Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

694.001/8–2951

Memorandum by Mr. William L. S. Williams of the Office of South Asian Affairs

confidential

[Washington,] August 29, 1951.

Background of India’s Decision Not To Sign the Japanese Peace Treaty

(For Use of US Delegation)¹

India has been a member of the Far Eastern Commission since it was established, has maintained in Japan representatives accredited to the Japanese occupation authority, and has never questioned the terms of the Potsdam Surrender Terms.

The United Kingdom received a copy of the draft treaty in mid-March 1951. On March 28, the Indian Ambassador in Washington was handed a copy.² A few days later, the Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs complained that India had received a copy of the draft from the UK, and stated that India preferred to deal directly with the United States in this matter.

Fully two months later, on May 28, the Indian Minister presented his Government’s views³ on the draft to the Department and Mr. Allison discussed with him the points raised by the Indian Government. In mid-June a revised draft which accommodated certain Indian wishes, was given the Indian Government.⁴ On June 20, Mr. Allison discussed this draft with representatives of the Indian Government in New Delhi.⁵

On July 13 our Embassy in New Delhi discussed with the Indian Ministry of External Affairs the question of the participation of the Associated States of Indochina in the San Francisco Conference. The Indian official with whom this question was discussed, was reported by the Embassy to have observed that “even if the draft were acceptable to the Government of India (and the United States was not to infer from this that the draft was not acceptable), the Government of India would find it difficult to sign a multilateral treaty of which the Associated States were also signatories”.⁶

On July 20 Ambassador Henderson discussed the draft with Prime Minister Nehru who expressed his concern with provisions of the draft treaty which he thought might cause Communist China or the USSR to fear that the United States might be planning to use Japan or its adjacent islands as a base of operations against the Asian mainland.⁷

Later on the same day our Ambassador presented to the Ministry of External Affairs the invitation to participate in the San Francisco Conference together with the July 20 draft of the treaty.

On July 30 the Embassy of India in Washington presented India’s views on the July 20 draft by an aide-mémoire⁸ On July 31 the Secretary General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs told our representative that the Government of India was still undecided about signing and that the decision would have to be made by the cabinet. He said further that the Indian request for the reconsideration of certain provisions was motivated by the view that if India’s attitude toward these provisions were not stated when the opportunity was offered, failure to do so might be taken to mean that the Government of India had changed its mind about the provisions in question, which was not the case.

Our reply to the Indian aide-mémoire, prepared after consultations with the British Government, was conveyed to the Government of India on August 12 in New Delhi.⁹ The Indian Minister in Washington,¹⁰ on reading our aide-mémoire, commented that it was “very conciliatory”.

In our aide-mémoire we agreed with the Indian Government that the treaty “should not be such as to give just cause for offense to other interested powers, or make it impossible for them to sign the Treaty, or a bilateral treaty of substantially the same terms, at a later date.” We expressed our belief that the July 20 draft met this test, and that the revised text of the draft took into account the basic viewpoint and suggestions of the Government of India in relation to the March 28 draft.

Specifically, we pointed out that we had yielded to India’s views regarding the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands to the extent of changing the March 28 draft so as to permit Japan to retain sovereignty over the Islands. We expressed our belief that failure of the treaty to cede the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin to the Soviet Union should not make it impossible for the Soviet Union to sign the treaty. We told the Indian Government that if, as it had suggested, the date of Formosa’s return to China were left open, it was equally appropriate that the whole matter be left unresolved by the treaty. We also informed the Indian Government that the provision of the revised draft providing for the formal ending of the occupation of Japan (Article 6a) was introduced to meet the views of the Government of India.

On August 13 Ambassador Henderson pointed out to the Indian Foreign Secretary¹¹ that signature of the treaty did not imply approval of security arrangements between the United States and Japan, and that India could properly put into the record any views it had on this subject. Regarding the Ryukyus, the Ambassador pointed out that India could also state that it reserved the position it would take in the United Nations General Assembly with respect to the trusteeship terms and the question of military bases.

On August 14, Ambassador Dulles discussed the latest draft with Madame Pandit, the Indian Ambassador, immediately prior to her departure for New Delhi on consultation, stressing the necessity for compromise between the various interested parties.

On August 23 the Government of India informed us that it had decided not to sign the treaty and not to attend the San Francisco Conference. On August 25 we presented our reply. This exchange has been widely publicized.

On August 25 the Secretary General¹² pointed out to our Ambassador that the Government of India had not retreated from the views it had expressed when it first saw the draft treaty. This is correct. The Government of India had not yielded to the United States on a single point, while we have modified the draft in significant measure to meet Indian views.

The basic views of the Government of India are therefore to be found in its August 23 note on the subject. Briefly, India laid emphasis on two fundamental objectives: (1) The terms of the treaty should concede to Japan a position of honor, equality and contentment among the community of free nations;¹³ (2) The terms should be so framed as to enable all countries especially interested in the maintenance of a stable peace in the Far East to subscribe to the treaty sooner or later.

With regard to the first condition, India believes that the provisions dealing with the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands will be a source of dissatisfaction to “large sections of the Japanese people” and “must carry the seed of future dispute and possible conflict in the Far East”. India also believes that the security arrangements between Japan and the United States are bound to give rise to the impression that Japan is not enjoying the full freedom of a sovereign state.

