Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Asia and the Pacific, Volume VI, Part 1

794.5/4–2651

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rusk) to the Secretary of State ¹

top secret

[Washington,] July 20, 1951.

Subject: Arming the Japanese Coastal Patrol.

Problem: Action to be taken to strengthen the coastal security of Japan.

Proposal of the Department of Defense

The Department of Defense on April 26, 1951,² requested the Department of State to review its position regarding the utilization of Japanese forces adequately armed for defense and the maintenance of internal security with a view to formulating a policy, to be approved by the President, which would enable SCAP to provide adequately for the security and defense of Japan. It was pointed out that the depletion of the occupation forces in Japan has created a situation in which the internal security of the islands and the security of the occupation forces may be seriously threatened. In particular the JCS proposed the enunciation of the following policy:

“In view of the radically changed conditions and the increased need to insure the security of Japan, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is authorized to provide appropriate armament for coastal patrol vessels of the Maritime Security Board.”

or as alternative if the above would provide too vulnerable a target for USSR propaganda:

“In view of the radically changed conditions and the increased need to insure the security of Japan, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is authorized to establish and operate a coastal security force for the Japanese islands, composed of vessels with appropriate armament and speed which will be manned by Japanese.”

Subsequent to this communication, the Commander-in-Chief Far East Command strongly recommended that the second of these statements be adopted since “adoption of this policy would permit establishment of security force under direct SCAP military control”. It has, therefore, been suggested informally by representatives of JCS that this statement of policy be amended to read as follows:

“In view of the radically changed conditions and the increased need to insure the security of Japan, a Japanese-manned coastal security force composed of vessels with appropriate armament and speed should be established and operated in waters contiguous to the Japanese islands.”

This suggested wording has been informally discussed on the working-level in the Navy and it is believed that the clearer and specific wording set forth below may be acceptable to Defense:

“In view of the radically changed conditions and the increased need to insure the security of Japan, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers is authorized to establish a Japanese-manned coastal security force organized and equipped along normal Coast Guard lines composed of vessels with appropriate armament and speed and under SCAP operational control to be operated in waters contiguous to the Japanese islands.”

Under this proposal, it is understood that this force would be set up under SCAP and operated under the control of ComNavFE.³ The vessels would be manned by Japanese, but would be under the operational control of American officers. Each vessel would carry armament appropriate only for a coastal patrol vessel. In this connection, it is noted that small craft of the U.S. Coast Guard are equipped with small arms rifles to medium calibre machine guns and automatic machine guns up to 20 mm, while intermediate craft carry all other straight armament and also heavy calibre guns up to and including 5 inch guns.

International Limitations on the Arming of the Japanese Coastal Patrol Prior to a Peace Settlement with Japan

In the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, (which was later accepted by the USSR in its declaration of war on Japan) the U.S., China and Great Britain agreed that Japan’s war-making power should be destroyed; in the Basic Post-Surrender Policy for Japan of June 19, 1947, the nations composing the FEC adopted as an ultimate objective in relation to Japan, to which policies for the post-surrender period for Japan should conform, that “Japan will be completely disarmed and demilitarized.” The FEC policy decision regarding Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of Japanese Military Equipment, February 12, 1948,⁴ provided that: “Possessions of arms, ammunition and implements of war by any Japanese should be prohibited save that the Supreme Commander may authorize the use by Japanese civil police agencies for the purpose of maintaining law and order of rifles and pistols and the necessary ammunition for them and other small arms exclusively used by civil police.” When this paper was under discussion in the FEC, there was considerable discussion as to the meaning of the phrase “other small arms”. At the time of the adoption of the paper the Soviet representative read the following understanding into the minutes: “The Soviet Delegation understands the term ‘and other small arms’ in paragraph 2a of FEC–017/21 to mean arms of non-group use and non-fragmentation or mass effect carried and used by a single person.” Thereupon the U.S. Representative submitted the following for the record: “The United States Government understands that it is within SCAP’s discretionary authority to interpret with what small arms he may equip the civil police and that any interpretation of the phrase ‘small arms’, which he may find it necessary to make in accordance with his authority under the Terms of Reference is in no way abridged by any other understanding.” While the Commission reached no formal agreement as to the meaning of “other small arms”, the discussion at the time indicates that with the exception of the Soviet Representative every representative was willing to permit the Japanese police to use tear gas bombs and submachine guns, if necessary. It should be noted that definition of “rifles” appeared to present no problem to the Commission.

