Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

611.94/8–2251

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson)

secret

Washington, August 29, 1951.

Principles To Be Applied in Stationing U.S. Forces in Japan

i assumptions

A. One of the principal security objectives of U.S. policy toward Japan is to obtain maximum contribution from Japan to free world opposition to Communist imperialism.

B. This contribution can be maintained over a period of time only by the free identification of the Japanese people themselves with the cause of the free world.

C. While the present Japanese Government and probably a majority of the people are now favorably disposed toward close cooperation with the U.S. and the remainder of the free world, there will be sufficient factors working in the other direction so that the continuation of such cooperation is not a certainty. Among these factors will be:

1. The racial and cultural affinities of Japan for the presently Communist-dominated areas of Asia in close proximity to Japan.

2. The economic attractions of Japan’s normal sources of raw materials and markets in nearby Communist-dominated areas of Asia.

3. The probable Communist “bait” of holding out to Japan the possibility of having a major role in a Communist-dominated Asia as opposed to a secondary role on the periphery of the free world position In the Pacific.

4. The revival of the inherent Japanese spirit of nationalism and hypersensitivity to real or imagined discrimination which will again constitute a fundamental source of difficulty in relations, in particular, between the “white” nations and Japan, and bring about a certain amount of reaction against the U.S. and “things American”.

5. The expectation that the coming into effect of a treaty of peace will result in a much more substantial lessening of the overall impact of U.S. forces upon Japan than is likely to be the case.

D. There will be an increased and continuing effort by the Communists to drive a wedge between Japan and the U.S. through exploitation of all of the issues implicit in C.

E. The degree to which the U.S. forces stationed in Japan will effectively contribute to U.S. security and other U.S. objectives in the Far East is dependent upon the degree to which Japan accepts and cooperates with such forces.

F. Disparities in living standards and differences in race and social customs between U.S. personnel and the Japanese population give rise to frictions which, in general, can best be minimized by minimizing contacts between the two groups.

G. In view of the previous history of western extraterritoriality in the Far East and in particular in Japan, the Japanese will be particularly sensitive to questions of jurisdiction and police powers.

H. Apart from the foregoing considerations, as Japanese defense forces are constituted and the spirit of nationalism revives, the acceptability of the continued stationing of U.S. troops in Japan will progressively decrease.

ii principles

While the foregoing is also pertinent to the formulation of the whole range of U.S. policy toward Japan, certain principles applicable to the stationing of U.S. military forces in Japan may be deduced therefrom. The policies adopted should be such as to anticipate and forestall pressures from the Japanese rather than such as eventually force the U.S. to be responsive to Japanese pressures for changes.

Therefore, the following principles should be among those applied:

A. Immediately upon the coming into effect of the treaty there should be in some manner a distinct break, readily perceived by all Japanese, between the Occupation and garrison status of U.S. forces in Japan.

The exact nature of this break cannot now be determined but it should be something more than a ceremony transferring remaining SCAP responsibilities and authority to the Japanese Government and the disbanding of what will then be a very small SCAP staff. For example, within the realistic possibilities of the situation, it should include the return to the Japanese of all physical properties outside of those which will be occupied by the garrison forces.

B. The garrison forces and overhead units should be kept to minimum size consistent with the performance of their mission. To the maximum possible extent supporting and headquarters units should he located outside of Japan; for example on Okinawa.

C. Garrison and subsidiary installations should be located outside principal centers of populations, be self-contained in so far as possible, and be of such construction and contain such facilities as will contribute to the maximum morale and efficiency of the personnel.

It will be particularly desirable that the garrison forces do not impinge any more than absolutely necessary upon Japanese private and commercial properties even though such properties have been in use by the Occupation forces. Maximum use should be made of former Japanese Army and Navy properties, ports and facilities.

D. In general, all arrangements for and administration of the security arrangements with Japan should not be less favorable to Japan than such arrangements with the NATO or other sovereign countries, particularly in such matters as jurisdiction.

E. Japan should be treated as a real partner in the sharing of a common defense burden. This includes careful attention to planning with the Japanese the increasing contribution to be made by them to their own defense and the accompanying decreases in the U.S. garrison.¹

1. In a memorandum of October 8, to Mr. Rusk, Mr. Bond, then in Washington for consultations, stated in part: “The views of the Mission [in Tokyo] with respect to measures to be taken in implementation of the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan are entirely in accord with those set forth in … [the memorandum printed here].” (611.94/8–2251)

   In telegram C 50803 of September 14 from Tokyo, marked “Deptar for JCS,” General Ridgway stated in part:

   “On the one hand we must keep in mind the basic reality governing our relations with the Japanese. This will be the reality of sovereign power. In theory Japan will be sovereign. In practice the survival of that sovereignty will reside in the power of the United States Armed Forces stationed on her soil, if Japan should be the subject of Soviet armed attack. Until such time as Japan shall have created the minimum essential means reasonably to safeguard her political and territorial integrity against external attack and internal subversion, her independent national existence will rest not in her hands, but in those of the United States.

   “On the other hand, and this is the opposing requirement, the maintenance of Japan as an effective, responsive and cooperative ally for the far future—a major US objective—requires that we have a thorough understanding of her national characteristics and sensibilities, and in the light of that understanding that we here accord her that courtesy and consideration in our daily lives to which her past and potential future eminence, and her sovereign position entitle her.” (Copy enclosed with memorandum of October 3 from Mr. Hemmendinger to Mr. McClurkin, not printed, 611.94/8–2251)