Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

894.501/11–651

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk)¹

top secret

[Washington,] November 8, 1951.

Subject: Proposed discussions with certain friendly FEC countries concerning the security of Japan

[Here follows a background résumé regarding the proposed discussions.]

NA believes that the discussions should be undertaken immediately, and recommends that the representatives of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France and the Philippines be called in within the next several days and informed in confidence of United States plans for strengthening the security of Japan. There is attached hereto a memorandum (attachment 4²) setting forth a suggested outline to be followed in presenting the United States position to these representatives.

[Attachment]

It is suggested that the proposed training of the Japanese National Police Reserve in the use of heavy military equipment and the proposed establishment of a Japanese-manned coastal security force be discussed in confidence with the representatives of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, France and the Philippines along the following lines:

1. General Ridgway and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recently emphasized the seriousness of the threat to the security of Japan resulting from increased tensions in the Far East because of nonparticipation of the USSR and Communist China in the Japanese peace settlement. Clearly the possibility of armed aggression can not be completely ruled out, The Joint Chiefs have pointed out that one step which would add significantly to the ability of the Japanese to contribute to their own defense in event of an emergency would be to begin immediately to train the Japanese National Police Reserve in the use of such heavy military equipment as tanks, artillery, mortars and rockets. They have also urged that there be immediately established a Japanese-manned coastal security force which will be adequately armed to prevent the infiltration of Communist agents, reduce smuggling, and exercise proper surveillance over Japanese fishing vessels in the waters contiguous to the Japanese islands.

2. So far as the establishment of a coastal security force is concerned, the United States Government believes that the equipping of such a force with normal coast guard type weapons would not constitute a violation of the spirit of FEC 017/21 of February 12, 1948, which while it made reasonably adequate provision for arming the land police, completely overlooked the legitimate and normal needs of the maritime police, who need armament suitable for use on the water. While the United States Government believes that it is within the executive authority of SCAP to remedy this oversight by equipping the present Japanese Maritime Safety Patrol with coast guard type weapons, it is recognized that a number of FEC countries would prefer that a strictly Japanese agency operating as an integral part of the Japanese Government not be given at this time any armament heavier than that specifically authorized by the FEC.

3. The United States Government recognizes that the equipping of the National Police Reserve with heavy armament would constitute a violation of FEC policy decisions, in particular FEC 017/21, which specifically limits the Japanese police to “rifles and pistols and the necessary ammunition for them and other small arms exclusively used by civil police.”

4. Thus, it is readily apparent that SCAP is faced with the problem of choosing a careful course of action which on the one hand will provide for the security of Japan and which on the other hand will be in consonance with FEC decisions which technically remain in force until the Peace Treaty comes into effect and which the United States Government regards as international commitments.

5. Accordingly, SCAP, with the full approval of the United States Government, plans to take the following action as soon as possible:

a. While no heavy military equipment will be delivered to the Japanese, provision will be made for National Police Reserve personnel to be brought to American bases in Japan on a rotation basis for training in the use of such equipment under direct American supervision and control. This procedure would not constitute a violation of existing FEC policy decisions; however, it would afford the Japanese a minimum of training for self-defense and gain valuable time in preparing for adequate defense of Japan.

b. SCAP will establish a Japanese-manned coastal security force, organized and equipped along normal coast guard lines, composed of vessels with appropriate armament and speed, and under SCAP operational control, to be operated in waters contiguous to the Japanese islands. Such a force will be utilized purely for regular coast guard purposes, and the vessels or flotillas will operate under the direct control of American officers and riot the Japanese. It will not be of such a character as to provide any valid basis for an assumption that it is the nucleus of a Japanese Navy.

6. The United States Government hopes that the_________Government will agree that the foregoing steps represent a constructive approach to the dilemma presented by the necessity of ensuring Japan’s security on the one hand and abiding by international commitments on the other. It is not believed likely that at this juncture the matter will be brought up in the FEC; however, in the event that any question should be raised, the United States Government would appreciate the support of the________Government.

1. Memorandum and attachment drafted by Douglas W. Overton of the Office., of Northeast Asian Affairs. Submitted to Mr. Rusk through U. Alexis Johnson.
2. Other attachments not printed.