The particular question of the Japanese coastal patrol was considered at length in the FEC as a result of the passage of the Maritime Safety Authority Bill⁵ by the Japanese Diet. With the wisdom of hindsight, it now appears that the great majority of the members of the Commission, annoyed at SCAP’s failure to inform them of this pending action, centered their fire at the possibility that the vessels of the Japanese maritime coastal patrol might be armed. Several FEC members insisted that any arms on the coastal patrol vessels—other than side arms carried by members of the crew—would violate the policies of the FEC. So apprehensive were the members of the Commission that the Japanese Government would establish a coastal patrol service which would violate FEC policy decisions, especially that prohibiting the possession of arms by the Japanese other than arms for the civil police, that a majority of the members of the Commission approved a paper that the Japanese should not set up or operate any coastal patrol or coast guard service until the FEC has an adequate opportunity of considering the matter. The paper was defeated by virtue of a United States veto.

In the course of these discussions the United States Representatives stated that “There is no substance to the allegation that the vessels will be armed; Personnel on ship duty will carry side arms similar to those of the civil police.” He also stated that he was in complete agreement with the contention that if the boats were armed, then the law was indeed in contravention of the Commission’s policy on disarmament.

Opinion of the Legal Adviser’s Office

It is the opinion of the Legal Adviser’s office that the only step that can be taken within the provisions of the FEC policy decisions would be to inform SCAP that his discretion is limited to authorizing the type of “small arms” appropriate for use by civil police, i.e., rifles, pistols and other such small arms. The present vessels of the Maritime Safety Board carry such arms which obviously do not permit them to deal effectively with the situations they face.

Overall Broad Policy Toward Japan

It is the view of the Department of Defense that the possible outbreak of a third world war and the natural limitations on the extent of United States power make it an urgent matter that steps be taken to develop the security potential of a future ally. Steps are now being taken to work out with the Department of Defense a paper implementing the policies set forth in NSC 48/5⁶ in regard to the timing, degree and speed with which certain courses of action are to be pursued.

The Department to date has, subject to future consultation with the Department of Defense, refused to concur in the arming of the vessels of the Maritime Safety Board, the supply of heavy armament to the Japanese National Police Reserve, the manufacture in Japan of arms, ammunition and implements of war for export to areas other than Korea, or a modification of the purge beyond that permitted by FEC decisions. This position has been based upon the facts that such action would prejudice the peace settlement which provides the basic solution to the question of maximum contribution by Japan to its own defense and would jeopardize the validity of SCAP’s position in Japan in the interim.

Although FE concurs that the establishment of a coastal security force under SCAP control is probably not permissive within a strictly legal interpretation of the FEC policy decisions, it is considered that a substantial justification can be made therefor on broad general policy grounds without incurring to the same degree the serious disadvantages of the other departures from FEC directives that have been proposed by the Defense Department.

It must be recognized that the type of equipment used by land police when used by personnel on coast guard vessels is insufficient to meet effectively the functions normally entrusted to a coast guard. The mere possession by personnel on vessels of the Maritime Safety Authority of pistols, rifles and other small arms renders this body entirely inadequate in curbing smuggling and the infiltration of hostile and subversive elements into Japan. Additionally, U.S. Naval forces are now heavily engaged in Korea, and are not in a position effectively to supplement the vessels of the Maritime Safety Authority. The FEC policy decision on the Prohibition of Military Activity in Japan and Disposition of Japanese Military Equipment was directed at the prohibition of military arms in Japan with the exception that Japanese police might possess weapons normally used by land police; rifles, pistols, and other small arms. The policy decision evidently envisaged only land police, for whom rifles, pistols, and other small arms would be adequate. Obviously, such armament is entirely inadequate for a coast guard vessel which must be prepared to deal with vessels of superior size and speed. The policy is silent on the question of a coast guard which is a normal part of any state’s law enforcement agencies. Nor was a coast guard considered in the discussions on this paper.

Soviet Reactions

The reaction of the USSR to the establishment of such a force must be considered. It is clear that at the minimum the Soviets would attempt to exploit the propaganda possibilities of the situation, alleging action by SCAP and the United States to arm the Japanese in defiance of the FEC. However, because of the veto power of the U.S. in the FEC, it would not be possible for the Soviets to carry through any formal FEC disapproval of the action. The U.S. position vis-à-vis the Soviets in both the FEC and the propaganda field will, of course, be strengthened to the extent that it is possible to obtain the support of other FEC member nations. This can best be done by consultations prior to taking the action.

The question of the point at which the Soviets might consider that progress on the Japanese treaty and measures for strengthening the defenses of Japan represent such a threat to Soviet objectives in the Far East as to require military counter action against Japan must also be considered. That is, would the establishment by SCAP of a Japanese coastal security force, taken together with all of the other developments in Japan adverse to Soviet objectives, be likely to be the decisive element in a possible Soviet decision to attack Japan in order to forestall further strengthening of Japanese defenses. Now that two U.S. divisions are stationed in Japan, it is not likely that the Soviets would conclude that any type of covert attack by “Japanese volunteers” or other elements could be successful. Therefore, the question should be considered from the standpoint of an overt Soviet attack against U.S. forces in Japan, which, in turn, would unquestionably involve full scale warfare between the U.S. and the USSR. Stated in these terms, it is evident that the Soviet decision to attack Japan could only be considered within the context of a Soviet decision to engage in war against the U.S., and that a small Japanese coastal security force could not but be a very minor element in such a decision. The possibility of the Soviets using the establishment of such a force as possibly one of several pretexts for an attack under conditions which would tend to isolate the U.S. from its allies would, of course, be minimized by the degree to which the U.S. had support for the policy from other FEC member nations.