With regard to the second condition, India believes the treaty as drafted can not be adhered to or subscribed to by all interested powers (by which India means Communist China and the USSR) because, (1) Formosa is not ceded to China, and (2) because the Kurile Islands and South Sakhalin are not expressly ceded to the Soviet Union.

On August 28 the Government of India transmitted through our Embassy in New Delhi a reply¹⁴ to our note of August 25. Somewhat more conciliatory than its previous note, the Government of India welcomed United States assurances that its over-riding desire was peace in Asia and that it did not want to be a party to colonialism or imperialism. India disagreed that our view of the proposed treaty was shared by the Government and people of Japan. It explained that its views on the Kurile Islands flowed from the agreement reached at Yalta that the Islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union. As for the Ryukyus and the Bonin Islands, India considered that their return to Japanese sovereignty would not run counter to the Potsdam Surrender Terms. India maintained that Japan should make any defensive arrangements it wished as soon as the treaty had been concluded. With regard to Formosa, India noted that it has held and continues to hold the view that a declaration that Formosa shall be returned to China will help in creating conditions for a settlement in the Far East. The Government of India further noted that it has been anxious that a peace treaty with Japan be signed and the military occupation terminated, and referred to its intention to terminate its state of war and to establish normal diplomatic relations with Japan. Its action in making a separate treaty should not, in its view adversely affect either the friendly relations that exist between India and the United States or the cooperation of the two governments in everything “which is practical and fruitful for peace”. The Indian Government hoped that the observations contained in the note would reveal a “unity of outlook” between India and the United States, and expressed the opinion that the differences that exist are differences of “method and approach” which “should not be allowed to cause resentment that might come in the way of mutual understanding and community of effort”.

We may be confident that the basic consideration that has led Mr. Nehru to decide not to sign the Treaty is his wish not to displease Communist China or the USSR. India does not wish, however, to appear to decisively align itself with these countries. As late as August 28, Mr. Nehru emphasized that India acted “quite independently” of the Soviet Union. Mr. Nehru seems to consider that his relations with the western democracies and particularly the UK are such that he can with impunity disappoint us, and be forgiven, but that his relations with Communist China and the Soviet Union are such that he cannot risk incurring their displeasure. The course which India has chosen will work to assure it the benefits of a peace with Japan (including security arrangements to deter aggression against an otherwise unarmed Japan) without requiring India to assume a share in the responsibility for the treaty by signing it.

1. To the San Francisco Conference.
2. Identical to that printed under date of March 23, p. 944.
3. Aide-mémoire not printed. (Lot 54 D 423)
4. Reference is to the revised draft of June 14, p. 1119.
5. In telegram 3712, from New Delhi, June 20, marked “For Dulles from Allison,” the latter had reported on a conversation with Mr. Chakravarty. Mr. Allison had stated in part that the question of whether or not India would sign the treaty “was said depend on exact wording provisions re Chi participation and Formosa. However, when gen scope provisions was explained to Chakravarty he seemed find them acceptable altho he made clear that he cld in no way indicate what final attitude of GOI wld be until revised texts had been studied and discussed with PriMin.” (694.001/6–2051)
6. The quotation is of a remark made by Subimal Dutt, a Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs, to Ambassador Henderson on July 13, which had been reported to Washington by the latter on that day in telegram 187, not printed. (694.001/7–1351)

7. Ambassador Henderson had reported on his conversation with Prime Minister Nehru in telegrams 292 and 293 from New Delhi, both of July 21, both not printed. (694.001/7–2151)

   However, in telegram 577, from New Delhi, August 11, Ambassador Henderson had reported in part that he had been visited that morning by Sir Archibald Nye, who had just come from a conversation with Mr. Bajpai. “From Bajpai’s remarks he is veering to opinion which we have had for some time that Nehru’s objections to treaty are based not so much on concern for reaction of Commie Chi and USSR as upon his own desire not sign any document which might indicate India looks with approval upon retention Amer troops Japan or In Islands contiguous thereto.” (694.001/8–1151)

8. Aide-mémoire not printed. (Lot 54 D 423)
9. See telegram 582, from New Delhi, August 12, p. 1262.
10. M. S. Kirpalani.
11. Reference uncertain, but possibly to K. P. S. Menon, Secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations.
12. Mr. Bajpai.
13. In telegram 733, from New Delhi, August 25, Ambassador Henderson had reported in part: “At Bajpai’s request I saw him briefly this morning. He read aloud excerpts from tel recd last evening from Ind Chargé Wash [Minister Kirpalani]. Excerpts were to effect that when Amb Dulles read GOI reply Jap treaty he was ‘furious’ and said India had not dealt ‘fairly’ with US in this matter.” (694.001/8–2551) In telegram 456, to New Delhi, August 27, marked “For Henderson from Dulles,” the latter had replied in part as follows: “Report of Indian Chargé somewhat misleading. On reading note I said not surprised at Ind decision as we had anticipated Ind might not want participate at San Francisco or sign multilateral Treaty. I never suggested that India’s decision in this respect was ‘unfair’. I did express surprise at grounds given. My only ref to ‘unfairness’ was I thought it rather unfair for India to base its decision on failure of US to provide Treaty which wld ‘concede to Japan position of honor, equality and contentment among community of free nations’.” (694.001/8–2551)
14. Not printed. Text is in the two-section telegram 758, from New Delhi, August 28. (694.001/8–2851)