afghanistan (Merrell) to the Secretary of State

secret

231. In hour and quarter conversation with PriMin this morning during which he frequently referred to US as Afghan’s best friend and incidentally indicated our request for dipl exchange rate seemed perfectly reasonable (Cabinet wld take it up Monday)1 and said “of course” we cld send occasional and extremely urgent messages by your own radio if we kept the matter secret (Embdes 70, August 11)2 he [Page 1998] endeavored to appeal to my vanity by saying I cld make a great name for myself if I cld solve the outstanding dispute between Afghan and Pak. When he replied in negative as to whether he had any new ideas how this cld be done or how Afghan cld cooperate I emphasized my opinion that cessation of provocative and useless propaganda by both sides wld help a great deal. To this he replied quite categorically that if US wld give an undertaking to see that the question of Pashtuns were brought before UN “in three or four years when world was calmer” he wld be willing to abolish all propaganda. When asked if that meant question of Pashtunistan wld be dropped he said yes. He explained that such an undertaking wld have to be a written document so that he wld have something to show “the young men of Afghan” and some of the tribal leaders.

Whether this furnishes the possibility of a solution or not, it certainly seems to verify Afghan’s keen desire for face-saving formula (last para Deptel 154, November 3).3

Dept pass Karachi. Sent Dept 231; rptd info Karachi 36.

Merrell
  1. November 12.
  2. Despatch 70, August 11, not printed, concerned the transmission of Embassy messages by radio (116.1/8–1151).
  3. In telegram 165, to Kabul, November 15, the Department replied as follows: “Dept inclined agree PriMins remarks (Embtel 231 Nov 8) may reflect desire find face saving formula, but for time being Dept believes it has exhausted all possibilities. Dept assumes Emb agrees consideration PriMins proposal re UN out of question. We shld continue urge Afghan officials to talk directly with Paks re their common problems.” (689.90D/11–851)