694.001/8–2951
Memorandum by the Secretary of State1
Memorandum for the President
The Department of State believes that it is of great importance that the President and the National Security Council be fully aware that the period of the coming San Francisco Conference will be one of sharply increased international tension.
The future alignment of Japan as between the free world and communism is an issue second in importance perhaps only to Germany. By a vigorous political initiative with respect to the Japanese Peace Treaty and by a determined stand against aggression in Korea, we face the prospect that we shall shortly have a Peace Treaty with Japan signed by more than 40 nations which is warmly supported by the Japanese and which lays the basis for a close association between the United States and Japan in the post-treaty period. If successful, the result will be a tremendous step toward changing by peaceful means the present power situation in the world in favor of the United States and its Allies. That very fact insures that the Soviet Union will make strenuous efforts to prevent a satisfactory Peace Treaty or close posttreaty relationships between Japan and the free world.
[Page 1301]The Soviet Delegation will not be able to prevent, by ordinary parliamentary means, the signing of the Peace Treaty by an overwhelming majority of Delegations at San Francisco. We must expect, however, that the Soviet Delegation will be fully aware of that and will resort to “shock” tactics of one sort or another in an effort to (a) reduce the number of signatures, (b) discredit the Treaty among Asian countries, (c) delay the signing of the Treaty, (d) produce pressures to amend the present draft Treaty in important respects, and (e) stimulate Japanese resistance to the present draft Treaty.
At some stage during the forthcoming Conference, the Soviet Delegation may produce a draft Treaty of its own aimed specifically at Asiatic and Japanese opinion. It might offer to sign our own draft if amendments were made on such points as the Ryukyus, the Kuriles and the posttreaty security relationship with the United States, amendments which would attract considerable Asian and Japanese support. It might seek to establish a direct connection between the fighting in Korea and the Japanese Peace Treaty in order to use one as a bargaining element with respect to the other. A major communist offensive in Korea might be timed to precede or coincide with the San Francisco Conference, in the hope that initial communist gains might produce wavering among other Delegations. The threat of such an offensive is implicit in the present situation in Korea. The Soviet Delegation might even produce something akin to an ultimatum when it becomes apparent that the Conference is firmly determined to proceed with the business for which it was convened.
The basic decisions governing United States policy and action in this situation have already been made. Simply stated, they are: (a) that we should proceed with the conclusion and signing of a Japanese Peace Treaty conforming to the characteristics set forth in your basic directives to Mr. Dulles of September 8, 19502 and January 10, 1951;3 (b) that we should not reopen the present draft Treaty to renegotiation at San Francisco; (c) that we should not allow ourselves to be diverted from the build-up of the strength of the free world by Soviet threats or intimidation; and (d) that we should not allow the aggressors to connect other issues with the Korean question in such a way as to reward aggression or to permit the aggressor to use his unlawful acts for bargaining on other questions.
The attitude of the United States during the forthcoming tension should be one of calm and firm determination to move ahead on a Peace Treaty which is fair in itself and has the overwhelming support [Page 1302] of the free nations. Any lack of resolution on our part under the expected Soviet pressure could shatter the free world majority and permanently lose Japan as an integral part of free world security. While we move ahead in the political field, the Defense agencies should be alerted to the increased risks inherent in this particular phase and to any precautionary steps which might seem warranted under the circumstances.
It may be necessary for the U.S. Delegation at San Francisco to respond instantly to certain moves of the Soviet Delegation. If so, the Delegation would act on the basis of existing instructions and along the broad lines of this memorandum. The President and the Secretary of Defense will be kept fully informed on developments at the Conference.4
- Memorandum drafted by Mr. Rusk.↩
- This directive was in the form of a joint memorandum, dated September 7, from the Secretaries of State and Defense to President Truman. It was approved by the latter on September 8, and circulated that day as NSC 60/1. It is printed in Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, p. 1293.↩
- For text, see enclosure 2 (as annotated) to Mr. Acheson’s letter of January 9, to Secretary Marshall, p. 788.↩
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A memorandum of August 30 by Mr. Battle follows:
“The Secretary took over to the NSC meeting yesterday a memorandum prepared by Mr. Rusk on possible developments at San Francisco and the policy line which we felt should be taken to cope with any moves the Soviets might make. The Secretary spoke to the President about the memorandum which was addressed to him and asked whether the President approved of the Secretary’s bringing it up in the Security Council meeting itself. The President said that he thought the Secretary should discuss the memorandum.
The Secretary told me that he read most of the memorandum aloud. The Vice President then made a speech, in which he said that he felt strongly that the attitudes discussed in the memorandum should be the ones we follow. The President then asked whether anyone had any criticism or suggestions. When no one did, he asked that the minutes of the NSC show that the Council had unanimously approved the memorandum and that he also approved.” (Lot 64 D 563: Files of the Policy Planning Staff)
Approval of the memorandum constituted NSC Action No. 539. (Lot 62 D 1: Executive Secretariat Files)
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