Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

694.001/7–2051: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Philippines (Cowen) to the Secretary of State

secret
priority

Manila, July 20, 1951—4 p. m.

308. I had long conversation this morning with Romulo regarding Japanese peace treaty after which Romulo saw Quirino. Romulo subsequently informed me Quirino will decide Monday whether he will send mission to Washington as suggested last para Deptel 202, July 17, 7 p. m.¹ Meanwhile both Romulo and Quirino request reply to their proposed wording for Article 14 submitted in Embtel 164, July 12.²

As I see picture some compromise is needed to break stalemate. I favor Philippines proposed revision para 14 (a) if word “adequate” removed. I suggest some such wording as “it is recognized that Japan shld pay reparation for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war and shld make compensation to the Allied powers “to the extent possible.” I do not support Philippine proposed revision para 14 (a) (1) nor do I believe it needs to be seriously considered.

I believe acceptance Philippine wording para 14 (a) without word “adequate” and leaving para 14 (a) (1) as drafted will enable Philippines retreat from present extreme position particularly if such compromise is coupled with agreement to conclude treaty of alliance to satisfy their fears of security. I do not believe any better solution possible under present circumstances. Notwithstanding Quirino’s adamant stand and strong public support for it I am reasonably confident of ability to persuade Philippines accept foregoing compromise. Intensity of feeling here on this issue can not be overemphasized and therefore I again urge Dept give this proposal most serious consideration.

Pls advise soonest.³

Cowen

1. Not printed. In it the Department had stated in part that it believed the Government of the Philippines had ample opportunity to satisfy itself of the inability of Japan to pay “adequate” reparations. It was also out of the question that the Philippines be given a prior claim to reparations over those of other countries occupied by Japan. However, the United States would be willing to receive a Philippine mission to discuss the whole problem, though this mission if it materialized should not be encouraged to anticipate any change in the attitude of the United States, which was based “not upon policy or preference but upon facts of Jap’s economy …” (694.001/7–1751) The Philippines did not send such a mission to the United States.

2. Not printed. The revision mentioned follows:

   “‘(a) It is recognized that Japan shld pay reparation for the damage and suffering caused by it during the war and shld make adequate reparations to the Allied powers. Therefore, Japan will promptly enter into negots with Allied powers so desiring, whose present territories were occupied by Japanese forces and damaged by Japan, with a view to assisting to compensate those countries for the cost of repairing the damage done. Such arrangements shall avoid the imposition of additional liabilities on other Allied powers’” (694.001/7–1251)

3. In telegram 253, to Manila, July 20, drafted by Mr. Dulles, the Department replied as follows: “Reurtel 308 we do not feel that Phil redrafting is acceptable even though word ‘adequate’ is eliminated as suggested. It seems to us essential to retain the two concepts embodied in FEC basic post-surrender policy, namely, that maintenance of viable economy and meeting of other obligations for relief under occupation must be taken into account. Proposed rewording, which wld eliminate these references after they have once been in text, wld give rise to strong inference that Jap was obligated to pay reparations through services even though this jeopardized viable economy and made it impossible for Jap to meet other obligations.” (694.001/7–2051)