Reactions of other FEC Members

The development of what might be interpreted as the nucleus of a Japanese Navy might engender opposition on the part of other friendly governments in the FEC so as to prejudice their position on the signature and ratification of the Japanese peace treaty. It is to be expected that such countries as the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and possibly Indonesia and India will be particularly sensitive to any action that could be interpreted as a premature revival of the Japanese navy. While most of these countries have, in connection with negotiation of the Japanese peace treaty, now accepted the principle of eventual Japanese contribution to its own defense, several of them are strongly opposed to other provisions of the treaty. The whole treaty negotiation procedure is now in a very delicate state of balance and there is considerable question as to the number of FEC countries which will accept the invitation to the treaty conference and sign the treaty. In view of this situation any additional factor now introduced in the picture, although in itself of relatively minor importance, might well jeopardize some support which might otherwise be received for the treaty. In view of the short time until the hoped-for signing of the treaty and the magnitude of the issues involved, it does not seem prudent to jeopardize already precarious support for the treaty by some countries with the adoption at this time of a measure such as this which could not, in any event, effectively assist the security of Japan until after the signing of the treaty.

These considerations would be present in a lesser degree following the signing of the treaty at which time all of the countries participating therein would have formally accepted the principle of Japanese contribution to its own defense. It is not thought that the adverse reactions would be strong or jeopardize ratification of the treaty, particularly if there is prior consultation, it is clear that the force would be under the operational control of SCAP, and the inevitable naval connotations are minimized.

Methods of Implementation

Pending further study which is now in progress, it is opinion of the Department that the policy decisions of the FEC remain effective until the treaty of peace with Japan comes into effect. Therefore, any implementation of this policy between the signing and the coming into effect of the treaty of peace must now be considered within the context of the FEC and its policy decisions, any change in which is vetoable by the USSR.

Under the terms of reference of the FEC, the U.S. Government can issue directives to SCAP only in accordance with the policy decisions of the FEC, or interim directives on matters not covered by FEC policy decisions, and all directives must be filed with the FEC. However, by the terms of reference, as well as by precedent, SCAP has very broad executive powers as the sole executive authority for the Allied Powers in Japan, and his acts can formally be questioned only by an FEC member requesting an FEC review of a directive issued or action taken by him involving policy decisions of the Commission. The U.S. is in a position to exercise its veto in the Commission so as to prevent an adverse decision on any such review.

Therefore, while the U.S. Government should not appear to be attempting to avoid responsibility for a decision which is, in fact, its own as well as SCAP’s, it is considered that the policy can probably best be implemented by authorizing and supporting SCAP in the exercise of his executive authority rather than by the issuance of an interim or secret directive. This aspect of the matter should be more fully discussed with the Department of Defense at the time instructions are issued to SCAP.

Consideration will also have to be given at a later date to the tactics of handling publicity and any possible FEC decision of the matter.

It is possible that full consultation with the UK may produce some useful suggestions with regard to both of these problems.

Conclusions

Balancing all of these considerations, FE has reached the conclusion that the following action should be taken:

1. Policy statement of the Department of Defense as amended by the Department should be presented to the President for his approval upon the understanding that it would not be implemented until after the signing of the peace treaty with Japan.

2. Very shortly after the signing of the peace treaty with Japan, the U.S. approach the UK and subsequently other friendly FEC members informing them of the action being taken and seeking their support thereof, if necessary in the FEC.

Recommendations

It is recommended that you approve the attached letter to the Secretary of Defense in the foregoing sense.⁷

1. Memorandum drafted by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared by, among others, Mr. Dulles. Submitted to the Secretary through Francis E. Meloy, Jr., Assistant to the Director of the Executive Secretariat.
2. Secretary Marshall’s letter to Mr. Acheson is not printed.
3. Vice Adm. C. Turner Joy.
4. For documentation with regard to this decision, see Foreign Relations, 1948, vol. vi, pp. 662–663.
5. Enacted April 15, 1948.
6. Of May 17, 1951. For text, see p. 33.
7. Secretary Acheson’s letter of July 20 to Secretary Marshall (also drafted by Mr. Johnson) is not printed. (794.5/4–2651) However, the policy statement therein is quoted entirely, and other elements of the Department’s position are summarized, in the enclosure to Secretary Marshall’s letter of September 4 to Mr. Acheson, p. 1330.