794.0221/11–851
Memorandum by the Deputy to the Consultant (Allison) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)1
Subject: Administrative Agreement with Japan
There are several points about General Ridgway’s message2 enclosed with Sebald’s letter attached hereto3 which immediately come to mind. I am sure they will occur to you but I just wanted to put my own comments on the record.
No one can take issue, of course, with paragraph 1(A) of General Ridgway’s message stating that until the effective date of the Peace Treaty ultimate sovereignty over the Japanese people resides in SCAP. Nor is there any reason to take issue with sub-paragraph (B) that the Japanese Government must always be presented with a single position on all questions, particularly those in connection with negotiating the Administrative Agreement. However, I am not sure that sub-paragraph (C) follows. General Ridgway states that in the light of (A) and (B) there must be no indication that the Administrative Agreement mission from Washington has any authority beyond that of advising and assisting SCAP. It seems to me that the General has completely misunderstood the purpose of the mission which, as I understand it, is to negotiate an Administrative Agreement which will have authority and go into operation only after SCAP ceases to function. It is certainly a United States Government mission and should speak to the Japanese with only one voice, but I am not at all certain whether SCAP as SCAP should have any part in the matter at all. SCAP is an international entity whereas the Administrative Agreement is to be negotiated between the United States Government only and Japan. Certainly General Ridgway as CINCFE should play [Page 1395] a part in negotiating the Administrative Agreement and his recommendations should receive the utmost consideration. However, this is a matter of long-term political as well as security interest to the United States Government and I firmly believe that General Ridgway should be informed that the mission which comes will have much more power than that of merely “advising and assisting SCAP”. Certainly the mission should work in closest cooperation with General Ridgway and presumably he should make the arrangements with the Japanese Government for any talks which the mission desires to make. But I would think that whatever agreement is negotiated and signed should,; not be negotiated and signed by SOAP but by duly appointed representatives of the United States Government alone. General Ridgway as CINCFE might well be one of these representatives.
You will note that paragraph 4(A) of General Ridgway’s message makes the categorical statement that “it is imperative to the mission of U.S. forces remaining in Japan that the U.S. Government should retain exclusive criminal jurisdiction over its personnel, including U.S. civilian employees and dependents, of the U.S. armed forces”. This of course goes to the heart of our problem and it is a little discouraging to see General Ridgway take this extreme position.
I am becoming more and more convinced in light of information from Tokyo such as that contained in this letter of Sebald’s as well as his letter of October 294 that serious consideration must be given to obtaining a White House directive which will place the whole matter in the proper focus. As you know, the President told Mr. Dulles that he was generally in sympathy with our approach to the problem of American troops in Japan after the Peace Treaty, and unless I am much mistaken we will have to call on the Presidents eventually and it might be better to do it now.